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Abstract 
MOLLY WESTERMAN: Narrating Historians: Crises of Historical Authority in 
Twentieth-Century British Fiction 
(Under the direction of Pamela Cooper) 
 
“Narrating Historians” takes an original and self-consciously interdisciplinary 
approach to debates over the relationship between fiction and history. By shifting the 
emphasis from fictional representations of history (the past) to novels that ventriloquize 
practitioners of history (the discipline), it foregrounds the dual function of scholarly 
discourses as they simultaneously convey knowledge and construct their own authority. 
This study traces a narrative technique that forges telling points of contact between 
narrative fiction and historical authority, a technique that ties novels intimately to 
realities outside their fictions. It embraces the complexity of exchanges between history 
and literature by taking seriously each as a historically-situated way of knowing. 
The project’s selection of literary texts is guided more by the history of historical 
knowledge than by conventional literary-historical categories. Each of the works it 
engages was composed during a period of intense disagreement regarding whether and 
how historians can know the past: the first in the years between the two world wars, and 
again during Margaret Thatcher’s tenure as Prime Minister. Diverse texts, including 
Virginia Woolf’s Orlando, Robert Graves’s I, Claudius, John Fowles’s A Maggot, John 
Banville’s The Newton Letter, Graham Swift’s Waterland, and Simon Schama’s Dead 
Certainties, illustrate how their shared narrative stance supports varying positions on the 
nature of historical knowledge. This dissertation demonstrates not only that the 
dissemination and acquisition of knowledge are situated within and limited by discursive 
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conventions, but also that those conventions enable productive self-reflection within and 
dynamic connections between established ways of knowing. 
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Preface 
 
This dissertation addresses the historical engagements of Virginia Woolf’s 
Orlando: A Biography (1928), Robert Graves’s I, Claudius (1934) and Claudius the God 
(1934), John Fowles’s A Maggot (1985), John Banville’s The Newton Letter (1982), 
Graham Swift’s Waterland (1983), and Simon Schama’s Dead Certainties (Unwarranted 
Speculations) (1991): an eclectic group, in which virtually any generalization requires an 
exception or explanation. Though all were produced by British writers1 during the 
twentieth century, they are far from uniform in aesthetic sensibility, literary-historical 
period, or even genre. Nor do all endorse a similar philosophy of history. What these 
texts share, however, is a feature that implicates them in a discussion of historians and 
their discipline rather than a more abstract consideration of history in the sense of the past 
and how ‘we’ know it. Each is what I will call a historian’s text, which is to say that each 
presents itself (though to varying degrees within a fictional framework) as though it were 
produced by a historian, whether its first-person narrator is a professional historian or its 
third-person narrator sometimes or always takes on what I will characterize as a 
historian’s voice. 
                                                
1 Even this generalization requires explanation. Banville is Irish, a point of much 
significance to his work but little addressed in this dissertation; he is therefore “British” 
insofar as that adjective refers to the British Isles but not in its more specific application 
to Great Britain or the United Kingdom. Schama (though London-born and Cambridge-
educated) moved to the United States in 1980 and wrote Dead Certainties from his 
Harvard post. The significant point for my purposes, however, is that Woolf, Graves, 
Fowles, Banville, Swift, and Schama were all aware of and impacted by the 
historiographic debates at play in British culture between the wars and during the 
Thatcherite period, debates discussed at length in the introduction. 
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By speaking as historians, these texts position their readers imaginatively (and to 
varying degrees actually) as readers of history. The fiction of this stance—the disconnect 
between readers’ role as receivers of these fictional historians’ words and our role as 
readers of the novels sitting before us and clearly labelled Literature/Fiction—makes the 
role of receiver-of-historical-knowledge a self-conscious one. And through this 
complexly layered rhetorical situation, these novels are able to (and indeed in some cases 
cannot help but) participate in debates about the discipline of history even though neither 
they nor the mass of their readers are subject to the procedures and conventions of that 
discipline. In other words, by performing a non-novelistic and widely-accepted mode of 
intellectual authority, these texts connect with and comment upon realities outside their 
fictions. As the introduction discusses in greater detail, the periods of these texts’ 
publication—the years between the two world wars and the Thatcherite era—were times 
when generally accepted and obvious-seeming aspects of historical knowledge and 
history’s authority came under questioning both within and outside the discipline. In this 
study, I argue that the novels I label fictional historians’ texts work to make readers at 
these moments of disciplinary instability more or less skeptical consumers of history, or 
of particular sorts of history—or, torn between the two directions, sometimes shore up 
the discipline’s authority and sometimes kick at its foundations. More broadly, the 
dissertation reflects upon the operation of epistemological authority as it is embedded in 
familiar discourses. Its readings suggest not only that the dissemination and acquisition of 
knowledge are situated within and limited by discursive conventions, but also that those 
conventions enable productive self-reflection within and dynamic connections between 
established ways of knowing. 
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 Most examinations of historical fiction and historiographic metafiction focus on 
texts’ engagements with the historical past and with theories about historical knowledge, 
to the exclusion of the ways in which these fictions interact with disciplinary history and 
its epistemological authority. Because the multiple meanings of “history” are intimately 
intertwined, my concerns overlap often with those of Linda Hutcheon, Amy J. Elias, 
Barbara Foley, and the many authors whose articles I cite in the following chapters. 
Focusing largely on fictions’ borrowings from and contributions to various philosophies 
of history, these critics offer illuminating readings of ways in which twentieth-century 
novels pose and, however tentatively, answer questions such as What does it mean to 
know the past? Can we know the past? What is the ontological status of the past? Yet 
little attention has been paid to the question at the heart of my own project: How do 
pieces of narrative fiction engage the authority of knowledge produced by professional 
historiography and historical pedagogy? In other words, in the midst of so much interest 
in literature’s preoccupation with history (the past), we have overlooked fiction’s 
fascinating engagements with another sort of history: the discipline and its practitioners. 
This dissertation takes seriously the dialogue between history-obsessed fictions and the 
history of disciplinary history. 
 After an introductory chapter providing a more detailed analysis of the workings 
of fictional historians’ texts and of twentieth-century British disciplinary history, the 
dissertation attends first to texts produced between the Great War and the Second World 
War; its final three chapters turn to texts produced during Margaret Thatcher’s tenure as 
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Prime Minister.2 Though these dates are most easily delimited with reference to political 
events, the periods’ real significance to this study lies in their historiographic events—
which are themselves intimately linked to the trauma of the Great War and to 
Conservative efforts in the arenas of school history and the English Heritage movement. 
Between 1918 and 1939, and between 1979 and 1990, polarizing debates raged within 
and (amongst artists, philosophers, and, especially in the later period, the broader public) 
about academic history’s access to historical truth. These debates shape the historical 
engagements of my project’s main texts and are the subject of further discussion in the 
introduction. 
In the two chapters following the introduction, Woolf and Graves serve as 
counterpoints and illustrate the flexibility of the form of the fictional historian’s text. 
Chapter two reads Orlando in the context of writings across Woolf’s career and argues 
that Woolf is never able to endorse or decry Victorian historical authority, unable to 
accept it intellectually or ethically but also unwilling to throw away its very real power. 
On the other hand, the next chapter finds that the Claudius novels demand that readers 
accept Graves’s historical authority as related to that of the discipline, embrace the 
authority of that discipline, but not question Graves’s flagrant divergence from various 
disciplinary traditions, procedures, and conventions. Both Orlando and I, Claudius are 
implicated in the fundamental questioning of historical knowledge that became influential 
                                                
2 Thatcher led the Conservative party beginning in 1975 and served as Prime Minister 
from May 1979 through November 1990. Though Dead Certainties appeared as a book in 
1991, it was at least largely composed and partially published (in Granta 32 and 34, as 
“The Many Deaths of General Wolfe” and “Death of a Harvard Man”) during Thatcher’s 
tenure. 
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in Britain at the time, but the two novels confront history’s mixture of authority and 
uncertainty from wildly differing stances. 
 The dissertation then moves into the 1980s with A Maggot, claiming that this 
novel instructs readers to believe ‘proper historians’ but cannot actually endorse ‘proper 
history,’ trapped in the false dichotomy of total knowledge or total meaninglessness that 
becomes so prevalent in the historical debates of the period. Chapter five pairs two 
novels, The Newton Letter and Waterland, which share an obsession with the intersection 
of gender and history but relate in opposed ways to the then-new field of gender history, 
which approaches gender as historically contingent. While both novels project images of 
ahistorical womanhood, The Newton Letter extends pointed irony to its historian 
narrator’s habit of imagining women outside and in opposition to historical thought. 
Finally, the dissertation closes with a discussion of Dead Certainties, which (with its 
historian author) takes us to the very verge of disciplinary history while still working in 
part as a fictional historians’ text. Reviewers vehemently critiqued Dead Certainties for 
what it says to historians, but my concluding chapter insists that this text (like all the 
project’s texts) actually and importantly directs itself to readers of history, in this case 
training us to take a more active part in interpretation. 
 My hope, of course, is that the chapters prove illuminative of the workings of 
each text under consideration, but my detailed readings of these fictions are also meant to 
make a larger point. By examining a particular narrative technique that engages fictional 
texts in a non-fictional discourse’s and an academic institution’s claims about reality, I 
aim to make apparent the need for attention to novels’ quite concrete and visible 
discursive relationships with other epistemological authorities. Only through careful 
 xi 
attention to the details of a variety of texts can we perceive the elasticity of the fictional 
historian’s text, which cannot help but refer to our reception of a historian’s discourse but 
can do so to a range of effects—to destabilize our trust with recourse to the uncertainty of 
the period, to reinforce a popular audience’s still-powerful faith in the historian’s 
knowledge, or to break down the obvious truth of a particular procedure, convention, 
tradition, or historian while shoring up other aspects or forms of the discipline’s 
authority. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction: 
Narrating Historians in Twentieth-Century Britain 
 
 History as a scholarly discipline—as a specialized and professional mode of 
knowing, supported and restricted by a set of conventions and institutions—has existed 
only since the early nineteenth century. Before that period, literature and history were 
generally viewed as kindred modes of knowing, each addressing a non-specialist 
audience through carefully-styled narratives. The simplest story of history’s history 
would then proceed to a modern historiography influenced by nineteenth-century German 
historian Leopold von Ranke, a scientific history striving to know the past for the past’s 
sake—to describe the past factually rather than turning to it for inspiration for, warning 
to, or validation of the present. Yet history’s history is not simple: historical knowledge is 
produced in multiple forms and traditions at the same time, varying both amongst and 
within nations. And although mainstream professional history is founded upon the 
obviousness of an opposition between reliable historical fact and dubious literary 
embellishment, that obviousness has never quite quelled questioning, uncertainty, and 
alternative approaches both within and in response to the discipline. 
 This dissertation focuses on texts that bring together narrative fiction and 
disciplinary history by speaking historians’ voices or performing historians’ work in a 
fictional context. They do so during two periods when the relationship between historical 
scholarship and literary narrative became particularly contested: in the years between the 
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two world wars, and again during Margaret Thatcher’s tenure as Prime Minister. Rather 
than a particular literary movement, then, this study’s connective tissue is a narrative 
technique, a feature by which certain fictional texts paradoxically engage this academic 
discipline whose mainstream approach throughout the twentieth century has striven to 
sever itself from literary and especially fictional narrative. The following chapters 
concern themselves primarily with Virginia Woolf’s Orlando: A Biography (1928), 
Robert Graves’s I, Claudius (1934) and Claudius the God (1934), John Fowles’s A 
Maggot (1985), John Banville’s The Newton Letter (1982), Graham Swift’s Waterland 
(1983), and Simon Schama’s Dead Certainties (Unwarranted Speculations) (1991). In 
posing as the discourse of a historian, each of these texts implicates itself in its period’s 
divisive debates over the proper audience of disciplinary history, and over the proper 
relationship between that scholarly discourse and storytelling. 
 It is no mere coincidence that the periods of my texts’ production—the years I 
outline below in terms of historical-epistemological rather than literary-aesthetic shifts—
are also, however roughly, the heights of “modernism” and “postmodernism” as my own 
discipline generally employs these terms. Literary modernists including Woolf (the 
subject of chapter two), T. S. Eliot, Ezra Pound, W. B. Yeats, Ford Madox Ford, and D. 
H. Lawrence were influenced by fin-de-siécle philosophies of history,3 the rise of 
professionalism,4 the increasing valuation and authority of scientific as opposed to artistic 
                                                
3 On Eliot and Pound, see Longenbach. On Yeats, Ford, Lawrence, and Pound, see 
Williams. 
 
4 Not only history but also literature and literary criticism professionalized during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For an insightful reading of this development’s 
impact on the literary modernists, see Collier, who distinguishes between, on one hand, 
Eliot’s and Pound’s association of amateurism, commercialism, and prostitution—the 
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forms of knowing, and the horror of the Great War and dread of a sequel—in short, 
influenced by many of the same factors that prompted a disciplinary and extra-
disciplinary shakiness of historical knowledge. Literary postmodernists including Fowles 
(the subject of chapter four), Banville and Swift (of chapter five), Jeanette Winterson, and 
Peter Ackroyd—to name only a handful of British novelists—similarly respond to factors 
in their period’s historical-epistemological shifts within and regarding disciplinary 
history: most notably, the rise of poststructuralist philosophy, a conservative political 
environment, and arguably elitist, racist, and sexist representations of the past as 
treasured English heritage. Many modernist and postmodernist literary productions 
therefore engage questions of the ontological status of the past, what it means (and 
whether it is theoretically and practically possible) to know the past, and who ought to 
have the authority to narrate and interpret the past. Indeed, these engagements have been 
the subject of considerable critical attention in recent decades and have proven 
illuminative of the aesthetics and politics of literary modernism and postmodernism.5 
 Yet, while literary modernism and postmodernism intersect with the concerns of 
this study, my focus remains on how a narrative technique implicates texts in particular 
historical-epistemological debates—and it seems to me that foregrounding literary-
historical categories is more a hindrance than a help to this effort. Here lies my most 
fundamental departure from the excellent work of Linda Hutcheon and Amy J. Elias: 
while these critics strive to understand postmodernist literature’s stance toward the past, 
                                                                                                                                            
devaluing of amateurism and its gendering as feminine—and, on the other hand, Woolf’s 
valuing of amateurism and distaste for a professionalism she saw as commercializing. 
 
5 See for instance Longenbach, Williams, Hutcheon (The Politics of Postmodernism and 
A Poetics of Postmodernism), Elias (Sublime Desire), and Jameson (Postmodernism), in 
addition to countless history-minded studies of individual authors and texts. 
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toward historical existence, and toward a wide variety of modes of narrating both the past 
and being-in-historical-time, my aim is to understand how novels in an age of 
professional history (a period encompassing but certainly not limited to the late twentieth 
century) engage this discipline and bolster, undermine, and/or modify the authority of the 
knowledge it produces.6 It would be problematic at best to define Robert Graves as a 
modernist or Simon Schama as a postmodernist (however often Schama’s critics fling the 
term at him), but a larger problem is even more to the point here: labelling Woolf and 
Eliot “modernists” does not help us see the care with which Woolf reflects upon the 
historical approaches of both the Victorian historians and contemporary artists’ and 
philosophers’ rejections of their narratives and methods. Nor does labelling Winterson, 
Ackroyd, and Swift “postmodernists” help us distinguish between the historical 
questioning of a novel such as Winterson’s Sexing the Cherry (1989) or Ackroyd’s 
Chatterton (1987), on one hand, and that of Waterland, on the other. Yet they differ 
vitally: while Sexing the Cherry and Chatterton focus on the ontology of historical time 
and the relationship between historical existence and human identity, fictional historians’ 
texts—postmodernist or otherwise—foreground the epistemology of historical 
knowledge by dramatizing its formation and transmission. Even viewing a single author 
through the lens of “postmodernism” blurs differences like those I trace in chapter four 
between Fowles’s The French Lieutenant’s Woman (1969) and his later A Maggot. 
 In seeking to illuminate the interactions between fictional historians’ texts and 
disciplinary history, therefore, I have selected and contextualized literary texts in 
                                                
6 Because most works to date on these issues and texts focus on either the ‘modernist’ or 
the ‘postmodernist’ period (or on a single author or novel), I have chosen to engage 
theoretical and critical discussions as they become relevant in each chapter rather than 
including a literature review in the introduction. 
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reference to the history of British historical knowledge rather than according to literary-
historical categories of period or movement. I focus on a handful of narratives that fit into 
two categories, one narratological and one historical: each fictional narrative presents 
itself as though it were produced by a historian, and each was composed during a period 
of intense questioning regarding whether and how historians can know the past. 
Accordingly, this introductory chapter offers preliminary sketches of the narrative stance 
shared by these texts, the nature of these periods of historical-epistemological doubt, and 
the relationships between these narrative techniques and historical conditions. Its first 
section focuses on narrative, analysing the rhetorical situation of fictional historians’ texts 
as the point of contact between the fictions and the extra-disciplinary authority of 
disciplinary history. Its second reads the debates into which the texts’ narrative stances 
throw them, characterizing the history of British historical thought as complex and 
nonlinear in its relationships with popular audiences and literary narrative. By narrating 
historians’ voices outside the boundaries of their discipline, these texts participate in 
debates about and within disciplinary history, dramatizing these debates for an extra-
disciplinary audience. 
 
Historian Narrators and Historians’ Readers 
While all of my main texts are historians’ texts, presenting themselves as though 
they were produced by historians,7 their narrative stances also vary significantly. Most 
                                                
7 Dead Certainties problematizes this category and definition by not just posing as but 
actually being a text produced by a trained, professional historian. Chapter six considers 
the differences and similarities between this historian’s text, which includes some 
fictional discourse and many literary flourishes but presents a historian’s accounts of two 
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obviously, some perform the position of the historian through an intradiegetic narrator 
who is a professional historian, while some employ an extradiegetic narrator who 
sometimes or always takes on a historian’s voice.8 More precisely: Swift and Banville 
explicitly set up historian narrators who are also characters in their stories, Graves both 
has emperor-historian Claudius narrate and himself acts the historian as implied 
translator/editor/author, Schama’s project sits uneasily between history and fiction and 
has a historian author as well as historian characters, Woolf employs an extradiegetic and 
heterodiegetic consciousness positioned variously as historian, biographer, novelist, and 
poet, and Fowles’s narrator acts and speaks as a history teacher presenting students with 
fascinating archival materials. The stance does not require a particular view with regard 
to the possibility or proper form of historical knowledge, as the following chapters 
illustrate with regard to these texts’ complex and contradictory historical-epistemological 
                                                                                                                                            
actual historical events, and the project’s other main texts, which tell more clearly 
fictional stories and were written by novelists rather than historians. 
 
8 The narrators of Orlando, A Maggot, and Dead Certainties (like those of I, Claudius, 
The Newton Letter, and Waterland) are dramatized narrators, constructing their texts and 
interrupting their stories to reflect in the first person on historical periods, historiographic 
problems, and ethical issues. Though extradiegetic and heterodiegetic to the narratives 
they recount, these narrators participate in one level of story through their very acts of 
narrating, and (like I, Claudius’s, Waterland’s, and The Newton Letter’s intradiegetic and 
to varying degrees homodiegetic narrators), they too function as historian figures. In my 
terminology, I here follow Gérard Genette in his objections to the familiar division of 
narratives into the first and third persons; even a “third-person narrator” may sometimes 
use the grammatical first person and in any case writes or speaks from a particular 
perspective and position (244). Furthermore, as Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan explains, 
“Even when a narrative text presents passages of pure dialogue, manuscripts found in a 
bottle, or forgotten letters and diaries, there is in addition to the speakers or writers of this 
discourse a ‘higher’ narratorial authority responsible for ‘quoting’ the dialogue or 
‘transcribing’ the written records” (88). Genette instead distinguishes between 
intradiegetic narrators who inhabit the same level or universe as do the stories they tell 
and extradiegetic narrators who exist on a level separate from (above and encompassing) 
those stories, and between homodiegetic narrators who take part in the stories they tell 
and heterodiegetic narrators who do not.  
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implications. This section and the dissertation as a whole thus explore the flexibility as 
well as the characteristic operation of the historian’s text as a fictional form of historical 
engagement. 
Yet simply by posing as a historian’s text, each of these novels refers not just to 
knowledge of the past but to the production and consumption of disciplinary history: its 
conventions, procedures, and authority. In emphasizing their own narration and 
construction, these texts raise questions about the narration and construction of the 
historical past as ‘we’—readers rather than professional producers of history—know it. 
Moreover, in times of intense debate regarding historical knowledge and its relationship 
to popular, fictional narratives, each text is further implicated by embedding the 
discipline in literary storytelling for an extra-disciplinary audience. This section considers 
some of the intersections of the narrative stance of the fictional historian’s text and the 
historical-epistemological stances of disciplinary history, focusing on their use of 
historians to tell stories that are not quite histories, their presentation of historical 
conventions and concerns as one discourse among many, and the signalling and 
significance of their nonspecialist audiences. 
Historians’ texts speak in the voices of historians but at an angle to their 
discipline, in part by embedding the historians in fictions (or, in the case of Dead 
Certainties, embedding fictions in a historian’s discourse). Whether a historian’s text 
clearly criticizes a given historiographic tradition (as in Orlando), eagerly affirms and 
thereby claims historiographic authority (as in the Claudius novels), or demystifies 
without denouncing disciplinary history (as in Dead Certainties), its narrative stance 
necessarily creates critical distance between its own discourse and that of disciplinary 
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history. As fictions (in whole or in part), these texts are not bound by the conventions and 
procedures of disciplinary history, even as they mimic and perform them. This effect is 
underscored by another feature shared by all the texts: though they take on the role of the 
historian, they ventriloquize not disciplinary histories but the texts historians write when 
they do not or cannot produce conventional scholarly discourse. 
In other words, these texts pose as historians’ texts but not as actual or even 
fictional proper histories. The Orlando narrator cannot settle into writing either a 
historical biography or a novel. Claudius writes I, Claudius as the secret and 
unconventional history he cannot publish during his lifetime, the true supplement to his 
dull and censored public histories; on another level, too, Graves ‘translates’ this 
‘manuscript’ instead of actually translating a historical account as he does in his later 
rendering of Suetonius’s Twelve Caesars. A Maggot’s narrator rarely narrates, offering 
readers something resembling an archive more than a history, and directs us to a question 
about the past that turns out to be impossible to answer: an unwritable history. The 
unnamed historian narrator of The Newton Letter cannot make himself finish his current 
book project, a historical biography of Isaac Newton, and produces a series of letters in 
its place; similarly, Waterland’s narrator Tom Crick delivers a series of lectures to his 
students and readers instead of completing and offering us his History of the Fens. And 
the narrator of Dead Certainties, who seems to speak the voice of Schama himself, 
flagrantly fictionalizes and philosophizes rather than writing a traditional and 
conventionally-documented historical account of the death of General Wolfe or the trial 
of John Webster. These historians, like the fictions of their texts, operate at the contested 
borders between historical and other forms of discourse and understanding. 
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 By dramatizing their historian narrators and drawing attention to the telling of 
their tales, historians’ texts further distance themselves from twentieth-century 
historiography, even as this performance and emphasis are the techniques by which the 
texts engage professional history in the first place. Despite passionate disagreements over 
the nature and pursuit of historical knowledge (the subject of the following section), 
mainstream historical thought of at least the past two centuries exhibits certain 
continuities—particularly with respect to the relationship between the historian and the 
history he or she studies and writes. Enlightenment principles, including the clean 
distinction between knowing subject and object of knowledge, led to historiographic 
conventions that divide the historian’s own historical context and personal commitments 
from the historical account. For instance, the typical structure of a historical monograph 
separates the historian’s actions and interests (the methodological preface) from the 
narrated events; the narration and analysis of historical events avoids the first and second 
person pronouns, promoting a sense of factuality and direct reference rather than 
mediation through the historian, so that readers perceive only the truth about the past and 
a record of documentary support. While the conventions of disciplinary history work to 
erase the historian’s tracks and voice, however, a fictional historian’s text places that 
voice front and center. 
The following chapters explore the many possible effects of this dissonant 
foregrounding. For instance, while the inadequacies of Orlando’s narrator undermine the 
objectivity and inclusiveness of scholarly historical narrative as a whole, the failures of 
Waterland’s narrator as a historian and history-teacher are ultimately attributed more to 
his personal indiscipline and confusion than to limitations inherent to disciplinary history 
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as a way of knowing. But by its basic narrative stance, each text is forced to deal in some 
way with the reality that histories are produced by historians, who are not only authorities 
on the past but also people. None of these narrators is omniscient; the extradiegetic 
narrators are just as emphatically limited in knowledge as the intradiegetic ones. The 
sense that our historian-narrator does not have access to the whole story foregrounds the 
ways in which readers’ access to historical knowledge is often mediated through 
historians and the procedures and conventions of their discipline. Fictional historians’ 
texts thus simultaneously connect to and distance themselves from historical discipline 
not only through the sheer fact of being novels—fictional and extra-disciplinary—spoken 
in historians’ voices, but also through an emphasis on the historian’s voice that runs 
counter to the discipline’s conventions. 
The texts further foreground history’s discursive boundaries and conventions 
(also a focus of the historical-epistemological debates of their times) by juxtaposing 
multiple discourses. Each of the texts analysed in the following chapters borrows from a 
number of discourses, including various traditions within literature and history (and often 
other arenas as well): for instance, in Orlando we encounter fantasy, literary modernism, 
Victorian historical biography, and personal communication, while in A Maggot we meet 
with eighteenth-century literary conventions, journalism, chronicle, and legal and 
religious discourses. Placing historical discourse in the context of other discourses, these 
texts tend to denaturalize the voice of historical-epistemological authority.9 Their mixing 
                                                
9 What I describe here is often labeled interdiscursivity: the mixing of or exchanges 
between what Norman Fairclough describes as “different ways of structuring areas of 
knowledge and social practice” through language (3). The concept of interdiscursivity or, 
perhaps more transparently, discourse mixing can help us apprehend fictions’ various 
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of multiple discourses suggests the constructedness of ‘proper’ historical writing by 
underscoring the multiplicity of available narrative conventions and the impact of style 
upon meaning. Even as it denaturalizes particular historical discourses, however, the 
discourse mixing of historians’ texts also allows them to construct their own 
epistemological authority and make claims regarding a world outside their fictions—the 
world where readers live, in which historians have authority to narrate the past. This 
tension between borrowing and undermining the authority of disciplinary history results 
from the duality inherent in a form that pretends to be but is not a familiar discourse. 
Irresolvable, the tension allows individual historians’ texts to emphasize one side of the 
coin (their faithful reproduction of historical knowledge and discourse, or their ironic 
caricature of it) but not to expel the other. 
Because the texts use the liberties and popular audience of fiction to enter into 
debates about the possibility and nature of historical knowledge, their engagement in 
these debates takes place primarily in the arena of non-historian readers’ reception of 
authoritative historical statements (historians’ knowledge). Though they comment on and 
dramatize the production and transmission of historical knowledge, these novels do not 
teach a specialized audience of historians how to produce histories. Rather, they bridge a 
gap between historians’ practices and extra-disciplinary receivers of history—both as 
philosophers of history and literary theorists, and as novel-readers outside not only 
disciplinary history but also academic disciplines in general. This latter audience is often 
neglected by critics, but the texts nonetheless address a general audience of readers in a 
culture in which historians’ utterances have immense authority in shaping other people’s 
                                                                                                                                            
claims to and forms of aesthetic, moral, and epistemic authority, claims and forms that 
interact but are not necessarily homogenous or uniformly serious, effective, or explicit. 
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understanding of the past, and thus their present senses of all sorts of important things: 
selfhood, nationhood, time, and political priorities and possibilities, for instance. By 
addressing a popular audience as receivers of historians’ authority, knowledge, and 
narratives, fictional historians’ texts engage the periods’ historical-epistemological 
unsteadiness from a significantly different angle from those taken by histories and 
philosophies of history—which generally assume an audience of specialists—and other 
historical and historiographic fictions—which generally raise questions about historical 
knowledge or existence in historical time rather than about the particular mediation of 
historical knowledge through disciplinary history and its practitioners. 
By underscoring the role of historians as arbiters of historical knowledge, these 
novels distinguish between professional spectators in the archive and the rest of us in our 
armchairs or classroom desks. Despite variations in terms of period and degree of 
‘literary’ as opposed to ‘popular’ aspiration, the novels discussed in the following 
chapters all imply a similar audience: we, the novels’ readers, are positioned as receivers 
of historical knowledge who are predisposed to accept historians’ discourse. The texts 
address this nonspecialist receiver of history in part through their broad and unmistakable 
references to the production of historical knowledge—their outright commentary on it, 
their obvious borrowing of historical discourses such as A Maggot’s graphically 
reproduced chronicles, their use of historian narrators and often other historian characters 
as well. Instead of or (less often) in addition to intertextual relationships with particular 
Victorian or modernist histories, these texts invoke whole traditions of historical 
knowledge, writing, and teaching; they require of their readers little detailed knowledge 
of disciplinary history, assuming only the authority of a historian’s position and then 
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working to shore up and/or break down that authority. In other words, though they 
interact intimately with their periods’ historical-epistemological uncertainty, they are 
perfectly intelligible to a reader aware in broad strokes of the historical status quo but not 
of its relatively new unsteadiness within history, philosophy, and the arts. Historians’ 
texts interpret and perform intellectual debates for a broad audience, mediating between 
historians’ discourses and non-historian readers, and drawing attention to the ways in 
which historians mediate between the historical past and non-historians’ perceptions of it. 
This disjunction—between what the implied author knows and what the reader 
can be trusted to know—produces an air of didacticism in each of these texts, although 
the degree and nature of the didacticism vary in telling ways. In Orlando, for instance, 
the implied author is clearly distanced from the narrator through humor, and readers are 
invited to laugh at the narrator’s didacticism (even as we are quite seriously taught 
lessons about historical knowledge and its exclusion of women). In I, Claudius, on the 
other hand, we may suspect the basically sympathetic yet imperfect Claudius, but the 
‘translator’ who introduces and annotates Claudius’s narrative is a transparently 
authoritative rather than a humorous figure. This distinction is in part a function of the 
authors’ perceptions of their positions with regard to disciplinary history and scholarship 
more broadly: whereas Oxford-educated Graves wrote what he saw as completely serious 
factual histories in addition to his poems and novels (and expressed surprised displeasure 
when scholars ignored his arguments), Woolf was excluded from university education 
because of her sex and wrote self-consciously as an outsider. In Orlando as in her many 
reviews of histories and biographies, Woolf addresses non-specialist readers as a non-
specialist reader herself; Graves claims greater authority and knowledge in relation to his 
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readers, and implies far less distance between himself and the organizing consciousness 
of I, Claudius than does Woolf in Orlando. In the first section of this dissertation, these 
two novels can thus help us approach the range of relationships with historical authority 
facilitated by the narrative stance of a fictional historian’s text. 
From their various positions and to their various ends, all of these texts mediate 
between disciplinary history and popular, extra-disciplinary audiences. They do so in part 
by foregrounding the mediation of historical knowledge through historians’ discourse, 
involving themselves in highly contested shifts within the discipline. By performing the 
failures and the constructedness of historical knowledge, these fictions suggest that 
historical production is neither linear nor progressive. In this and other ways, they mirror 
terms of the historical-epistemological debates raging at the times of their publication. 
Their disciplinary context also foregrounds the nonlinearity of historical knowledge; the 
texts and these debates grapple with multiple models and with complex relationships 
between old and new. Furthermore, both the texts and the debates destabilize hard and 
fast oppositions of literature and history, of fiction and fact, without dismissing the 
potential of disciplinary historical knowledge. In the next section, I contextualize and 
begin to analyze the historical-epistemological moments of these historians’ texts, 
focusing on the disciplinary instability that each text reflects and engages. 
 
Challenges to ‘Proper History,’ 1918-39 and 1979-90 
 The fictional historians’ texts I discuss in the following chapters were produced in 
a culture in which epistemological authority resided largely in academic disciplines; 
certainly, historians and the texts they produce are often understood as having special 
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access to the past because of the procedures developed during nineteenth-century 
professionalization, when history became a ‘discipline’ rather than a hobby, a literary 
endeavor, or a form of moral reflection. Simply by approaching questions about historical 
knowledge through the framework of historians, these fictions suggest disciplinary 
history’s authority beyond its own specialists. On the other hand, they appear during two 
markedly unsteady moments in British historical thought, when the historiographic status 
quo came under particularly pointed attack both within the discipline and in the arts, 
philosophy, and public debate: the historical tradition of the Victorian gentleman-scholar 
came under increasingly powerful attack in the early twentieth century (and especially 
between the wars) by professionalized, research-oriented modernist history,10 which itself 
came under attack by a skeptical postmodernist approach11 in the final decades of the 
                                                
10 The term modernist history describes an approach to historical research, writing, and 
pedagogy so entrenched that it is often used interchangeably with the phrase proper 
history (or, more skeptically but equally suggestively, ‘proper’ history). Yet, as Michael 
Bentley points out, the term is little-defined: it describes a mode of knowing and telling 
the past that has become so obvious and common-sensical that it requires no explanation. 
The dating of this historical approach varies significantly as well: while Bentley’s study 
of modernist historiography covers the period from 1870 to 1970, Alan Munslow’s 
definition of modernism extends from the eighteenth-century Enlightenment to the 
present. Like Bentley, I use the term to refer to an outlook and methodology rather than a 
period; my understanding of its rise to prominence in Britain is outlined in this section. 
 
11 As in other areas of intellectual and artistic production, postmodernism in history is 
characterized in part by multiplicity and contradiction: there is no single, easily-defined  
“postmodernist history.” In broad strokes, and like postmodernist philosophies, the 
postmodernist challenge to modernist history critiques “realist epistemological [...] and 
ontological [...] dualisms: the separation of knower and known, observer and observed, 
subject and object, form and content, and fact [...] and value” (Munslow 189). 
Postmodernist historians, and historians influenced by without fully embracing 
postmodernist approaches, pay attention to the selection and rhetoric involved in 
historiography, rather than accepting the modernist view of writing as transparent 
reporting; they question the simplicity or stability of the relationship between narrative 
and past event. In its extreme form, postmodernism may reimagine history as “no longer 
an empirical enterprise but simply a variety of fiction that is wholly dependent upon self-
 16 
twentieth century. 
These shifts were far from linear. During both periods, ‘proper,’ ‘obvious’ modes 
of knowing and telling the past became less obvious and less opaque to history’s various 
audiences, in response to changes in the political world, in the arts, in philosophy, and in 
history-writing. And these challenges did not simply overthrow or propose separate 
alternatives to but also interacted with and modified the natural way of knowing the 
past—‘proper history’ itself. The postmodernist critique of modernist history, for 
instance, both includes the return of certain elements of Victorian historiography (its 
emphasis on narrative, style, and non-specialist audiences) and prompts its own critics to 
champion the old-fashioned virtues of Victorian historiography (particularly its belief in 
progress and the excellence of England).12 This section therefore charts a history of 
overlapping and competing modes of historical thought in which earlier constructions can 
lurk in the background or turn to extra-disciplinary venues, sometimes returning to vie 
with now-established traditions. It portrays nineteenth- and twentieth-century history-
writing in Britain as a series of overlapping approaches that became more or less 
dominant in response to various events within disciplinary history and in British culture 
                                                                                                                                            
referentiality for its meaning” (189). But in practice, postmodernist history more often 
involves a shift from Truth to truths, a self-consciousness about perspective and 
methodology, and a loss of modernist confidence in the ultimate accessibility of the truth 
about the past. 
 
12 As Bentley argues, “the whigs did not die” (Modernizing 7): they may have “lost the 
commanding heights of the academic economy to hard-nosed professionals,” but they 
continued writing, moving “from glorious pronouncement […] towards a form of 
distressed criticism, as though trying to remind the new culture that it owed something to 
the past’s legacies. […] The view that historians needed to write about Life and ought to 
get one of their own in order to do so has survived into the era of the tele-don, as has the 
notion that books are for reading by a wide audience rather than for reference purposes 
among a self-sealing elite” (8). These ideas receive further attention in the final pages of 
this chapter. 
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and politics, rather than as a story of approaches following one after the other. 
By understanding some of the many factors that shaped the resulting historical-
epistemological clashes, we can better apprehend the relationship between fictional 
historians’ texts and the authoritative though contested historians’ discourse they harness. 
Significantly for my purposes, these two periods of historical-epistemic instability share 
intense concern over the role of narrative in shaping historians’ and readers’ 
understandings of the historical past, and over the proper audience of historical writing. 
These patterns clarify why fiction-writers might approach this academic discipline in the 
first place, and what it is about the discipline that opens it up to such engagements. 
History’s intimate though sometimes rocky relationship with narrative opens the 
discipline to novelistic treatments and helps explain not only the popularity of realist 
historical fiction but also the existence of fictional historians’ texts, in which ‘historians’ 
tell us stories. The broad appeal of the discipline’s basic subject matter (even during 
periods when its practitioners tend toward highly technical and densely footnoted prose) 
also invites attention from novels aimed at a popular audience. 
 My story begins during the nineteenth century, when history (like so many other 
scholarly fields) began a process of professionalization that resulted in the specialized 
academic discipline we know today, with its considerable collection of conventions and 
institutions. The Victorian historical field grew out of (partly continuing, partly in 
opposition to) a variety of inherited traditions: Classical historiography, which 
constituted a branch of literature based primarily on eyewitness testimony and (in 
recounting older events) the accounts of earlier historians, and chiefly concerned with 
political events; medieval chronicles; the Renaissance’s emerging secularism; and most 
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immediately Enlightenment historiography, with its emphasis on progress in historical 
development as well as in historical knowledge, its increasing concern with causality, and 
its split between detail-oriented, source-gathering “antiquarians” and narrative- and 
philosophy-oriented “historians.”13 In European and American historiography, the shift to 
a professionalized, “scientific” history is usually dated to the contributions of German 
historian Leopold von Ranke, which spanned much of the nineteenth century. British 
historiography developed rather differently, however, because of a hesitant and uneven 
adoption of these new European methodologies and institutions. Here, the rise of 
modernist history—as a professionalized discipline requiring methodological training and 
committed to objective knowledge of the past based on critical evaluation of primary 
sources—was neither rapid nor steady. 
In Britain, nineteenth-century historiography remained dominated by the 
gentleman scholar; the modernist model of a university-trained and university-employed 
professional historian prevailed over Victorian traditions only in the twentieth century. 
Furthermore, the field did not simply follow a slow but still linear path to a highly 
specialized, insular, professional discipline. Instead, a competing (and arguably more 
prominent) nineteenth-century development for history in Britain was the subject’s 
increasing public importance, as evidenced by the remarkable popularity of works by 
Thomas Babington Macaulay, Thomas Carlyle, James Anthony Froude, and J. R. Green. 
While from mid-century onwards some British historians (notably William Stubbs) 
turned critical attention to sources and bias, emphasizing accuracy and objectivity, a great 
                                                
13 This synopsis does inexcusable violence to the diversity of historical thought and 
writing in these long periods, in an effort to provide a concise background for the 
historiographic issues most relevant to my argument. For more nuanced overviews of 
these periods, see Bentley (Companion) and Breisach. 
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deal of historical writing remained accessible to amateur writers and readers. A still-
vigorous generalist, literary tradition of historiography coexisted with this emerging, 
more narrowly specialist, scientific one. The tradition labeled and critiqued in the 
interwar period as the “whig interpretation of history” was famously influential in the 
Victorian era; Herbert Butterfield introduced the term in 1931 to describe a historical 
approach tending “to emphasise certain principles of progress in the past and to produce a 
story which is the ratification if not the glorification of the present” (v).14 These 
teleological grand narratives of (overwhelmingly English) history stand in obvious 
contrast to a nineteenth-century modernist drive to scientific history and its value of 
historical facts for their own sake. They represent a tradition of English history as stirring 
popular narrative—as literature rather than as science—that would be driven largely 
outside the profession during the twentieth century but remains influential and productive 
even today. 
At Cambridge and Oxford, history joined the ranks of the university’s 
undergraduate fields in 1848 and 1850, respectively. But as T. W. Heyck argues, these 
programs were not designed to produce professional historians, for the simple reason that 
in mid-century England “there was no independent historical profession” (131); rather, 
the assumption remained that “it takes a good man rather than a specially trained expert 
to write good history” (131). In Heyck’s account, English history became 
                                                
14 Butterfield’s thesis has been influential but also criticised. Some critics complain that 
The Whig Interpretation of History is unfairly critical of the Whig historians (because not 
just they but all writers bring their preconceptions and politics to the past; or because 
their work is judged to have other merits outshining the deficit of politics, presentism, 
and teleology; or in protest of the assumption that Whiggish faith in progress and 
parliamentary government is a bad thing). Others critique the volume as vague, 
contradictory, or unrealistic in its methodological advice. For critical approaches to The 
Whig Interpretation, see for instance Windschuttle and Patterson. 
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professionalized in the final decades of the nineteenth century, by 1900 adopting methods 
including specialization, the division of labor, and critical use of sources from the 
sciences—both directly and through the German historians already moving toward a 
scientific history (138). Yet, while an identifiable trend by the turn of the century, the 
shift in qualifications that would so alter mainstream historiography—from a historical 
scene dominated by the popular and colorful progress narratives of gentleman scholars to 
one dominated by seminar-trained researchers in the archives—was far from complete or 
uncontested. 
The discipline’s formative pedagogical approach—the seminar, in which small 
groups of students perform research and learn document analysis for archival work—was 
initiated by Ranke in the 1820s or 30s (Smith 105-6), but British historical culture was 
reluctant to change. Bonnie Smith points out that in the 1880s, when seminars were 
firmly established in history programs in the United States and continental Europe, 
English students were still travelling to Germany for such training (114). Similarly, the 
doctorate of philosophy became available in Germany (first at Friedrich Wilhelm 
University) around mid-century and in the US (beginning with Yale) in 1861—but 
England’s universities debated the possibility of such a degree without actually offering it 
until the decade following the Great War (Kenyon 189). Differences in historical training 
had several significant implications: the requirements for teaching university-level 
history were necessarily different in England than in Germany and the US, the distinction 
between professional and amateur historians remained less absolute for a longer period, 
the place of detailed footnotes and archival work shifted only slowly from antiquarian 
amateurism to the center of the discipline, and narrow specialization imposed itself with 
 21 
far less institutional force in the British nineteenth and early twentieth centuries than in 
the same period’s Continental and American historical professions. 
These tensions came to a head in the first part of the twentieth century. Especially 
in the period after the Great War, a divide between amateur and professional historian—
emergent but weak at the turn of the century—became rigid and increasingly 
marginalized grand narratives and popular audiences. The English historical profession’s 
major institutions shifted: while its London base into the twentieth century stood in 
contrast to the increasingly university-centered and systematized training of Continental 
and American history, this period markedly changed both the nature of the London 
institutions and the scarcity of university-affiliated institutions. For instance, while 
London’s Royal Historical Society and English Historical Review were founded in 1868 
and 1886, respectively, only in 1922 did an English university form “an equivalent 
society and an equivalent periodical”: the Cambridge Historical Society and its 
Cambridge Historical Journal (Kenyon 164). In the first quarter of the twentieth century, 
the Royal Historical Society itself became increasingly professionalized, shifting “from a 
semi-recreational society catering for cultivated amateurs with a spare-time interest in 
history to a fully academic organization confined to university staff and those others who 
could provide evidence of professional skills by publication” (195). The interwar period 
was characterized not by a straightforward shift to professionalized history, however, but 
by many forms of change and uncertainty with regard to historical knowledge—both 
within and outside the discipline. 
The war brought to a head multiple strains of epistemological skepticism and 
methodological change that had begun to impact pre-war thought, as Nietzschean 
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questioning and a drive toward science-like factuality became simultaneously influential. 
If, as Butterfield argues, historians had previously been “the very model of the 19th 
century gentleman” (3-4), perceptions of traditional history were bound to be affected by 
many people’s belief that Victorian gentlemen and their values had needlessly 
condemned young men to be maimed and killed. And as Hayden White recounts, the war, 
which “seemed to confirm what Nietzsche had maintained two generations earlier,” 
undermined the subject’s nineteenth-century claims to authority: “History, which was 
supposed to provide some sort of training for life, [...] had done little to prepare men for 
the coming of the war” (36). For many modern artists, thus, history seemed “not only a 
substantive burden imposed upon the present by the past in the form of outmoded 
institutions, ideas, and values, but also the way of looking at the world which gives to 
those outmoded forms their specious authority” (White 39).15 Here, White emphasizes 
the sense of doubt that followed the war, pointing to modernist literary representations of 
historians as “the extreme example of repressed sensibility” (31). Alongside these 
spiritually-dead or deadly boring historian figures, though, we must also acknowledge the 
very different approach of novels as otherwise diverse as Orlando and I, Claudius. As 
their treatments of their historian narrators demonstrate, even fictions engaged with 
                                                
15 Longenbach offers evidence for this view in the modernists’ own words, though he 
complicates an understanding of postwar modernism as simply anti-historicist. After 
experiencing the war, for instance, Ford Madox Hueffer wrote: “If, before the war, one 
had any function it was that of historian. Basing, as it were, one’s morality on the Europe 
of Charlemagne as modified by the Europe of Napolean. I once had something to go 
upon. One could approach with composure the Lex Allemannica, the Feudal System, 
problems of Aerial Flight, or the price of wheat or the relations of the sexes. But now, it 
seems to me, we have no method to approach any of these problems” (qtd. in 
Longenbach 9); Wyndham Lewis saw the opposition to Germany as a strike against “the 
interference of the past” and continues, “Europe to-day dislikes history. It is not one of 
her subjects. The past is a murderous drug [...]” (qtd. in Longenbach 9). 
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historical-epistemological questions could still posit enormous authority in disciplinary 
history’s representations of the past. Non-historians, as artists and as readers of histories, 
responded diversely to the interwar uncertainty of history’s capacity and purpose. 
For historians, too, the war combined with other changes to alter historical 
thought. As Bentley summarizes, “The empire shaken in 1902, the lives lost after 1914, 
the transformed culture after 1918, the sheer acceleration of ideas of time and space, the 
leap forward in technology” all posed a challenge to established historical conventions 
(Modernizing 15). In Smith’s transnational view of the fin-de-siécle through inter-war 
years, disciplinary history “seemed to pull in multiple directions, moved less by 
consensus than by controversy” (213); these strains were comparatively limited in British 
historiography until the interwar period when, most obviously, a Victorian faith in the 
progress of civilization stood in stark contrast to the horrors of trench warfare. 
Longenbach argues that, unlike their German counterparts, English historians “remained 
relatively uninterested in the philosophical speculation about the nature of history” until 
the war “gave a more concrete reality to what had previously been purely theoretical 
problems,” prompting British historians, philosophers, and artists to rethink the values 
and procedures through which we know the past. Cultural, political, and intellectual 
events and developments joined together in interwar Britain to produce a wildly varied 
landscape for historical writing and its reception. 
In the 1930s, historians and philosophers such as Carl Becker, Charles Beard, R. 
G. Collingwood, and Benedetto Croce16 placed the very possibility of objective history-
writing under question (Munslow 165) at the same time as many historians threw 
                                                
16 This list suggests the international character of antipositivist thought between the wars; 
Becker and Beard were American, Collingwood British, and Croce Italian. 
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themselves into an emphatically modern and scientific pursuit of historical facts for 
historical facts’ sake. Longenbach correctly notes that twentieth-century historiography 
questioned “the presuppositions about the nature of historical knowledge that make the 
construction of any sort of teleological or even linear history possible” (6). Yet Bentley is 
also accurate in reminding us both that most British historians “continued to affirm the 
whig idea of progress” (Modernizing 81) and that many turned in this period from a 
Victorian legacy toward a history “drained of its colour and picturesqueness [...] but 
charged with a new sense of reality and legitimated by procedures quite as rigorous as 
those found at the Cavendish Laboratory” (15). Furthermore, as I argue with regard to 
Virginia Woolf in chapter two, many extra-disciplinary readers and writers of history 
struggled to choose between or reconcile, on one hand, a Victorian historiographic 
inheritance and, on the other, the philosophical-artistic flight from history associated with 
Friedrich Nietzsche’s 1874 essay “The Use and Abuse of History” and James Joyce’s 
description of history, in the mouth of Stephen Dedalus, as “a nightmare from which I am 
trying to awake” (34). Compared even to the significant methodological disagreements of 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the interwar period of British historical 
thought and of non-historians’ (especially artists’ and philosophers’) perceptions of 
history were beset by uncertainty and contradiction. 
 Both Victorian and modernist approaches to history survived the intense 
epistemological doubt of the early twentieth century and of its two world wars. The 
Victorian tradition of colorful narrative histories appealing to non-specialist readers 
persevered despite modernist disdain for it. Indeed, dissonance between scientific 
historians and (often amateur) historians of sweeping narratives continued throughout the 
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1940s, ’50s, and ’60s, alongside quite meaningful divergences amongst various 
modernist schools of history. Yet modernist history as a general approach to historical 
research, writing, and teaching had become so entrenched as to seem transparent—so 
much so that “modernist history” and “proper history” would soon be (and still are) used 
as interchangeable terms. Even debates between two university historians from deeply 
opposed ideological or methodological perspectives would ‘obviously’ operate within 
modernist notions of evidence—critically-evaluated archival materials and, in an 
ancillary role, ‘secondary’ sources—and qualifications—postgraduate training, academic 
publication, and a university post. Modernism’s obviousness would be shaken, though its 
methodology has yet to be fundamentally unsettled, in the 1970s, ’80s, and ’90s of 
postmodernist theory and Thatcherite politics. 
 The second section of this dissertation addresses texts produced during Margaret 
Thatcher’s tenure as Prime Minister: The Newton Letter, Waterland, A Maggot, and Dead 
Certainties. As chapter four describes in greater detail, these decades were home to a 
number of highly divisive and related conflicts over historical knowledge within British 
politics, popular culture, art, philosophy, and disciplinary history—debates characterized 
by a deep sense of the meaningfulness and power of the past, and simultaneously a deep 
doubt regarding the accessibility and nature of historical truth. At the same time as the 
heritage movement and its opponents rose in prominence, ‘The Great History Debate’ 
questioned the proper nature and purpose of history in the schools, and postmodernist 
thought extended its reach beyond philosophy and literary studies to critique the widely-
accepted objectivity of modernist history. Margaret Thatcher’s desire to return to 
Victorian values expressed itself in part through a historical imagination that was itself in 
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many ways Victorian: a confident narrative approach emphasizing political history, the 
greatness of Great Britain, and (somewhat paradoxically, given the narrative’s nostalgia) 
progress. Her government passed the National Heritage Acts of 1980 and 1983 and 
presided over the re-evaluation of school history, with Thatcher herself promoting a 
kings-and-queens version of history quite foreign to modernist—let alone 
postmodernist—historical practices (Phillips 51). As in the interwar period, a whole 
collection of only loosely-connected scholarly, political, and artistic developments 
collaborated in Thatcherite Britain to produce a period of intra- and extra-disciplinary 
questioning about the possibility and proper methodology of historical knowledge. 
 In addition to this shared uncertainty and multiplicity, the debates of the 
Thatcherite period echo those of the interwar period in their content: while postmodernist 
challenges to historiography fundamentally challenged the modernist model, the 
Thatcherite period was also a time when nineteenth-century historical traditions retained 
and even regained meaningful cultural authority, particularly for an extra-disciplinary 
audience. As Bentley claims, “the postmodern world has in some ways encouraged the 
rubber ball to resume its bouncing in the direction of history as meaning, story-telling, 
communicating with a wide general audience” (Modernizing 115), even as postmodernist 
(far more fundamentally than modernist) history has discredited singular and teleological 
narratives “of the kind that the Victorian whigs had offered” (115). In both the interwar 
and Thatcherite periods, and indeed to varying degrees throughout the twentieth century 
and into the twenty-first, we find passionate defenses of and attacks upon Victorian 
historical traditions and particularly the practice of history as popular, literary narrative. 
Cutting across the various historiographic and historical-pedagogical debates of 
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the later period—the arguments over school history, the influence of postmodernist 
philosophy and literary theory, and popular representations of the English past as heritage 
in political rhetoric, films, museums, and other media—was this dual desire for and 
suspicion of historical narratives, of stories as a way we can know and tell the past. 
Bentley associates the unsettling of modernism’s hegemony in the 1970s and 1980s with 
a desire to reach non-specialist audiences through readable (or, increasingly, watchable) 
narratives: 
Historians began to seek new audiences—the ones that modernism had so 
significantly failed to touch. [This shift] involved historians from a 
widening background of experience who worked in institutions quite 
different from the ones modernists had known. It gave rise to new journals 
and popular magazines and television programmes […]. Among the 
younger historians now known to the public for their skills in 
communication we detect nothing so much as a new whiggery. Stories 
have returned, footnotes have thinned or disappeared, history has relocated 
itself as a literary and visual medium. (Modernizing 220-1) 
 
In the later period’s dissonance over the role of story in history, we can hear echoes of the 
emerging modernist historians’ interwar complaints about their whig predecessors, and of 
(largely amateur) narrative historians’ and biographers’ complaints about the modernists 
who had soon marginalized storytelling and interest in readers’ pleasure.17 And although 
Bentley warns against attributing modernism’s decreasing authority to something “so trite 
(and often meaningless) as the arrival of ‘postmodernism’” (220), postmodernist 
philosophy has prompted many historians to acute awareness of the role of narrative in 
                                                
17 As Heyck recounts, “The tradition of ‘amateur’ historical writing directed at a general 
audience did not die out; indeed, it has remained more vital in England than elsewhere in 
modern Europe or America. Nevertheless, the new professional history had become more 
important in volume and intellectual authority than the older Victorian style. […] By their 
research orientation and their sense of their legitimate audience, the professional 
historians cut themselves off from the general reading public to a remarkable degree. This 
meant that the professional historians gave up the position of immense public esteem held 
by earlier Victorian historians” (150). 
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historical knowledge, and to experiments with narrative form. 
 By rejecting the modernist view of historical knowledge as progressive and 
potentially exhaustive, postmodernist philosophers of history including White, Michel de 
Certeau, and Michel Foucault support an anti-stadialist understanding of history’s history 
such as the one I offer here.18 Through gestures of intellectual inheritance, they also 
perform the layered and nonlinear history of historical thought. Foucault’s 1971 essay 
“Nietzsche, Genealogy, and History,” for instance, troubles a progress narrative of 
historical knowledge on multiple levels: most obviously, it attacks the very notion of 
progress and knowledge. But it also stands as evidence for a nonlinear interpretation of 
history’s history, through its own twentieth-century endorsement of Nietzsche’s 
nineteenth-century position. Foucault’s essay thus reminds us that one strain of historical-
epistemological doubt in late-nineteenth-century Europe (and early-twentieth-century 
Britain) bears striking resemblance to the later, postmodernist, critique; indeed, 
Nietzsche’s “On the Use and Abuse of History” echoes through many postmodernist 
reflections on history. The shared critique reminds us that the confidant modernist move 
from colorful Grand Narrative to scientific knowledge of the past occurred alongside a 
fundamental suspicion of knowledge, objectivity, and reason. 
It also reveals that modernist historians adopted some of the Victorian historians’ 
most basic assumptions, even as they saw themselves as breaking definitively from their 
                                                
18 My account follows the postmodernists’ emphasis on history’s discursive conventions 
and changing epistemological assumptions, joining them in viewing historical inquiry 
and other forms of knowledge as constructed rather than given. In thus privileging certain 
postmodernist insights, I do not mean to posit this approach to historical knowledge as 
somehow outside or above the discipline’s history. Rather, this dissertation historicizes 
postmodernist as well as Victorian and modernist historical traditions as objects of 
inquiry, in terms of their representation within and shaping of fictional historians’ texts. 
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predecessors’ way of knowing the past. Foucault describes “traditional history” or “[t]he 
historian’s history” (152) as a teleological approach premised upon “objectivity, the 
accuracy of facts, and the permanence of the past” (158)—a critique that encompasses 
not just a specific tradition within historiography but centuries of competing traditions. 
Despite their marked differences, both Victorian Grand Narratives and the modernist 
stance share those Enlightenment assumptions; Foucault’s critique—and the very fact 
that he can seamlessly borrow it from someone writing a century earlier—underscores 
these traditions’ shared faith in objectivity and progress. Despite his privileging of 
discontinuity, Foucault’s essay thus presents historical knowledge as a series of 
overlapping and connected approaches. Similarly, the essay suggests that the 
postmodernist turn against modernism draws on modernist thought: modernism’s will to 
knowledge threatens the assumptions of modernism. It is history’s own methodology that 
can dismantle traditional history and lead us to a history of accident, rupture, and 
domination. Historical thought, after all, has the potential to resituate “within a process of 
development everything considered immortal in man” (153), including premises vital to 
mainstream nineteenth- and twentieth-century history alike: the unified self, reason, 
objectivity, temporality.19 These concepts came under question during both the inter-war 
and the Thatcherite periods, as those mainstream historical approaches became less stable 
and transparent. 
                                                
19 Foucault claims that a history of reason and knowledge—including, presumably, a 
history of disciplinary history—will show “that it was born in an altogether ‘reasonable’ 
fashion—from chance; devotion to truth and the precision of scientific methods arose 
from the passion of scholars, their reciprocal hatred, their fanatical and unending 
discussions, and their spirit of competition—the personal conflicts that slowly forged the 
weapons of reason” (142). While my view of scholarship is not quite so violent, this 
perception is played out (in a more nuanced, concrete, and even-handed fashion) in 
Smith’s The Gender of History, which informs chapter five. 
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 Yet as Bentley’s comments also suggest, while the historical-epistemological 
debates of the early and late twentieth century shared concerns, they were far from 
identical—in part because they played out in significantly different arenas. Passionate 
statements of doubt regarding and energetic disagreements over historical knowledge and 
methodology were, in the 1920s and ’30s, largely confined to a scholarly or artistic elite 
and little-present in popular media such as newspapers. In contrast, the contestations of 
the 1970s, ’80s, and ’90s raged in newspapers and magazines as well as in scholarly 
journals and books within disciplinary history, education, philosophy, and literary 
studies. The shift to a broader public debate resulted in large part from the expansion of 
higher education and the explosion of the mass media between the two periods. 
The history of the British Broadcasting Corporation illustrates the latter trend as 
an important (though far from the sole relevant) example. Formed in 1922,20 the BBC 
rapidly expanded its radio broadcasting to nearly-national coverage during the following 
four years. It began experimental television broadcasts in 1929 and launched the BBC 
Television Service21 in 1932, again rapidly expanding from a tiny broadcast area to reach 
approximately twenty thousand homes by the beginning of the Second World War—and 
then approximately twenty million viewers22 for the 1953 coronation of Queen Elizabeth 
II (“Sound”). In 1964 the BBC launched its second television station, BBC2, in a first 
                                                
20 As the British Broadcasting Company; it became the British Broadcasting Corporation 
in 1927. 
 
21 The station was known as the BBC Television Service until 1960, when it became BBC 
tv; upon the 1964 launch of BBC2 the station was renamed BBC1. 
 
22 While this figure dwarfs the number of television sets owned in Britain at the time 
(because many people gathered to view the broadcast at neighbors’ homes or in public 
places), it illustrates the rise of television as a popular medium; indeed, the experience 
prompted many people to purchase television sets. 
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step toward the niche programming that would make possible today’s television 
documentaries and specialized stations—including, of course, BBC History. The ever-
expanding mass media and its increasing attention to niche publishing and broadcasting 
also created new venues for the distribution of historical narratives to a general audience. 
History Today (which now describes itself as “the world’s premier, and probably the 
oldest, history magazine” [“About”]) was launched in 1951, for example, and historian A. 
J. P. Taylor gave the first of his popular televised lectures in 1957 (Collini 380-1). The 
history of the BBC also offers glimpses of the expansion of the British university system: 
in 1971, BBC radio and television stations began broadcasting Open University 
programs, initiated by a Labour government seeking to democratize already-rapidly-
expanding higher education—and by 1980, 70,000 students were enrolled (“History”). 
More likely to be university-educated and therefore to view themselves as qualified to 
opine about scholarly matters, with access to a far more diversified mass media whose 
specialized organs covered historical debates, and increasingly connected to political 
controversies and decisions through radio and television coverage, a larger segment of 
the British population participated in the historical-epistemological contention of the 
Thatcherite period than in its interwar forebear. 
 The two sections of this dissertation thus play out in similar-but-different 
contexts. They engage disciplinary history at moments when doubt leads to acute 
awareness of a particular historical form’s constructedness and contingency, and to 
attempts to produce either a more transparent form or a more self-consciously and 
honestly constructed one. Yet in addressing an audience outside the discipline, these texts 
are significantly impacted by the shifting relationship between professional historians and 
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popular audiences. The history of British history, especially from the perspective of an 
extra-disciplinary audience, is far from stadial or teleological: the following chapters 
work to account for echoes and distinctions between these two periods, coexisting strains 
within each period, and the unresolved and perhaps irresolvable tensions that drive both 
the historical-epistemological debates and the fictional narratives analyzed here. During 
periods of disciplinary instability, these historians’ texts harness points of contact 
between the discourse of professional historians and the knowledge and values of non-
historian readers. Through a shared narrative stance, they promote significantly varying 
ends, identifying different points of contact through their different assessments both of 
their readers’ competence and of the various challenges to historical authority. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Acts of Inheritance: 
Virginia Woolf, Orlando, and the Impossible Legacy of Victorian Historiography 
 
“The complete Insider”—I have just coined this term to express my 
feelings toward George Trevelyan; who has just been made Master of 
Trinity: whose history of England I began after tea [...]. Insiders write a 
colourless English. They are turned out by the University machine. I 
respect them. Father was one variety. I dont love them. I dont savour 
them. Insiders are the glory of the 19th century. They do a great service 
like Roman roads. But they avoid the forests & the will o the wisps. 
   - The Diary of Virginia Woolf (333) 
 
 As the preceding chapter establishes, the history of the British historical 
profession troubles simple periodization or a linear narrative of scholarly progress; 
multiple methodologies and epistemologies have overlapped and interacted. And even 
more markedly than its professional cousin, popular British history has followed many 
crossing and sometimes recursive paths. These categories provide a necessary 
background for understanding Virginia Woolf’s engagements with historical knowledge 
and its authority—yet how inadequate they prove even in the face of a snippet from her 
diary. In the handful of sentences from a 1940 entry that serve as this chapter’s epigraph, 
Woolf describes a historical-epistemological inheritance that obeys the laws not only of 
chronology but of sex and privilege: G. M. Trevelyan was only six years older than 
Woolf herself, and his History of England was published not in the nineteenth century but 
in 1926, but Woolf nonetheless aligns him with her father rather than with herself. These 
Cambridge-educated men are insiders, Romans, “the glory of the 19th century,” 
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regardless of dates. And even in pointing out their failings, Woolf acknowledges their 
“great service,” their practical and lasting contribution. 
In turning to Woolf’s works, the present chapter offers an extended example of 
the nonlinearity of historical knowledge through the writings of a woman who occupied a 
peculiar space between insider and outsider, between professional and amateur23—and 
who insisted on the higher value of amateurism and outsider perspectives without 
neglecting the power of the insiders, their credentials, and their facts. It enriches and 
complicates the introduction’s preliminary sketch of the historiographic terrain traversed 
by literary texts, by considering an author whose aesthetics and politics blur lines: 
between what I have termed Victorian and modernist history, for instance, and between 
novelistic and historical representations of the past. The methodological shifts of the late 
Victorian and especially modernist periods within the British historical field are far less 
important from Woolf’s perspective than certain continuities across these periods’ 
mainstream historical approaches: continuities of sexism, and of attention to external 
facts at the expense of internal experiences. In one sense, Trevelyan soon became an 
outsider to the mainstream of his discipline, spending a long and productive twentieth-
                                                
23 The distinction between amateur and professional is important to Woolf and plays a 
role in Orlando. Patrick Collier traces how male modernists perpetuated the traditional 
association of amateurism, commercialism, and prostitution—the devaluing of 
amateurism and its gendering as feminine—and presents, in contrast, Woolf’s valuing of 
amateurism, disgust with professionalism and association of it with commercialism. Also 
usefully, he explains that “For Woolf, professional can connote being certified by 
university credentialing to explain and critique literature; it can also attach to popular 
critics such as Arnold Bennett, who adopted a declamatory, authoritative, professorial 
tone even though they lacked a university education. Professionalism is above all a state 
of mind marked by an excessive emphasis on income, authority, or reputation. The 
professional pose lends what Woolf saw as a specious authority to the critics and 
professors who mediate between the artist and the audience […]” (378). Yet Woolf herslf 
was, of course, a professional writer. 
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century career writing histories in the Victorian tradition; many of his modernist 
colleagues reviled as whiggish and old-fashioned this popular, literary style that 
privileged imagination and engagement over scientific objectivity. And yet he remained 
an insider from Woolf’s extra-disciplinary and female perspective, backed as he was by 
the enormous public authority of Victorian historiography, a Cambridge education, and a 
university post. In contrast, as she so often points out, Woolf was an outsider as a woman, 
excluded from historical authority and allowed little formal education—despite her 
position as a member of an economic and cultural elite. 
 The diary entry was not the first time Woolf used Trevelyan to represent 
university historians and their limiting insider perspective; his figure also helps her plot 
out mixed desire for and repulsion from insider status in her 1929 A Room of One’s 
Own.24 Here, Woolf critiques Trevelyan’s History of England—standing in for scholarly 
history in general—for its near-total omission of women: “Occasionally an individual 
woman is mentioned, an Elizabeth, or a Mary; a queen or a great lady. But by no possible 
means could middle–class women with nothing but brains and character at their 
command have taken part in any one of the great movements which, brought together, 
constitute the historian’s view of the past” (2115). Rather than simply rejecting “the 
historian’s view of the past” for that of the novelist, anthropologist, or mythographer, 
however, Woolf’s narrator makes a strangely roundabout proposal to the women of 
Newnham and Girton Colleges: 
                                                
24 For more on Woolf’s uses of Trevelyan, see Karin Westman’s reading of “Friendships 
Gallery” as parody of his historical approach (“First Orlando” 47-9) and Hotho-Jackson’s 
reading of Trevelyan as an example of continuity between nineteenth- and twentieth-
century historiography: a continuity she sees as vying with literary-modernist rupture in 
Woolf (294-5). 
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It would be ambitious beyond my daring, I thought, looking about the 
shelves for books that were not there, to suggest to the students of those 
famous colleges that they should rewrite history, though I own that it often 
seems a little queer as it is, unreal, lop–sided; but why should they not add 
a supplement to history, calling it, of course, by some inconspicuous name  
so that women might figure there with out impropriety? (2115) 
The ironic modesty of this passage—its assurances that the narrator would never dream 
of trodding upon the male historians’ toes or presume to call researched narratives of 
women’s past lives “history”—refuses to be taken seriously. At the same time, however, 
it voices sentiments that come up again and again in Woolf’s writings: its search for some 
form of history-but-not-quite, its uncertainty regarding whether “unreal, lop-sided” 
history is even salvageable, its connection between women’s exclusion from historical 
knowledge as its subjects and women’s exclusion from historical knowledge as its 
producers and recorders. Such a tone may prove troubling in its slipperiness, short on 
practical answers. But, as I claim in this chapter, slipperiness and ambivalence lie at the 
heart of Woolf’s struggles with a historiographic inheritance that both drew and repelled 
her. 
This chapter thus takes as its anchor Woolf’s least forthright and serious treatment 
of historiography and its shortcomings, her 1928 novel/biography Orlando. Like all the 
historians’ texts discussed in the introductory chapter and analyzed in greater detail in the 
chapters to follow, this particular text has an illuminating habit of pointing readers 
outside itself, in this case to Woolf’s other writings and extratextual life as well as to the 
discourses of historical authority. Orlando’s echoes of earlier texts, and later texts’ 
echoes of Orlando in turn, prompt readers to writings spanning Woolf’s career and across 
genres. As a multifaceted lens, it makes visible the deep-seated and ultimately 
irresolvable nature of Woolf’s ambivalence toward various historical traditions. It offers a 
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view of Woolf stuck in the gap between a Victorian faith in factuality and transparency, 
and a literary-modernist abandonment of documented for mystical, imagined, or felt 
history—not so much in believing in both, but in repeatedly concluding that each is 
impossible and unfaithful to past lives, and then trying again to accept one, both, or a 
combination of the two. 
Woolf’s ongoing struggle with her Victorian historical inheritance is also voiced 
tellingly in Orlando through a fascinatingly indefinite use of the historian’s text form. Its 
narrator shifts amongst nineteenth-century, masculinist modes of historiography, 
biography, and novel-writing without ever settling into one—or even into a masculine 
stance. Through this mixing of discourses, the text performatively echoes that odd 
position between insider and outsider famously described in A Room of One’s Own: “if 
one is a woman one is often surprised by a sudden splitting off of consciousness, say in 
walking down Whitehall, when from being the natural inheritor of that civilisation, she 
becomes, on the contrary, outside of it, alien and critical. Clearly the mind is always 
altering its focus, and bringing the world into different perspectives” (2142).25 Orlando’s 
                                                
25 The potential problems of being a female “inheritor” surface in Orlando on multiple 
levels. At the end of his/her ‘biography,’ Orlando remains in “undisturbed possession of 
her titles, her house, and her estate; though costly, the lawsuits against her fail to unsettle 
her inheritance and leave her “infinitely noble” (255), but the woman on whom Orlando 
is based had less good fortune. Knole, the country estate where Vita Sackville-West was 
born in 1892, was entailed to the male heirs to the Sackville title; when Sackville-West’s 
father died in 1928, her cousin thus inherited her home. This double-exposure image of a 
woman’s inheritance—Orlando’s innate and legally recognized right to both title and 
estate, simultaneously covering and drawing attention to Sackville-West’s ineligibility for 
both—neatly signals the interactions amongst gender, genre, and inheritance so evident in 
Orlando and across Woolf’s writings. And like Sackville-West, Woolf too was treated as 
ineligible for a large part of what she seems to have seen as her rightful inheritance—not 
a house like Sackville-West’s beloved Knole, but the education and the resulting 
intellectual (and specifically historical) authority her father and brothers were offered as a 
matter of course. 
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inconsistent narrative stance acts out women’s and Woolf’s mixed blessing and curse, 
this critical multiplicity of perspective that Orlando him/herself experiences dramatically 
when the male character suddenly becomes a woman. Never straightforward and always 
joking, this text flickers with but does not stabilize a shorthand caricature of Victorian 
historiography to be dismissed as absurdly outdated, hypocritical, and inadequate to 
historical reality. Instead, its narrative slipperiness and humor accommodate 
ambivalence: in refusing to be serious or logical—in refusing to limit itself to a single 
perspective—Orlando need not maintain a consistent image of the Victorians or their 
approach to the past. 
Pointing outside itself to countless texts, figures, and ideas, Orlando can help us 
understand Woolf’s long engagement with historical knowledge; in turn, it can best be 
understood in this context where it places itself through intertextuality and discourse 
mixing, through echoes and imitations. This chapter thus begins with the multiplicity of 
Woolf’s connections to the production of history, exploring the complexity of her 
historiographic inheritance. I then explore the ambivalence toward historiography Woolf 
expresses across her writing career. From her earliest writings into her final novel, this 
chapter asserts, Woolf both shares the Victorians’ desire for historical narrative and 
knowledge, and undercuts the idea that we can seek such knowledge in a reasonable or 
genuinely illuminative way. Next, I discuss Woolf’s stereotyped representations of the 
Victorian historian, as well as her representations—often deeply skeptical—of such 
caricaturing and periodization. 
The chapter’s final sections focus more tightly on Orlando. There, I address the 
shifting relationships of the Orlando narrator with disciplinary history and with its 
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masculine perspective, and then examine the impact of irony and joking on the text’s use 
of Victorian historical authority. Finally, I make the case that these narrative 
techniques—however amusing—contribute significantly to Orlando’s capacity to express 
something serious: a complex relationship with historiography as a sexist way of 
knowing (which has so excluded and controlled women) and simultaneously as a vital 
tool for women’s entry into public meaning and meaningful action. This text does not 
launch a total rejection of historiography; indeed, it recounts literary history in a social 
context,26 and writes (in its own way) centuries of Vita Sackville-West’s family history. 
Nor does it completely reject biography; though far from a traditional biography, it 
attempts to write a woman’s life and claims a kind of truth that is not exclusively 
novelistic. Instead, Orlando performs uncertainty about the relationship between 
historical fact and the imagination or fantasy, through a narrator who takes on a range of 
not-always-distinguishable poses and who breaks down the traditional boundaries of 
Victorian historiography and biography—even as he or she sometimes facilitates the 
mocking rejection of those forms’ authoritative personae. It seems to me that this 
awkward slipperiness is, if not the firmest, the best ground from which to view the 
immediacy and messiness of early-twentieth-century relationships with Victorian 
historiography. 
 
 
                                                
26Andrew McNeillie asserts that Woolf “shared with [Leslie] Stephen a common 
perspective upon literature as a commodity that is socially and historically conditioned, 
despite her belief in ‘purity’ and autonomy. It is a befitting irony that her extraordinary 
(and to some exasperating) jeu d’esprit Orlando […] itself expresses a view of English 
literature that is as historical and social as Stephen could have wished, for all the 
gendering of his critical values” (Essays IV:xii). 
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A Troublesome Inheritance 
 The Victorians and their approach to history remained influential throughout the 
twentieth century, in various forms and for various audiences, as this dissertation’s 
introduction suggests. But who made ‘the Victorians,’ the monolithic intellectual and 
cultural force so easy for us to assume? Many scholars of the nineteenth century point to 
the literary modernists, and especially to the Bloomsbury group, as responsible for late 
twentieth- and early twenty-first-century oversimplifications and misrepresentations of 
Victorian culture, art, scholarship, and life.27 Christopher Herbert follows this trajectory 
when he asserts that the particular “alienation” of late-twentieth-century thought from its 
Victorian inheritance is built upon “a longstanding cultural mythology”: even “the late-
Victorian and Edwardian years are full of testimonies to a supposed transformation of 
consciousness sharply separating the Victorian age from the one that comes after” (33). 
His second example is the one that appears most dependably in analyses of this abrupt 
turn: “When Virginia Woolf declares from the vantage point of 1924 that ‘In or about 
December, 1910, human character changed,’ […] she offers another version of the same 
insistent myth of a radical discontinuity between the Victorians and us folk of the 
twentieth century” (33). Certainly Woolf participates in Bloomsbury’s characterization of 
the Victorian as everything the modern is not—stuffy, stable, certain. And yet, when we 
                                                
27 Simon Joyce discusses this habit of pointing to the Bloomsbury group: “Arguably 
theirs is a view that set the terms for thinking about the nineteenth century in the 
twentieth” (631). He cites John McGowan and Matthew Sweet as scholars of the 
Victorian who see Bloomsbury as central in this way. According to McGowan, 
“Although their period was the modern for Mill, Carlyle, and Ruskin, the Victorian is 
now quintessentially the past, the period against which we gauge our own modernness. 
The Bloomsbury Group played a large role in this transformation of the Victorian into the 
nonmodern,” especially in their ideas about sexuality (11); Sweet blames the group for 
“grotesque caricatures and misreadings of the period” (Joyce 631; see Sweet xv-xvii). 
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examine Woolf’s representations of Victorian historical thought—so central to twentieth-
century impressions of the period—we are faced not with simple caricature and rejection 
but instead with thoroughgoing changeability and ambivalence throughout her writing 
career. 
 Taking Orlando and many of Woolf’s essays and reviews seriously, even in their 
jokes, means taking Victorian historical authority seriously. Relatively little literary 
criticism treats literary-modernist understandings and uses of history as an intellectual 
pursuit; when James Joyce’s Stephen Dedalus calls history “a nightmare from which I am 
trying to awake” (34), he is often taken as representative of a modernism that perceives 
the past as an existential burden.28 Woolf, on the other hand, frequently depicts history 
not as a crushing weight but as a topic (the past) and mode (archival research and 
historiography) of scholarly inquiry. As Sabine Hotho-Jackson explains, while Woolf’s 
historical thought participates in the contemporary crisis of liberalism and positivism, she 
does not fit tidily with “philosophically minded authors like Pound, Yeats, Eliot, who did 
not write about the historian’s plight or about the past, but about […] history as 
metahistory”—as “fate, nightmare, dilemma, apocalypse” (295). Hotho-Jackson argues 
instead that Woolf’s writings display both “[t]he modern view of history/reality [as] a 
complex network of the subjective and the objective, an osmosis of past and present” and 
“a traditional concept of history as story and particularly as English story” (296). 
Furthermore, I argue here, Woolf never fully abandoned or accepted the authority of that 
                                                
28 Particularly interesting, though, are: Longenbach on T. S. Eliot and Ezra Pound as 
“historical poets”; and Louise Blakeney Williams on cyclic views of history in Pound, 
W.B. Yeats, Ford Madox Ford, T.E. Hulme, and D.H. Lawrence, who (she argues) were 
all either formulating or further invested themselves in such views during the 1920s and 
’30s. 
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familiar Victorian approach to history: rather, she participated in the interrogation of 
historical epistemology that occurred both within and outside disciplinary history at the 
time of her writing career. 
Even the literary modernists Hotho-Jackson describes as “philosophically 
minded” were not detached from a Victorian tradition of historical inquiry. Instead, 
James Longenbach perceives a great deal of continuity from the Victorians’ 
“preoccupation with the past” to that of Ezra Pound in The Cantos and T. S. Eliot in The 
Waste Land (5). For Longenbach, it is the modernists’ disbelief in linear progress or 
decline that distinguishes their historical approach from “a simple elaboration of their 
Victorian inheritance” (5). More significantly for my purposes, though, I would add that 
these poets make historians irrelevant by removing both factuality and mediation from 
the project of knowing the past, which “becomes a mystical project” (Longenbach 18). 
For instance, Longenbach argues, “The fact that he represents his historical sense with 
the tale of Isis gathering the limbs of Osiros or Odysseus reviving the ghost of Tiresias 
(rather than, say, George Eliot’s Mr. Casaubon searching for the key to all mythologies) 
reveals the intensity with which Pound approached the past” (19). But in using the voice 
of a seer rather than a researcher, Pound also approaches historical knowledge in a way 
that discards disciplinary history as beside the point. Similarly, in The Waste Land we 
have a palimpsestic history accessible to a priest and prophet, not a narrative history 
available to objective reflection (Longenbach 27). 
“The heart of Anglo-American literary modernism,” claims Longenbach, “may be 
found in Pound’s and Eliot’s attempts to negotiate between several conflicting types of 
historicism, and discover a vitalizing attitude toward history” (12). Without attempting to 
 45 
(re)locate the center of modernism, however, this chapter insists that Woolf’s different 
negotiation has a great deal to show us about writing and reading the legacy of Victorian 
historical knowledge in twentieth-century Britain. Like Eliot, Woolf distrusted the ideal 
of historiography by which the gathering of enough facts would eventually lead to an 
accurate, objective view of the past—an ideal shared by mainstream Victorian and 
modernist historians, scholarly and popular. But while “Eliot was able to overcome his 
skepticism with a moment of transcendental vision” (Longenbach 21), Woolf could do so 
only fleetingly and almost always self-consciously. Her skepticism was directed not only 
at Victorian historical knowledge but also at both ‘modernist’ challenges to it (the literary 
modernists’ existential doubt and mysticism, and the historical modernists’ scientific 
factuality). She questioned amateur and disciplinary, research-based and imaginative 
modes of knowing the past. Such thorough misgivings placed her in an impossible 
position with regard to history throughout her writing life. 
Woolf’s generation could not help but be personally enmeshed in their inheritance 
from the Victorians, however much they may have rejected it. Unlike even the earliest 
generation of postmodernists, these writers remembered their Victorian forebears as 
individual people rather than as historical figures, outdated scholars, or prefabricated 
symbols, whether of patriarchy and prudishness or of a lost epistemic and moral stability. 
Born in 1882, Woolf lived about a third of her life under Queen Victoria’s reign; her 
father was just four years old upon Victoria’s accession to the throne and died three years 
after that queen. The personal nature of Woolf’s connection to ‘the Victorians’ surfaces 
in her 1941 Between the Acts, in its amused understanding of Etty Springett’s reaction to 
a critical caricature of the Victorian era: “children did draw trucks in mines; […] yet Papa 
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read Walter Scott aloud after dinner; and divorced ladies were not received at Court. How 
difficult to come to any conclusion! She wished they would hurry on with the next scene” 
(164). Yet personal memories of the Victorian do not lead exclusively to nostalgia 
(however uncomfortable). Equally by virtue of this immediacy, Woolf’s generation’s 
objections to Victorian epistemology and values were often deeply personal, molded as 
they were by lived realities: feeling oneself left out of history (both its action and its 
writing) because of one’s sex, for instance, or the conviction that Victorian self-
assuredness killed one’s friends in the Great War. 
The sheer multiplicity of Woolf’s connections to historians, historical 
biographers, and the professional and amateur study of the past in the late Victorian and 
Edwardian periods is astonishing. Most obviously, Woolf’s father was Leslie Stephen, 
first editor of the Dictionary of National Biography and author of The History of English 
Thought in the Eighteenth Century, but perhaps now best known as “that staunch 
Victorian patriarch” to a young Virginia Stephen and her siblings (Hill 351). In Woolf’s 
case, nineteenth-century historical authority—later to be so often critiqued through the 
image of an old, rich, white, university-educated man delusionally convinced of his own 
voice’s objectivity—lived in her home in quite literal form. Virginia Stephen was 
excluded from her brothers’ university education, and guided in her reading of the 
Victorian historians and a great deal else, by an influential late-Victorian historian and 
biographer. Thus, not only does Victorian authority often manifest in her essays in the 
figures of men she knew or heard about in gossip (rather than always-already historical 
figures she only knew from books), but also in her particular upbringing this authority 
was significantly an intellectual and specifically historical one. 
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Yet although Woolf’s relationship with history began with her father, it certainly 
did not end with him. Virginia Stephen and then Virginia Woolf had a vast range of 
personal, scholarly, and professional interactions with history and historical biography, 
both professional and amateur. Her paternal grandfather was early Victorian historian Sir 
James Stephen, author of Lectures on the History of France (1851) and regius professor 
of modern history at Cambridge beginning in 1849; his granddaughter would read his 
Essays in Ecclesiastical Biography (1849) nearly half a century later (Hill 353). Her 
father and grandfather were friendly with Thomas Carlyle.29 The Stephens and 
Macaulays were also friends, and Leslie Stephen seems to have guided his daughter to 
read Thomas Babington Macaulay’s historical work (Hill 353). Trevelyan, Macaulay’s 
great-nephew and an acquaintance of the Bloomsbury men during their university days, 
was of course familiar to Woolf. She was also long friends with (and very briefly 
engaged to) the highly unconventional biographer Lytton Strachey. 
Furthermore, her connections to historical work were not all mediated through the 
men in her life: after a struggle with her resistant father, for instance, Virginia Stephen 
attended lectures in history at King’s College, London, in 1897 (DeSalvo 103). In 1905 
she taught history at Morley College, a working-class women’s college (Essays 1: xvi).30 
She reviewed histories and biographies throughout her career. And yet she markedly 
lacked formal training or official authority with regard to the subject. During the year of 
                                                
29 Woolf recounts that a grief-stricken Leslie Stephen repeatedly begged, “I was not as 
bad as Carlyle, was I?” after the death of his wife (Moments 41). This perception of the 
lofty nineteenth-century historian as abysmal husband recalls Eliot’s Casaubon, as well as 
the real-life demands of the role of historian’s wife as discussed by Bonnie Smith in The 
Gender of History. 
 
30 In this teaching she is further connected to Trevelyan, who also lectured at Morley that 
year (Westman, “First Orlando” 47-8). 
 48 
her stint at Morley, Virginia Stephen recorded that it is tricky to review a book “when 
you dont know the subject”; the Times rejected her review, which its editor saw as “not 
‘academic’ enough”: instead, “a professed historian is needed” (Fox 105). The Victorian 
girl who grew up to be a modernist novelist and essayist had first wanted to be a 
historian, and her diaries and letters attest that she toyed with the idea of writing a history 
throughout her life. 
Thus, while Stephen is clearly relevant to Woolf’s relationship with Victorian 
historical authority, it is important to avoid assuming that the man and the scholarly 
legacy line up one-to-one in Woolf’s work. Stephen is not simply a symbol for Victorian 
historical thought; nor does Victorianism merely stand for Stephen. In her otherwise 
insightful chapter on Orlando and Flush, Ruth Hoberman slips too easily between person 
and tradition when she writes: 
Woolf’s anti-Victorianism emerged more gradually [than Strachey’s], and 
her 1932 essay about her father is extremely affectionate. By the late 
nineteenth thirties, however, […] she is bitterly anti-Victorian and critical 
of her father. Like Strachey, she equated what she most disliked about 
Victorianism with the form and content of the traditional biography—a 
massive, artless compendium of letters and chronicle, compiled by an 
awestruck disciple. (135-6) 
 
While Hoberman reminds us that Stephen did not actually write that sort of book, she 
seems to imagine in Woolf a conflation of her father and Victorianism, despite Woolf’s 
extensive reading of her father’s and other Victorians’ work. Hoberman furthermore 
posits a linear development from affection to criticism that I do not see in Woolf’s 
writings with regard to either Stephen or Victorian biographical and historical writing. 
Instead, this chapter foregrounds the difficulties inherent in turning against a legacy so 
personal and so complex. For Woolf’s original audience, too, the Victorians were 
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individuals and individual scholars rather than a homogenous mass; she was able to 
assume many readers’ familiarity with historians such as Macaulay, Carlyle, Froude, and, 
indeed, Stephen. As various critics have noted (to various ends),31 Woolf does not simply 
reject her father or Victorian historiography or biography; she sometimes treats both with 
appreciation, and she constantly borrows and inherits from even as she critiques and 
writes outside them. 
In other words, Woolf actively engages Victorian historical authority as an 
irresolvable legacy. Arguing against the common caricature of Stephen as overwhelming 
patriarch, Katherine C. Hill claims that Stephen regarded his youngest daughter as “his 
literary and intellectual heir” (351) and, in a more complicated way than a simply 
damning view would allow, made positive contributions to her intellectual development. 
Regardless of how we settle the question of Stephen’s motivations or success as a parent, 
his daughter did read a great many histories from his library, along with Stephen’s 
marginalia. She literally inherited his books upon his death in 1904 (“Library”), and she 
continued to use the books he had read and written even as she launched a critique of 
their limitations. In a much larger sense, too, Woolf and the rest of her generation faced 
an imposing inheritance upon the death of Victoria, a symbolic moment that underscored 
a felt need for a ‘Victorianism’ that might be shaken off. 
Leonard Woolf, the man who would become Virginia’s husband in 1912, writes 
in his 1960 memoir Sowing that even during Victoria’s final illness, “we already felt that 
we were living in an era of incipient revolt and that we ourselves were mortally involved 
in this revolt against […] bourgeois Victorianism” (166). In this passage, Victoria’s death 
                                                
31 See for instance Hill, Hoberman (ch. 5), Hotho-Jackson, and Westman (“First 
Orlando”). 
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serves as a symbol for the death of “Victorian civilisation” and provides an opportunity 
for Leonard Woolf to free himself from a huge range of influences reified here as 
“Victorianism.” Perhaps because of her earlier death, but certainly also because of her 
concern with women’s rights and women’s biographical and historical invisibility, Woolf 
never approached this degree of simplicity in her attitude toward her Victorian forebears. 
Instead, Woolf’s reviews of historical works, her historical and historiographic essays, 
and her history-minded novels Orlando and Between the Acts repeatedly engage an 
inheritance whose authority is both desirable—in its potential to change readers’ 
perceptions and thus the world and women’s position in it—and despicable—patriarchal 
and epistemologically untenable. In the following section, I turn to Woolf’s long, 
conflicted engagement with historical knowledge and thus to the broader question of how 
she navigates her generation’s Victorian historiographic inheritance. 
 
Impossible Histories 
 If many critics blame the Bloomsbury group for the inadequacy of our received 
images of the Victorians, Simon Joyce argues that we should avoid similarly 
oversimplifying the Bloomsbury group by assuming it was unified on this point. He 
rereads Strachey’s Eminent Victorians as far from “a systematic assault on the previous 
century” (642)—and instead, as a deconstructionist reading of the Victorian era as 
informed by internally inconsistent values and demands. By contrast, Joyce aligns 
Virginia, along with Leonard, Woolf with the “anxiety to distance oneself absolutely 
from what came before” (631)—with the pull within the Bloomsbury group to reify and 
reject all things Victorian. Through a reading of Virginia Woolf’s 1923 essay “Mr. 
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Bennett and Mrs. Brown,” Joyce identifies “an abstracted Victorianism […] arrayed 
against an equally abstracted force of rebellion” (639). Joyce helpfully distinguishes 
between a critique that inverts ‘the Victorian,’ “pinning down the supposed essence of the 
period and then substituting antithetical values and qualities in its place” (648), and one 
that deconstructs it; he sees both at play in Bloomsbury. But his reading oversimplifies 
Woolf’s relationship with Victorian thought in a way that excludes her long-term and 
complex engagement with the period’s historical-epistemological legacy. 
The approach with which Joyce identifies Woolf “leave[s] the initial 
characterization in place rather than unsettling it, so that ‘the Victorian’ hardens as an 
analytical concept the more it comes under attack; it is thus available as a reference point 
or rallying cry for subsequent forces of reactionary counter-inversion, from Evelyn 
Waugh to Margaret Thatcher” (648). A deconstructive approach like Strachey’s, on the 
other hand, “insists that the dominant is never a coherent entity but instead contains 
contradictory elements and ambiguities” and, in focusing on these contradictions, “pushes 
fixed definitions to the point of collapse or chiasmus, where one term of a binary 
opposition inevitably entails its supposed other” (648). And yet, as I argue in the 
following sections, Woolf often does just that with regard to Victorian epistemology as 
well as to historical periodization more generally. While Joyce’s warning against 
assuming a Bloomsbury party line is extremely useful, his relatively brief treatment 
depends so heavily on the oft-cited “Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown” that he freezes 
Woolf’s ever-moving and ever-self-questioning approach in a moment of caricature. 
Instead, I see Woolf’s historical and historiographic texts as dynamic acts of 
inheritance: they never quite figure out what they want to inherit or what they must 
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inherit. Woolf’s stances toward the legacy of Victorian historical thought are 
deconstructive in the sense that they remain plural and admit an inability to pin down the 
heritage. It is precisely this engagement and not a straightforward acceptance or rejection 
of a tradition that constitutes inheritance in a deconstructive view.32 From this 
perspective, rather than seeing Woolf’s ongoing ambivalence as mere inconsistency and 
confusion—as inadequacy to the task of this particular intellectual inheritance—we might 
understand it as a responsible, active effort to think through the past and the future in 
their complexity. 
This chapter attends to the messiness of Woolf’s vexed inheritance by taking 
seriously the messiness of a long career and especially of a peculiar novel. Orlando is 
often dismissed from understandings of Woolf and of modernism as a mere squib, a mere 
jeu d’esprit, a mere love letter33—a dismissal that stands to deprive us of significant 
insight into the transition from the people who lived under Victoria to ‘the Victorians’ 
whom writers in the later twentieth century could so easily deride or wistfully recall. By 
looking at Orlando and at the broader context of Woolf’s works, we can observe how 
Woolf’s critique of Victorian historical authority deconstructs as well as inverts an image 
of that discourse’s values, conventions, and practitioners. Orlando itself invokes such a 
                                                
32 I obviously borrow here from Jacques Derrida’s Specters of Marx. In my reading, 
Woolf’s texts obey what Derrida sees as the order of inheritance: “one must filter, sift, 
criticize, one must sort out several different possibles that inhabit the same injunction” 
(16). She navigates both a paternal and a textual legacy, and indeed a paternal legacy that 
is in significant part textual, encountering “the readability of a legacy” that “call[s] for 
and at the same time def[ies] interpretation” (16). Derrida’s deconstructive reading of 
inheritance is both illuminating of Woolf’s and, in its insistence on the filial nature of the 
act, problematic in view of Woolf’s exploration of gender. For an insightful feminist 
reading of Specters of Marx, see Nancy J. Holland. 
 
33 For more on scholars’ habit of dismissing Orlando as insufficiently serious, see 
Boehm. 
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broader context, asking to be read alongside Woolf’s other works and in the terms of a 
number of discourses when it blurs the boundaries of the individual and independent 
work in blurring the boundaries between personal and public references, between fiction 
and fact, between biography and history, and between Woolf’s own fiction and 
nonfiction. It seems to invite critics to read it alongside other works by Woolf through 
enticing little intertextual echoes, only a small part of its thoroughgoing game of 
intertextuality. The invitation often leads readers to Woolf’s ongoing engagement—and 
frustrations—with the challenges of historical narrative. 
Some such echoes interact with the writing she completed alongside Orlando: for 
instance, the novel’s reference to Queen Elizabeth’s wax figure (23) rings of the 1928 
essay “Waxworks at the Abbey,” and the narrator’s insistence that we are composed “so 
unequally of clay and diamonds, of rainbow and granite” (77) calls up Woolf’s 
description of human character in her 1927 review “The New Biography.” Other echoes 
resound across her writing life, as is the case when Orlando includes one of Woolf’s 
many references to the work so firmly associated with her father’s name: “The true length 
of a person’s life, whatever the Dictionary of National Biography may say, is always a 
matter of dispute. Indeed it is a difficult business—this time-keeping; nothing more 
quickly disorders it than contact with any of the arts; and it may have been her love of 
poetry that was to blame […]” (306). 
The reference is amused but also serious; Orlando writes a life that cannot be 
accommodated by the historical-biographic approach represented by the DNB because 
that approach is concerned only with external facts rather than internal experience, and 
because Orlando is for much of her life a woman and thus a problematic choice of 
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subject. While Victorian historical biography pins down and records, Woolf, through her 
category-defying character, proposes attention to the messy, changeable, and intangible 
workings of personality. In “The Lives of the Obscure” (1925), Woolf deviates in a more 
straightforward way from the DNB’s patriarchal values, pulling a female figure from the 
background of a father’s life into the foreground of her own: the Dictionary, as Andrew 
McNeillie observes, includes Eleanor Anne Ormerod only “under the entry for her father, 
George Ormerod (1785-1873), historian of Cheshire, as ‘a distinguished entomologist’” 
(Essays IV: 145). In her essay, in contrast, Woolf inverts this convention by imagining 
the life and career of the daughter, allowing George only a bit part as tiresome Victorian 
patriarch. And yet, McNeillie notes: “That Woolf when reading for an essay or review 
habitually consulted her father’s essays and contributions to the Dictionary of National 
Biography is bourne out by her reading notes” (Essays IV: xii). Woolf seems to have 
used the DNB both as a reference work and as an example of the limitations of Victorian 
biography, neither accepting nor rejecting its knowledge. 
In its DNB reference and throughout, Orlando performs Woolf’s concern with the 
difficulty of representing personality and of experiencing a connection with lives lived in 
the past, without violating those individuals’ reality and difference. Orlando also echoes 
Woolf’s nonfictional reflections on history in its imagery of haunting and burial—
flexible motifs that sometimes emphasize continuity with the past but sometimes present 
that past as totally inaccessible because it is dead and gone.34 This distinction, between 
the past as uncanny presence and the past as contained absence, contrasts Victorian 
historicism (with its attention to historical difference) with a mystical, romantic sense of 
                                                
34 In addition to the two essays discussed here, see especially “Their Passing Hour” 
(1905) and “Maria Edgeworth and Her Circle” (1909). 
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contact with the dead through haunting. Within the novel, this distinction breaks itself 
down even as it is produced; its deconstruction is magnified through the language and 
imagery it shares with Woolf’s nonfictional writings. 
The association of history and haunting are particularly clear in “The Lives of the 
Obscure,” which imagines bits of the lives of the “Taylors and Edgeworths” in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, of eighteenth-century writer Laetitia Pilkington, and 
of the entomologist Woolf rescues from the DNB’s shadows. Here, she explains that “one 
likes romantically to feel oneself a deliverer advancing with lights across the waste of 
years to the rescue of some stranded ghost” (Essays IV: 119). The essay’s imagery 
opposes this historical approach to that of history books, by imagining that “the 
unknown” liquefy the literal containers of scholarly historical knowledge: 
instead of keeping their identity separate, as remarkable people do, they 
seem to merge into one another, their very boards and title-pages and 
frontispieces dissolving, and their innumerable pages melting into 
continuous years so that we can lie back and look up into the fine mist-like 
substance of countless lives, and pass unhindered from century to century, 
from life to life. (120) 
 
In “The Duke and Duchess of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne” (1911), however, Woolf 
complicates this schema by associating historical research and suicide in the figure of a 
man so interested in and fond of the dead that he decides to join them. 
Before turning to the seventeenth-century duke and duchess of the title, Woolf 
opens with a story about historical scholarship: “Some one has probably written a story in 
which the hero is forever thinking about the dead. […] Becoming obsessed by the idea, 
he spends his life in reading, volume after volume. He discovers that great men had 
uncles and aunts and cousins. He dives after them, so to speak, and rescues them by the 
hair of their heads” (Essays I: 345). Proceeding with his research, this historian hero 
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reasons that “the living change and lie and drop one; all the arguments, in short, are on 
his side; and finally, outraged by contact with unreal fugitive flesh-encumbered live 
people, he draws his razor and departs” (345). Woolf sympathizes with the sentiment and 
says it can make a book feel “fresh” (345), but is nonetheless glad that “there is generally 
some obstacle to prevent us from crashing through the little plank on which we stand into 
the immense abyss” (346). Unfamiliar with the document-writers’ attitudes toward 
writing and thus how exactly to read their words, tone, “style,” the historical researcher is 
prevented from quite tipping over into the world of the dead. This parable does not 
oppose romantic contact with the dead and scholarly distance from them; rather, it 
suggests that truly successful historical scholarship could only end in suicide, if it were 
not fortunately impossible because of the nature of historical evidence and the pastness of 
the past. 
In other words, at least in this review, Woolf questions the line between 
historicism and mysticism by painting the former as a desire for a communion with the 
dead unreachable through scholarly means—a communion that can only be ontological, 
not epistemic. Without dissociating herself from the effort to know the past, she 
simultaneously deconstructs both a romantic/mystical and a scholarly approach to it, in 
part by questioning the distinction between them. When Orlando visits his family crypt, 
his over-the-top employment of this familiar trope mocks not only Orlando’s 
longwindedness but also that of the narrator, drawing attention to the telling of the tale 
rather than allowing the sense of transparency so important to conventional historical 
authority (whether Victorian or modernist). Orlando muses: 
 “Nothing remains of all these Princes,” Orlando would say, indulging in  
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some pardonable exaggeration of their rank, “except one digit,” and he 
would take a skeleton hand in his and bend the joint this way and that. 
“Whose hand was it?” he went on to ask. “The right or the left? The hand 
of man or woman, of age or youth? Had it urged the war horse, or plied 
the needle? Had it plucked the rose, or grasped cold steel? Had it—” but 
here either his invention failed him or, what is more likely, provided him 
with so many instances of what a hand can do that he shrank, as his wont 
was, from the cardinal labour of composition, which is excision, and he 
put it with the other bones, thinking how there was a writer called Thomas 
Browne, a Doctor of Norwich, whose writing upon such subjects took his 
fancy amazingly. (71-2) 
 
Orlando takes his philosophizing so far that we are bound to wonder whether, rather than 
experiencing a genuine connection with his ancestors or understanding of mortality, he is 
simply showboating to himself, admiring his own gloomy reflections and appropriating 
the bodies of the dead as mere props. In implicitly comparing his or her own narrative 
style to that of Orlando, the narrator also allows us to question whether he or she is 
sacrificing historical difference and distance for a good story and clever theories. And in 
directing humor at a trope its author sometimes employs more seriously, Orlando invites 
us through echoes and differences to question Woolf’s and Orlando’s relationships both 
with the past and with authoritative Victorian historiography. 
 
Reifying Victorian History: Caricature and the Historian Figure in Woolf 
 The ambiguities of Woolf’s historical approach—pulled between an emphasis on 
continuity and a concern for historical difference, and between a love of history and a 
belief that real historical knowledge, insight into the personalities and lives of the past, is 
unattainable—complicate her treatment of ‘the Victorian’ as it is represented through 
Victorian historiography and the familiar figure of the Victorian historian. Woolf’s 
writings value the authority of factuality even as they project a deep suspicion toward a 
 58 
nineteenth-century historical-epistemological certainty with regard to the past and to 
other people’s lives. As they express these opposed and intertwined feelings, Woolf’s 
fictional and nonfictional writings work to posit a Victorianism stable enough to be 
rejected. Yet, for Woolf, such stability and the historical certainty it implies are 
necessarily fleeting; her works exhibit intense self-consciousness about easy caricatures 
of the past and its people. Interestingly, it is because of one of her major disagreements 
with the Victorian historical tradition—its conviction that the past is objectively 
knowable and can be pinned down through the sheer weight of enough facts—that she 
cannot quite posit and simply reject or accept ‘the Victorian.’ Instead, she acknowledges 
the allure of such modes of knowing and simultaneously laughs at herself for feeling it. 
For instance, in a 1908 review of a collection of a family’s mid-nineteenth-
century letters and diaries that she feels ought not to have been published, Virginia 
Stephen remarks that reading the volume is not without its pleasures. The figures are 
“just distant enough to be old-fashioned, but hardly as yet picturesque. It seems very 
probable that such people were alive in the year 1840; it is comfortable to imagine that 
the world before our time was so cheerful a place” (Essays I: 241)—comfortable but not, 
the tone implies, particularly realistic. In another review, Stephen asserts ironically that 
“The past has an immense charm of its own; and if one can show how people lived a 
hundred years ago—one means by that, how they powdered their hair, and drove in 
yellow chariots, and passed Lord Byron in the street—one need not trouble oneself with 
minds and emotions” (Essays I: 315). She continues: 
How charming our ancestors were!—so simple in their manners, so 
humorous in their behaviour, so strange in their expressions! […] There is 
no need to tease ourselves with the suspicion that they were quite different 
in the flesh, and as ugly, as complex, and as emotional as we are, for their 
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simplicity is more amusing to believe in and much easier to write about. 
Nevertheless, there are moments when we bewail the opportunity that 
Miss Hill seems to have missed—the opportunity of getting at the truth at 
the risk of being dull. (318) 
 
In these reviews, she sympathizes with authors’ and readers’ drives to caricature and 
nostalgia but renders both modes as obviously inadequate to the task of “getting at the 
truth.” Though opposed in spirit, the easy comforts of rejecting a caricature of the past or 
wistfully imagining a golden age are equally oversimplifying drives. 
Woolf’s “anxiety to distance [her]self absolutely from what came before” (Joyce 
631) is thus problematized by her lurking affection for it, and even more significantly by 
her deep doubt that we can truly know and stabilize “what came before” in the first place. 
Carrying on an ambivalence present in her writings at least as early as 1907, even her 
final novel reflects with interest and doubt on the historical processes of reification and 
periodization. In Between the Acts, Miss La Trobe’s pageant presents the expected 
historical periods—as Mrs. Manresa reflects while looking ahead in the program, “Early 
Briton; Plantagenets; Tudors; Stuarts—she ticked them off, but probably she had 
forgotten a reign or two”—and the expected historical figures—Queen Elizabeth, a 
Victorian constable. But it also shocks and confuses its audience with unexpected irony 
and, in the end, fragmentation. 
Between the Acts uses not only the pageant but its audience’s reactions to question 
the realism of historical periodization and generalization.35 When Isa, William, and Mrs. 
                                                
35 The issue of periodization arises in Woolf’s essays as well. Most notably, as Joyce 
points out, Woolf’s famous pronouncement in “Character in Fiction” that “on or about 
December 1910 human character changed” (Essays III: 421) is both flippantly specific 
and at odds with the traditional periodization of British history in excluding Edward VII’s 
May 1910 death. Given that “the end of Victoria’s reign […] produced a range of 
predictions—some apocalyptic and others entirely dumbfounded—about what the future 
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Swithin discuss the Victorian scenes they have just watched together, their disagreement 
about the nature of historical knowledge draws attention to the blurriness of boundaries 
such as that between the Victorian and the modern: 
“Were they like that?” Isa asked abruptly. She looked at Mrs. 
Swithin as if she had been a dinosaur or a very diminutive mammoth. 
Extinct she must be, since she had lived in the reign of Queen Victoria. 
[…] 
“The Victorians,” Mrs. Swithin mused. “I don’t believe,” she said 
with her odd little smile, “that there ever were such people. Only you and 
me and William dressed differently.” 
“You don’t believe in history,” said William. (174-5) 
It is not modern William but Victorian Mrs. Swithin, avid reader of an Outline of History, 
who doubts such typically Victorian historicism, with its emphasis on the spirit of the age 
and differences between historical periods. And yet again, this exchange problematizes 
any simple relationship with Victorian knowledge and values. Woolf shares Mrs. 
Swithin’s knowing smile about imaginary entities such as ‘the Victorians,’ even as she 
shares Miss La Trobe’s critique of the Victorians and their hypocrisy.36 
                                                                                                                                            
might bring, all certain that it would at any rate be entirely different from what had come 
before,” Joyce argues, “Woolf’s de-emphasizing of monarchical succession is itself 
significant, and consistent with the larger argument of ‘Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown’ that 
nominally ‘Victorian’ traits of writing and perception were continued by the Edwardian 
novelists under discussion: in this, as in many other ways, the Edwardians had failed to 
engineer a decisive break with the past” (632). The monarchy is both emphasized and 
deflated when Woolf invokes Queen Victoria in the name and description of Mrs. Brown, 
depicting this “defining symbol of her age brought down to earth” (Joyce 633). In these 
two cases, readers’ expectations regarding and Woolf’s treatment of the Victorian are 
placed under scrutiny through unconventional (and absurdly specific) periodization and 
through the shorthand of a “Mrs. Brown” who must be reimagined now that Victorian 
and Edwardian assumptions about her are falling apart. While the latter impulse conforms 
to Joyce’s claim that Woolf reifies and inverts ‘Victorianism,’ the unsettling and 
underscoring of both conventional and Woolf’s own periodization is an impulse more 
closely tied to what Joyce calls deconstruction. 
 
36 As the pageant enters “The Victorian Age” (149), its tone turns pointed just as audience 
members most desire nostalgia. The constable, figure for Victorian “authority” (161), at 
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 Though the two works are obviously different in genre, structure, and tone, 
Woolf’s final novel returns strikingly to the concerns of the much-earlier Orlando. Woolf 
had neither resolved nor walked away from the historical-epistemological problems 
raised in this funny little fantasy, as I have established through her essays and reviews. 
The shared techniques of these two novels, so different in other ways, underscore even 
more strongly the repeated struggles that characterize her inheritance of historical 
authority. Each novel uses as a structural principle a familiar historical genre—biography 
in Orlando and the pageant in Between the Acts. And each problematizes historical 
periodization (and historical knowledge more broadly) through the emergence of that 
historical genre into the fragmented present. The audience of Miss La Trobe’s pageant 
models the discomfort of readers as we reach ‘the present moment’ of Between the Acts: 
before the scenes even unfold, viewers are displeased at the program’s projection of “The 
Present Time. Ourselves.” “But what could she know about ourselves?,” they protest; 
“The Elizabethans, yes; the Victorians, perhaps; but ourselves […]—it was ridiculous” 
(178-9). They are prepared for one of two conclusions: a “flattering tribute” (182) 
through a depiction of the present as flattening as that of the Victorian, or “a Grand 
Ensemble. Army; Navy; Union Jack; and behind them perhaps […] the Church” (179). 
They are not at all prepared for ten minutes of unmediated reality, “Swallows, cows, etc.” 
(179), or a noisy rush of the actors in costumes from various periods holding a random 
                                                                                                                                            
first speaks unsurprisingly of “empire,” “duty,” “purity,” “security,” “prosperity,” 
“respectability,” and “the laws of God and Man” (161-2). As his speech continues, 
though, the constable’s language begins to suggest the emptiness of Victorian charity and 
religion. He concludes, “Let ’em sweat at the mines; cough at the looms; rightly endure 
their lot. That’s the price of empire; that’s the white man’s burden” (163). At least some 
audience members feel affronted; Mrs. Lynn Jones finds herself uncomfortable, as 
though “a sneer had been aimed at her father; therefore at herself” (164). 
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collection of reflective items “To show us up,” as the audience defensively interprets 
(186). The pageant ought, its viewers expect, to end within what they see as history, not 
to turn on them in their seats. 
Similarly, while the Orlando narrator reminds us of “the first duty of a 
biographer, which is to plod […] on and on methodically till we fall plump into the grave 
and write finis on the tombstone above our heads” (65), Orlando is still very much alive 
at the end of the book. Defying the generic rules of historical biography as well as the 
biological limitations on the length of a human life, Orlando jolts “violently” into “the 
present moment,” ten o’clock on the morning of 11 October 1928 (298). Orlando: A 
Biography ends not with a tombstone and finis but with Orlando’s unfinished thought, 
punctuated with an ellipsis, and “the twelfth stroke of midnight, Thursday, the eleventh of 
October, Nineteen Hundred and Twenty-eight” (329). Like the pageant and its audience 
in Between the Acts, Orlando enters the present moment with confusion and shock but 
does continue into it, crossing historical periods into the uncharacterizable modern day. If 
we feel our experiences are so unique, so unassimilable to the generalizations of 
historical narrative, Orlando and Between the Acts seem to ask of the genres they invoke, 
how can we assume differently of past lives? 
Woolf’s critique of Victorian historiography thus repeatedly and comically self-
destructs. For instance, Orlando implies disapprovingly that the Victorian was an 
oversimplifying mode of knowledge. In order to render judgment in the legal cases that 
span centuries, the courts must define and stabilize Orlando’s gender—a definition that 
occurs during the Victorian age both legally and in Orlando’s bending to the conventions 
of the period. When the legal ruling arrives at her door, it is her fiancé who manfully 
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orders the messenger up, “as if on his own quarter deck” (254). And yet Orlando also 
winks at the modern reification of the Victorian when the narrator describes in 
nineteenth-century St. James Park “a conglomeration […] of the most heterogeneous and 
ill-assorted objects, piled higgledy-piggledy in a vast mound where the statue of Queen 
Victoria now stands” (232). 
 In the first decades of the twentieth century, writers were only beginning to 
stabilize ‘the Victorian,’ and thus the Victorian historian, as an image to reject or 
emulate. Woolf and others remembered the variety of actual Victorian historians and 
biographers, people—mostly men—who disagreed with each other and whose works and 
theories were often internally inconsistent, who had personal lives and personalities as 
well as careers and works, who used to send one’s father a book or read one poetry on 
Sunday evenings. As Joyce implies, rebelling against a tradition involves both defining 
that tradition and allowing oneself to be defined in part by it, allowing the terms of the 
discussion to be set by that tradition: it posits the tradition as an image of authority. Such 
rebellion is part but not all of the historical questioning of Orlando, which simplifies and 
stabilizes—though never completely—the traditions of biography, historiography, and 
narrative Woolf learned from her father and her extensive reading, initially in her father’s 
library. 
 By allowing herself inconsistency and by making fun of herself alongside her 
Victorian forebears, by doubting her own access to historical knowledge as much as 
theirs, Woolf explores the problem of historical writing from many angles. Her career 
spans decades in which the intellectual authority of historians, presenting themselves as 
objectively reconstructing the past, is unsettled in the academic disciplines as well as in 
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the arts. Time and again, Woolf recognizes the problem but also recognizes her inability 
to solve it—and entertains the impossibility of its solution. This chapter’s remaining 
sections envision Orlando’s humor and the instability of its narrator as richly 
accommodating to the difficulties of Woolf’s position, making space for a fluid but 
seriously engaged historiographic critique. 
 
The Orlando Narrator and Historical Authority 
In shifting amongst modes of knowing, Orlando draws attention to the difficulty 
of distinguishing amongst those modes, especially underscoring the work of the 
imagination even in disciplinary history. It pretends at moments to follow traditional 
procedures, as when the narrator invokes that most familiar function of realist historical 
fiction, by which such a novel ‘fills in the blanks’ of recorded history. Sometimes, 
regrettably but inevitably, “a hole in the manuscript” makes it “necessary to speculate, to 
surmise, and even to make use of the imagination” (119). And yet, this text is anything 
but a traditional historical novel humbly filling in archival gaps with realistic though 
imaginative reconstructions. Rather, from page to page, and even line to line, the 
narrative voice of Orlando pointedly shifts the ground of its own authority. Instead of 
covering up the seams between its historical and imaginative elements as a traditional 
historical fiction would do, it insistently draws attention to its violation of the boundaries 
amongst history, biography, novel-writing, and poetry. In shifting and blurring its own 
authority with regard to the past, Orlando deconstructs rather than simply inverting these 
received conventions of knowing and narrating history. 
 The Orlando narrator is as difficult to pin down as Orlando him- or herself. 
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About one-fifth of the way through Orlando, the narrator announces: “Up to this point 
[…] documents, both private and historical, have made it possible to fulfill the first duty 
of a biographer, which is to plod […] in the indelible footprints of truth” (65)—in other 
words, that the text has so far operated in the strictly documented and truthful mode of 
historical biography. Although we have now arrived at an event “dark, mysterious, and 
undocumented,” the narrator reaffirms a “simple duty […] to state the facts as far as they 
are known” (65). And yet, Orlando makes a joke of the idea that such a duty might be 
simple, or that this narrator is genuinely attempting a straightforward account of the facts. 
Later, when we encounter that “hole in the manuscript,” the narrator invokes an official 
historical record but focuses on its gaps, including literal destruction of parts of the 
record by fire; though the tone here is one of humbly making do with the available 
record, the narrator proceeds to exercise “the imagination” with gusto while underscoring 
the unknowability of the past (119). As its narrator slips between the roles of artist and 
researcher, storyteller and truth-teller, the novel underscores the inadequacy of either 
traditional form to the task of opening up historical understanding to the vagaries of 
personality, gender, and human experience as Woolf paints them here. And as he or she 
slips between the roles of man and woman, the novel draws attention to how the 
intellectual authority of those roles is also gendered. 
 Orlando’s narrator is an ambiguous and unnamed figure, a consciousness that 
shifts allegiances throughout the text. In some passages, the narrator identifies with and 
claims the authority of the historian, historical biographer, or “historian of letters” (113). 
He or she consults those fire-damaged records, analyzes their meaning as artifacts (121), 
and quotes extensively from a damaged diary, a letter, and a newspaper in 
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‘reconstructing’ a sequence of events in seventeenth-century Constantinople (126-30). 
This narrative consciousness operates like a professional historian in constructing the text 
by including a corrective, source-based footnote (167); a preface invoking archival 
research and historical knowledge (interestingly, acknowledging her husband’s 
“profound historical knowledge” and “accuracy”); an index of names, mostly of historical 
persons; supposedly authentic (though historically impossible) illustrations; and the 
subtitle “A Biography.” 
This historian narrator makes jibes at novelists and poets, positing them as other. 
He or she claims, for instance: “To give a truthful account of London society […] is 
beyond the powers of the biographer or the historian. Only those who have little need of 
the truth, and no respect for it—the poets and the novelists—can be trusted to do it, for 
this is one of the cases where truth does not exist” (192). This passage asserts that 
“Society is the most powerful concoction in the world and society has no existence 
whatsoever. Such monsters the poets and the novelists alone can deal with; with such 
something-nothings their works are stuffed out to prodigious size; and to them with the 
best will in the world we are content to leave it” (194). These attacks undermine 
themselves by appearing in a work by a well-known novelist, and undermine their 
supposed discourse (that of scholarly historical biography) by admitting it inadequate to 
the rather important subject of “society” as the term extends beyond the upper classes and 
embraces human interaction and experience. Despite this irony, they also genuinely 
undermine traditions of poetry and novels that can only accommodate the silliness of 
parties, curtsies, and fashion: “is this what people call life?,” Orlando wonders in distress 
(195). 
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 At other moments, however, the historian is posited as other. Occasionally this 
move implies little judgment, positioning the narrator as a reader of history: “The Great 
Frost was, historians tell us, the most severe that has ever visited these islands” (33). At 
other points, the narrator disparages the values of conventional historiography, claiming 
for instance that “these moralities belong, and should be left to the historian, since they 
are as dull as ditch water” (149). In another scene, the narrator implies that historians lack 
a genuine understanding of history in their tendency to simplifying narratives: Orlando 
takes a train for the first time “without giving a thought to ‘that stupendous invention, 
which had (the historians say) completely changed the face of Europe in the past twenty 
years’ (as, indeed, happens much more frequently than historians suppose)” (272-3). In 
the same vein, when a young Orlando presents himself to Queen Elizabeth—one of 
several famous historical figures who make cameos as we follow his and then her life—
his view is obscured by “shyness,” and he bows his head “as the great rings flashed in the 
water and then something pressed his hair—which, perhaps, accounts for his seeing 
nothing more likely to be of use to a historian” (22). The implication is that the narrator is 
not a historian, as he or she finds plenty of interest in the scene and Orlando’s experience 
of it. 
 In still other scenes the narrator wavers between factual and fictional stances 
before our very eyes; even the preface acknowledges Victorian historical novelist Scott 
and Victorian historian Macaulay right next to each other. The “hole in the manuscript” 
appears in a passage of such wavering: “Just when we thought to elucidate a secret that 
has puzzled historians for a hundred years,” the narrator explains, “there was a hole in the 
manuscript big enough to put your finger through. We have done our best to piece out a 
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meager summary from the charred fragments that remain; but often it has been necessary 
to speculate, to surmise, and even to make use of the imagination” (119). Here, a 
historical biographer bound to documented facts admits the method of invention in the 
absence of archival evidence. Similarly, but less frankly, from one paragraph to the next 
in describing Orlando’s daily life in Constantinople, the narrator moves from a historical 
approach with hesitant modifiers—“it would seem,” “somewhat,” “[a]bout,” 
“apparently”—to a novelistic approach, confidently recounting Orlando’s thoughts, 
feelings, and private actions (120-1). And when the narrator observes Orlando at her 
family prayer book and wonders about her “pious thoughts” and “evil passions,”  he or 
she is at a loss for answers because “Novelist, poet, historian all falter with their hand on 
that door” (172). 
 This narrator sometimes appeals to the authority of a historical record and the 
conventions of historical biography and history, from indices to grand theories of 
causation and historical change, yet often takes the liberties granted poets and novelists. 
He or she rejects both historiography—boring, inaccurate, self-satisfied—and historical 
fiction—disrespectful of facts, obsessed with the meaningless mess we call ‘society.’ 
These ambiguities and this all-encompassing dissatisfaction with available modes of 
historical narrative bear out Woolf’s stance in her essays and reviews. But it does so 
through an extended performance that opens out into the authorities and territories of 
multiple discourses, and moreover through a performance that uses the unpredictable and 
illogical—an inconsistent narrative stance, an impossible hero/heroine, jokes and 
laughter—as a tool for unsettling the rationality and objectivity of scholarly historical 
discourses. 
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Making Fun: Humor in Orlando and “The New Biography” 
 Orlando is funny, and nearly everything it says is a joke. This comic exuberance, 
related to the text’s lighthearted sense of fantasy, allows its narrator and main character to 
exist outside traditional categories of sex, time, genre, and modes of truth. It also often 
results in critics writing it off as, for instance, “a squib […] a playful exercise in 
androgyny [… that] proved curiously successful commercially” (Bradbury 180). Orlando 
certainly is playful and pleasurable, but its play is not simply amusing; it also allows 
Woolf to present this problem she cannot resolve, the problem of historical 
representation. In this section, I consider the work of humor in Orlando by following its 
echo of Woolf’s 1927 review “The New Biography”; the dialogue between these two 
texts further illuminates Orlando’s performance of multiple historical discourses. 
In Woolf’s essays, both disciplinary history and more personal relationships with 
the historical past are represented as powerful, entertaining, impossible, and life-
destroying. In a single text, Orlando encompasses this range of impressions, juggling 
them through its sometimes-casual, sometimes-serious, sometimes-poetic, sometimes-
fact-obsessed narrator, the subject of so much irony and the source of so much 
amusement. This novel’s performative treatment of the Victorian era and of its narrative, 
biographical, and historiographic conventions is parodic and mocking; it particularly sets 
up and undercuts the idea of the historical biographer who fancies himself the authority 
on the past, his knowledge ungendered, universal, transparent, factual, and therefore 
unassailable. The sometimes bumbling and document-obsessed narrator is pulled, like 
Orlando herself, by the apparently extremely strong force of Victorian conventionality, 
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and he or she struggles against the absurdity that makes writing Orlando’s life in that 
period virtually impossible. The comedy of these passages allows us to see a narrator 
who is both entirely, stereotypically Victorian and at odds with Victorian conventions—
just as it allows for an Orlando who is both entirely, stereotypically Victorian and at odds 
with Victorian conventions. 
 The comedy of Orlando arises in part through its mocking presentation of its 
narrator. If, as some points of the text suggest, this narrator is a historical biographer, he 
or she is often a laughable one. Though the text includes photographs of its subject and 
her ancestors and romantic interests—and, after the table of contents, an official-
sounding list of illustrations—its photograph of a sixteenth-century Russian princess 
clearly deviates from historical plausibility. And, as Caroline Webb observes, while it 
includes a preface whose serious-sounding acknowledgements at first “[mimic] the 
habitual voice of Victorian biographers so precisely as to be unexceptional” (192), the 
preface turns out to be a series of jokes. Throughout the novel but particularly in the 
nineteenth-century passages, the historical voice tends to the absurd. When the narrator 
develops a theory by which a sudden change in climate produces a new nineteenth-
century temperament (227-34), or when the narrator can only, according to biographical 
conventions and in view of Orlando’s behavior, recite the months of a whole year of her 
life (266), the effect is humorous rather than authoritative, despite or even because of the 
traditional trappings of historical authority. The ironic treatment of the narrator’s persona 
as historian and biographer works to undermine the authority of those trappings—the 
index, footnote, preface, and table of illustrations as well as the didactic tone, focus on 
causation, privileging of action outside the home over thought at one’s writing table or 
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tea table, and obsession with factuality as the most important or only mode of truth. 
And yet, as “The New Biography” makes clear, to mock is not quite the same as 
to reject. There, Woolf famously argues that no biographer has yet been able 
satisfactorily to represent life, “that queer amalgamation of dream and reality, that 
perpetual marriage of granite and rainbow” (Essays IV: 478). The essay is a review of 
Harold Nicolson’s37 Some People, and though it is critical, the review contends that 
“Nicolson with his mixture of biography and autobiography, of fact and fiction, […] 
waves his hand airily in a possible direction” of a solution (478). Insofar as his book 
succeeds, Woolf suggests, it does so by being “extremely amusing,” by laughing at its 
subjects as well as its author—but with “the laughter of intelligence,” laughter that 
“mak[es] us take the people he laughs at seriously” (476). Similarly, in Orlando as well 
as in her essays, Woolf’s intelligent amusement extends to herself as interpreter and 
reader of history. It thus allows her to accept the inadequacy of existing historical 
forms—both the Victorian and the various reactions against the Victorian—without 
freezing in her tracks and abandoning historical thought. 
On the other hand, Woolf worries that in Some People, “The irony with which 
[the subjects] are treated, though it has its tenderness, stunts their growth,” leaving them 
“rather below life size” (477). Woolf considers both the promise and the danger of 
bringing a sense of humor to biography, and of combining fact and fiction: as for the 
latter, while “Nicolson has shown that a little fiction mixed with fact can be made to 
transmit personality very effectively” (477), Woolf is also concerned that he appears able 
“to mix the truth of real life and the truth of fiction […] only by using no more than a 
                                                
37 Nicolson, a biographer, was the husband of Vita Sackville-West. 
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pinch of either. For though both truths are genuine, they are antagonistic; let them meet 
and they destroy each other” (477-8). Clearly these reflections are relevant to her own 
work in Orlando, where irony and mocking accommodate the slipperiness, uncertainty, 
and inconsistency needed to undermine traditional forms of masculine, universalizing, 
and absolute intellectual authority in selectively narrating the past and (especially 
women’s) lives—and where irony and mocking preclude a genuine solution, the proposal 
of a viable form through which to explore and express the complexity of personality and 
especially of women’s lives. Woolf questions not only the Victorians but also her own 
modes of questioning them. 
The comedy of Orlando plays off and helps produce stereotypes of the Victorian 
biographer, historian, and novelist, as I discuss in the next section. In “The New 
Biography,” too, we see humor used to this effect. The essay opens by (mis)quoting 
Leslie Stephen’s successor as editor of the Dictionary of National Biography: “‘The aim 
of biography,’ said Sir Sidney Lee […], ‘is the truthful transmission of personality,’ and 
no single sentence could more neatly split up into two parts the whole problem of 
biography as it presents itself to us today” (473). She continues in a tone of admiration 
and graciousness: 
For the truth of which Sir Sidney speaks, the truth which biography demands, 
is truth in its hardest, most obdurate form; it is truth as truth is to be found in 
the British Museum; it is truth out of which all vapour of falsehood has been 
pressed by the weight of research. Only when truth had been thus established 
did Sir Sidney Lee use it in the building of his monument; and no one can be 
so foolish as to deny that the piles he raised of such hard facts, whether one is 
called Shakespeare or another King Edward the Seventh, are worthy of all our 
respect. […] Truth being thus efficacious and supreme, we can only explain 
the fact that Sir Sidney’s life of Shakespeare is dull, and that his life of 
Edward the Seventh is unreadable, by supposing that though both are stuffed 
with truth, he failed to choose those truths which transmit personality. (473) 
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Woolf makes clear that both she and Lee see the transmission of personality as the whole 
point of biography and then mock-innocently wonders how it is that Lee’s method, so 
carefully carried out, completely misses the mark; she characterizes the method bitingly 
in suggesting that Lee treats people as “piles […] of hard facts.” By making fun of Lee, 
Woolf stabilizes his work and goes on to characterize “the Victorian biography” in 
similar terms. 
 In (sometimes) presenting a correspondingly stuffy and hemmed-in researcher as 
its narrator, Orlando exposes hypocrisy within the authoritative stance of historical 
biography. As Karin Westman notes, both “The Friendships Gallery” (1907) and Orlando 
present “satiric commentary both on the necessarily imaginative role a biographer plays 
in re-presenting experience and on the historiographic methods that traditionally mask 
this subjective view” (“First Orlando” 43). In each text, a narrator writing as a biographer 
“acknowledges the limitations that censor his38 narrative, but does so in a way that such 
limitations appear ill-conceived and hypocritical—indeed, worthy of our laughter” 
(Westman, “First Orlando” 46). In “The New Biography,” Woolf delineates these 
limitations quite clearly: we have not yet found a satisfactory solution to the challenges of 
granite and rainbow, but: 
Be that as it may we can assure ourselves by a very simple experiment that 
the days of Victorian biography are over. Consider one’s own life; pass 
under review a few years that one has actually lived. Conceive how Lord 
Morley would have expounded them; how Sir Sidney Lee would have 
documented them; how strangely all that had been most real in them 
would have slipped through their fingers. (478) 
 
Woolf’s review is ambivalent, ending with the rather defeated assertion that while the 
                                                
38 Later in this chapter, I discuss—and contest—the straightforward characterization of 
the narrator as masculine. 
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‘new biography’ is doomed because “[t]ruth of fact and truth of fiction are incompatible,” 
we might as well not return to the Victorian biography that ignores “all that had been 
most real” in life (478). This position of dissatisfaction without solution is well 
accommodated by Orlando’s narrative irony and shapeshifting, by which the novel 
(unlike the review) can try out a range of modes, critiquing several historical approaches 
without entirely discarding them, trying out a mixture of fact and fiction without 
committing to any approach with theoretical, scholarly, or novelistic seriousness. And 
even though this text uses light humor and a shifting stance to deliver Woolf’s historical-
epistemological critique, it proves perfectly capable of a steady position on one point—
on that aspect of Victorian historiography which she treats with unabated displeasure 
during her otherwise quite conflicted career. 
 
Writing Women in Orlando’s Nineteenth Century 
 Woolf’s, and Orlando’s, critique of Victorian modes of knowledge and authority 
is least ambivalent with regard to gender: time and again, she writes (angrily, sadly, 
cleverly, amusingly) against the exclusion of women from histories and biographies. 
According to Anna Snaith, “The importance for [Woolf] of the lives of the obscure, and 
the role of women’s biography and autobiography in ‘publicizing’ women’s experience, 
cannot be overstated” (42). Orlando launches a serious critique of Victorian 
historiography and biography—as well as realist fiction—as sexist and limiting forms. 
And as Hoberman notes, Woolf “recognized the huge impact biographies have on the 
construal of reality, and she bemoaned the absence of women from the biographical 
record” (14). In realizing the immense public authority of biographical and other 
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historical writing, Woolf cannot dismiss them—even if she cannot believe in them—
because the forms’ significance compels her to work on them, attempting to modify them 
to make room for women’s lives. 
 Orlando makes such room in part by drawing attention to and unsettling the 
traditional gendering of the biographic, historical, or novelistic voice of authority as both 
masculine and universal. Over and over, it enacts that “sudden splitting off of 
consciousness” described in A Room of One’s Own, shifting to render the familiar “alien”  
and the self-evident questionable (2142).  We can see this work clearly, for instance, as 
the narrator recounts Orlando’s conversation with an eighteenth-century prostitute named 
Nell. Dressed as a man, Orlando removes her disguise with “anger, merriment, and pity” 
(217); this truth known, they and a group of other prostitutes “would draw round the 
Punch bowl […], and many were the fine tales they told and many the amusing 
observations they made for it cannot be denied that when women get together—but 
hist—they are always careful to see that the doors are shut and that not a word of it gets 
into print” (219). Here, the printed word is the product of men, and the narrator is shut 
out by the door the women close; their words do not appear in this text. The passage 
continues, “All they desire is—but hist again—is that not a man’s step on the stair? All 
they desire, we were about to say when the gentleman took the very words out of our 
mouths. Women have no desires, says this gentleman, coming into Nell’s parlour; only 
affectations” (219). While the narrator accepts the statement of “the gentleman” and 
seems conflated with him in the “male step” that causes the women to shush themselves, 
the experience of having “the very words [taken] out of our mouths” by a gentleman is a 
more typically female one: the gentleman silences the women and substitutes his own 
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words for those of the narrator. 
After all this attention to the role of gender in determining knowledge and its 
limits, the scene draws to a close on what must now be an absurd denial of the question 
of the narrator’s gender. Reflecting on what it is that women do or say alone together, the 
narrator decides: 
As that is not a question that can engage the attention of a sensible man, 
let us, who enjoy the immunity of all biographers and historians from any 
sex whatever, pass it over, and merely state that Orlando professed great 
enjoyment in the society of her own sex, and leave it to the gentlemen to 
prove, as they are very fond of doing, that this is impossible. (220) 
 
The narrator—aligned for the moment with biographers and historians rather than poets 
and novelists—is here both masculine and incompletely gendered. He discards a line of 
inquiry because it does not merit “the attention of a sensible man” but excludes herself 
from another discussion amongst “the gentlemen.” The narrator’s claim to “the immunity 
of all biographers and historians from any sex whatever” is as laughable as his or her 
earlier pretense to “let other pens treat of sex and sexuality” (139) in a book whose main 
character changes sex and carries on countless affairs. The narrator’s gender is also 
changeable, enabling an irony that exposes the masculine perspective underlying 
mainstream biography’s and history’s pretenses to disinterested objectivity. 
 In Orlando, such nineteenth-century biographical conventions seem as 
“antipathetic” to Woolf and her narrator as “the spirit of the nineteenth century” is to 
Orlando (244). The Victorian age is represented as particularly stifling both to women 
writing and to the writing of women’s experiences and personalities; the connection 
between these two modes of making history (women writing histories and women acting 
upon history) is as strong and nearly as explicit here as in A Room of One’s Own. But 
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here, the point is performed through a narrator shifting not only amongst individual 
consciousnesses but amongst discourses and genders. Kathryn Miles further clarifies the 
role of Orlando’s highly visible narrator by suggesting that this voice performs the 
conventions of authority Woolf sees in various traditions of writing past lives. Miles 
reads Orlando as a creative presentation of the history of biography Woolf sketches at the 
beginning of “The New Biography,” with an Elizabethan biographer-narrator in the 
Elizabethan chapter, a Boswell-like voice in the eighteenth century, and so forth. In the 
nineteenth century of “The New Biography,” biography “privileges truth of fact and 
elides personality” (Miles 215). Accordingly, the Orlando narrator in the Victorian 
period “becomes increasingly interested in that which can be empirically accounted for: 
detailed accounts of legal briefs, invitations, and other bits of tangible proof begin to 
clutter the pages of the Victorian account of Orlando’s life” (Miles 216)—but, Miles 
observes, even the narrator cannot long abide this approach, which privileges the 
masculine, the adventures of Great Men over the thoughts and poetry of boring, 
insignificant ladies whose purpose is to marry and then produce boys who can inherit 
property and titles. 
Just as Orlando has trouble living and writing in the Victorian age, Miles argues 
convincingly that “it is in this section […] where the biographer begins his most overt 
critique and protest of biographical mores” (216), objecting to Victorian constraints on 
the form. In “The New Biography,” Woolf complains that Victorian biographers were 
“dominated by the idea of goodness. [...] The figure is almost always above life size in 
top hat and frock coat, and the manner of presentation becomes increasingly clumsy and 
laborious” (Essays IV: 475). But the Orlando narrator, following his or her now-female 
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subject, faces these conventions with eye-rolling annoyance: “It was now November. 
After November, comes December. Then January, February, March, and April. […] This 
method of writing biography, though it has its merits, is a little bare, perhaps” (266). 
Here, the narrator does not seriously play the scholarly biographer but rather underscores 
the particularly offensive conventions of Victorian biography through irony. Indeed, the 
narrator complains of the impossibility of writing an interesting, valuable biography of a 
subject such as Orlando given these conventions (266-7), drawing attention to the 
absurdity of what he or she has just written and to the difficulty of writing women’s lives 
into history as it is told within Victorian scholarly traditions and values. 
 Like many other critics, though, Miles artificially stabilizes this narrator as “the 
biographer” and as “he.” Certainly the narrator is sometimes identified as a biographer, 
and sometimes clearly strikes a masculine pose; by attending to the ways and moments in 
which the text is composed by a male biographer, Miles and others illuminate Orlando’s 
critique of the biographical conventions of Lee, Morley, and Stephen—conventions that 
exclude women. The issue is far from merely a scholarly one: Woolf, as Hoberman 
reminds us, “saw the exclusion of women from historical action as not only reflected but 
reinforced by the exclusion of women from historical commentary” (134). And yet, the 
Orlando narrator does not occupy either position—biographer or man—consistently, and 
treating him or her as stable oversimplifies the complex ways in which Orlando grapples 
with these problems of historical representation. 
If we examine the narrator’s performance as biographer at the expense of those 
moments in which that stance wavers, we might imagine a novel in which Woolf simply 
mocks traditional, fact-based historical biography and posits fiction as a freeing 
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alternative to the binding and misleading conventions of Victorian-style historiography. 
Instead, as Westman argues, Woolf critiques nineteenth-century traditions of both 
disciplinary history and novel-writing in Orlando and other works. Woolf, Westman 
asserts, traces the connection between “history’s official narratives and a corresponding 
literary realism” (Westman, “Character” 4). She exposes both modes as patriarchal and 
capitalist in their ‘realism’: “The moral imperative which motivated Thomas Babington 
Macaulay’s Victorian and G. M. Trevelyan’s Edwardian historiographic projects parallels 
the didactic goals of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century novel” (Westman, 
“Character” 4). Orlando’s form, with its slippery narrator, demonstrates that merely 
filling in the blanks of traditional history with (traditional) historical fiction is inadequate 
because, in fact, both forms are based in the same Victorian, sexist values and authority. 
This fictional historian’s text, by taking the form’s discourse mixing so far as to 
perform the historian’s role (and any role) only in flickers and laughs, thus unsettles the 
authority of realist fiction, history, and biography. The multiplicity of positions claimed 
by the Orlando narrator mocks not only the pretense of objectivity and disinterestedness 
of the historical biographer’s voice—“the immunity of all biographers and historians 
from any sex whatever” (220)—but also the epistemic, aesthetic, and moral “authority” 
claimed by “the male novelists” (269) in the conventions of their realism. Instead of 
merely supplementing an existing historical and biographical record with additional, 
alternative, or even imagined data, Orlando exists both between and beyond the 
traditionally complimentary modes of scholarly and fictional history. It uses multiplicity, 
slipperiness, satire, and irony to suggest the limits of every available mode of historical 
narrative. 
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 The Victorian appears as the era in which it is most difficult to write a woman’s 
life; it is also the era in which it is most difficult for Orlando, as a woman, to write. It is 
the most oppressively gendering. In the eighteenth century, Orlando often dresses as a 
man and takes both male and female lovers, but in the nineteenth even this eccentric 
bends to gender roles; she blushes at wearing breeches (233), marries, and tops off the era 
by producing a male heir in the paragraph before the transition into the twentieth century 
and Edward’s reign (296). In Orlando’s Victorian England, even in reference to the 
queen, pregnancy is “the fact; the great fact; the only fact” which itself must be hidden 
modestly under a crinoline (234). Emphasizing the distinctiveness of Orlando’s approach 
to this most recent historical period, the image of a pregnant Victoria appears in 
juxtaposition to a flashback to Queen Elizabeth three paragraphs later. In Orlando’s 
memory, the sixteenth-century queen “stood astride the fireplace with a flagon of beer in 
her hand, which she suddenly dashed on the table when Lord Burghley tactlessly used the 
imperative instead of the subjunctive. ‘Little man, little man, […] is ‘must’ a word to be 
addressed to princes?” (235). Elizabeth’s authority as a “prince” has been replaced by 
Victoria’s far more passive representation in the text, wearing a wedding ring and then a 
crinoline and later appearing as a statue. Orlando initially resists the Victorian era’s 
differences from the other periods she has experienced, but she cannot ignore its impact 
on her own writing. 
When she decides to return to her poem “The Oak Tree” in this period, Orlando 
thinks, “True, Queen Victoria is on the throne and not Queen Elizabeth, but what 
difference. …” (237). But as Orlando “dip[s] her pen in the ink,” she is interrupted by 
servants busy with her tea service; “a blot” spreads over the page; “[s]he tried to go on 
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with what she was saying; no words came” (238). Moments later, she can only write “the 
most insipid verse she had ever read in her life,” over which she has no control: 
emphatically in the passive voice, “[h]er page was written” in a hand that is not her own, 
and when “[a]gain she dipped her pen and off it went” with more nonsense, Orlando can 
take charge only by pouring ink over the page (238-9). Suddenly painfully aware of the 
ring finger on her left hand, Orlando buys herself a wedding band and tries to write again, 
but she once more faces either meaningless ink blots or a pen that “ambled off” into 
awful verse beyond her control. She thus decides “to yield completely and submissively 
to the spirit of the age, and take a husband” (243). Finally, Orlando is able to write again, 
though only because she is safely married and “no satirist, cynic, or psychologist” (266). 
Her work, especially in reference to sexuality, is now subject to an internalized censor: a 
“power […] which had been reading over her shoulder” objects to her reference to 
“Egyptian girls” but allows it because she “ha[s] a husband at the Cape” (265). Though 
the narrator claims that Orlando “remained herself” and had successfully compromised 
enough with “the spirit of the age” to write, Orlando is clearly more aware of what she is 
permitted to write, think, and feel as a woman in the Victorian era than she has been 
during the previous centuries of her life. The interruption of writing on the part of 
domestic life—the servants and tea pot and a ring finger in want of a wedding ring—can 
only be surmounted by at least an outward “submission” to the domestic, the masculine, 
and the heterosexual. 
It is, after all, during the Victorian era that Orlando “is pronounced indisputably, 
and beyond the shadow of a doubt […] Female” (255); the “spirit of the age” cannot 
abide the indeterminate gender of eighteenth-century Orlando and employs the law to sort 
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out her appropriate mode of being. Orlando does regain her ability to write and even 
finally finishes the poem during this era (271). At the same time, as we have seen, her life 
as a wealthy Victorian woman—cut off from action outside the home, inside writing 
while her husband sails around Cape Horn—is hardly life worth mentioning at all: “Life, 
it has been agreed by everyone whose opinion is worth consulting, is the only fit subject 
for novelist or biographer; life, the same authorities have decided, has nothing whatever 
to do with sitting still in a chair and thinking” (267). A biographer (or novelist) faced 
with such an externally inactive subject, and bound by nineteenth-century biographic (or 
literary) procedures, can only count off the months. In this case, it matters little whether 
the narrator aspires to the truth of fact or of fiction, since “the authorities” of each mode 
deem women’s lives outside “life.” 
In her 1910 review “‘Modes and Manners of the Nineteenth Century,’” Virginia 
Stephen places the blame for women’s exclusion from historical narrative, at least, firmly 
upon nineteenth-century men of history. The review briefly exhibits an all-out caricature 
of the Victorian historian, complete with top hat: 
When one has read no history for a time the sad-coloured volumes are 
really surprising. […] Wars and ministries and legislation—unexampled 
prosperity and unbridled corruption tumbling the nation headlong to 
decay—what a strange delusion it all is!—invented presumably by 
gentlemen in tall hats in the Forties who wished to dignify mankind. Our 
point of view they ignore entirely: we have never felt the pressure of a 
single law; our passions and despairs have nothing to do with trade; our 
virtues and vices flourish under all governments impartially. The machine 
they describe; they succeed to some extent of making us believe in it; but 
the heart of it they leave untouched—is it because they cannot understand 
it? At any rate, we are left out, and history, in our opinion, lacks an eye. 
(330) 
 
Women, living outside scholars’ definition of history, are written out of history by 
“gentlemen in tall hats in the [eighteen] Forties who wished to dignify mankind.” These 
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men’s national narratives of linear development—whether of progress (“unexampled 
prosperity”) or decline (“unbridled corruption”)—not only disregard but, Woolf suspects, 
cannot account for female lives. 
It is in keeping with images such as this one that Ruth Hoberman asserts that, for 
Woolf as well as for Strachey, “Serving as images of this polarity [between history and 
women] are two figures, both biographers, husbands, and Victorians: Thomas Carlyle and 
Leslie Stephen. Biography for Woolf was, above all, the genre of Carlyle, who argued 
that history was made by ‘Great Men,’ of her father, and, overall, of an exaggerated 
belief in the power of human will and an oversimplified view of what the self is” (135). 
Each man “served […] as a vehicle through which to attack the Victorian age as a whole” 
(135). But, as I have argued throughout this chapter, Woolf never seriously and steadily 
launched an unambivalent attack, in part because she also could not accept literary-
modernist approaches to the past and in part because she wanted to use the authority of 
recognizable biographical and historical forms—those popular, interesting, factual-
sounding, truth-making Victorian works. As Hoberman explains, “she was faced with a 
dilemma: how could she appropriate the influence and ideological weight carried by 
biographical writing without either succumbing to its traditional values and methods, or 
vitiating its effectiveness by losing her audience’s trust?” (133-4). Hoberman’s answer is 
that, in Flush and Orlando, Woolf brings together “granite and rainbow but [does] so as a 
‘joke’” (134); she “meet[s] her father halfway: accepting his allegiance to the facts 
halfway, borrowing his narrative persona halfway, imitating his emphasis on gender roles 
halfway” (146). Such a “halfway,” in-between stance is enabled by a narrator who is both 
man and woman (and neither), both novelist and historical biographer (and neither), 
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approaching each stance with ironic distance. 
Furthermore, the nonlinearity of Woolf’s historical inheritance and her mixture of 
attraction to and repulsion from Victorian historical authority are not simply concessions. 
They are not failures in some larger teleological progress from flawed Victorian faith to 
wise modern skepticism. As Woolf records in her diary even in a mood of annoyance 
with “The complete Insider,” she esteemed the “great service like Roman roads” 
performed by scholars including Trevelyan and her father; as I have argued above, her 
own meaningful access to “the forests & the will o the wisps” often depends upon just 
such roads (Diary 333). This career of complex engagement with a historical-
epistemological inheritance thus dramatizes the implications of the nonlinearity of 
historical knowledge—the messiness of history’s history for insiders and outsiders alike. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
“A True Historian”: 
Historical Authority outside History in the Claudius Novels 
 
This chapter turns from Woolf’s self-conscious historical-epistemological 
questioning to a pair of apparently quite straightforward historical fictions, bestselling 
novels that take an extremely confident tone and earned their author much-needed cash 
and lasting fame. Robert Graves’s I, Claudius and Claudius the God (both 1934). These 
novels, so distant from the humor and shapeshifting of Orlando, allow me to revisit the 
previous chapter’s preoccupations—with historical authority, the meeting points of 
factual and fictional discourses, the relationship between fictional historians’ texts and 
the historiographic debates raging between the wars—from a revealingly different angle. 
They provide an opportunity to delineate both the flexibility and the limitations of the 
narrative stance they share with Orlando. While the form of the historian’s text makes 
space for contradictions in both Woolf’s and Graves’s hands, Woolf’s intense 
engagement with the messiness and nonlinearity of historical knowledge is nowhere to be 
found in Graves’s Claudius novels. Instead, the layers of historical authority in I, 
Claudius and Claudius the God make room for a vision of absolute historical truth. 
Whereas Woolf deconstructs specific traditions of historical authority from the 
perspective of an outsider, able to accept neither Victorian historical biography nor the 
different modernisms of history and literature, Graves strives to hold together his own 
texts’ authority as both fiction and fact, toward both extra-disciplinary and specialist 
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readers. Like Graves’s comments in interviews and his theoretical discussions in texts 
such as The White Goddess, the Claudius novels take a didactic approach that asks a great 
deal of readers. They address readers willing to embrace the authority of scholarly 
history, to accept Graves’s historical authority as authorized by that of the discipline, and 
not to question Graves’s brazen divergence from the discipline’s traditions, procedures, 
and conventions. In this chapter, I argue that Graves’s sweeping claims to historical 
authority rely upon a representation of historical knowledge as ahistorical and 
unproblematic. I trace tensions within and between the two Claudius novels: tensions 
between the depiction of historical knowledge as transparent and the highly mediated 
nature of a fictionally translated and edited text; amongst the contradictory historical 
traditions Graves combines as though they were in perfect harmony; between absolute 
confidence and extreme sensitivity to criticism; and between Graves’s self-positioning as 
a novelist and as a historian. 
Graves avoids the epistemological challenges and controversy that grip Woolf, in 
part by avoiding the interpretive disagreements of modern scholars. Thus, when Huw P. 
Wheldon expresses surprise at Graves’s small library while interviewing him in his 
home, Graves explains: 
If you write a historical novel you don’t really need many books; you need 
the original histories, Latin or Greek histories, whatever it may be. The 
commentaries are not necessary. There are too many commentaries. You 
can get drowned in commentaries. I have the histories, a lot of dictionaries 
and reference books and it is simply a matter of throwing myself back into 
the right period and living very much in that period the whole time I am  
writing about it. (Kersnowski 51) 
He rarely refers to modern commentaries on classical texts, and generally proceeds as 
though modern histories were quite irrelevant. If Graves’s only claim for the Claudius 
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novels were as entertaining fictions or even as realistic impersonations of their classical 
‘author,’ this approach would be perfectly reasonable. Yet, as the final section of this 
chapter shows, he often insists that these novels tell a historical truth that should be taken 
seriously by the classicists and historians he blithely ignores. 
 Graves also avoids the complexity of historical doubt by firmly resisting the 
historicization of historical knowledge—a historicization not only performed in Orlando, 
but also promoted by many of Graves’s contemporaries within disciplinary history. The 
Claudius novels flatten historical knowledge into a transparent representation of the truth, 
at a time when many scholars and artists were reimagining historical knowledge as itself 
historically contingent—and when still others found modernist history’s new scientific 
approach so compelling that they could simply discount previous historical knowledge. 
The Claudius novels neither apply history’s methodology to itself in a critical reappraisal 
of past and present practices, nor privilege the most up-to-date version of history as the 
best. Instead, they treat the diverse historical discourses of classical historians, Victorian 
classicists and historians, and modernist historians as fundamentally equivalent in truth 
standards, procedures, and purposes. 
 These texts thus perpetuate some of the very assumptions against which we have 
seen Woolf writing. They naturalize the historical approach that Woolf historicizes and 
destabilizes in Orlando and so many of her other writings, a realist attitude that conveys a 
factual, objectively knowable past. The Claudius novels imagine an unchanging, 
common-sense mode of knowing the past—despite Graves’s own unorthodox 
methodology, his inconsistent though forceful statements regarding historical knowledge, 
and the enormous questioning of history’s authority both within and outside the discipline 
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during the decades surrounding the novels’ publications. In short, these novels accept as 
still current and unproblematic what Woolf struggles with as no longer believable yet still 
powerful: the impression that one can simply tell the truth about the past. 
 Paradoxically, I, Claudius and Claudius the God invoke a multiplicity of 
historical discourses—classical, Victorian, and modernist—through a layered narrative 
structure that draws attention to the mediation of historical knowledge even as other 
aspects of the texts treat that knowledge as transparent. On one level, the Claudius novels 
claim the historical authority of their eponymous historian narrator: even after he accedes 
as Roman Emperor, Claudius (10 BCE - 54 CE) portrays himself as fundamentally “a 
true historian” (462). Yet these novels are not only fictional historians’ texts at the 
diegetic level of Claudius’s narration. Mediating Claudius’s discourse, Graves enters the 
text as translator and editor, a modern scholar who re-presents this historical document 
through paratextual materials including footnotes and genealogical tables. We can thus 
trace distinct but interwoven claims to authority at the levels of Claudius as narrator (and 
implied author within the fictional world) and of Graves as implied author (and translator 
with reference to the fiction of Claudius’s authorship). In view of the fascinatingly 
defensive “Author’s Note” to Claudius the God, we can also characterize these novels as 
fictional historians’ texts in terms of Graves’s self-presentation as a historian as well as or 
instead of a novelist. Here and in his writings outside the novels, Graves sometimes 
claims not only aesthetic authority or even (like Woolf and many other extra-disciplinary 
writers) the authority to critique historians, but also the authority of a historian writing 
scholarly histories. 
 This chapter works through this multiplicity of historical discourses and historian 
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figures to illuminate a doomed attempt. Graves’s sweeping claims to the authority of 
disciplinary history prove insatiable partly because of a disconnect between his 
personally-experienced historical Truth and his contemporaries’ research methods, but 
even more fundamentally because of Graves’s desire to span fictional and factual modes 
of truth as well as disciplinary and extra-disciplinary audiences. In the first two sections, I 
trace I, Claudius’s uses of modernist history, Victorian classicism, and classical history, 
asserting that the novel’s references to multiple historical approaches work to naturalize 
rather than historicize notions of historical truth. Indeed, it is this universalizing view of 
historical knowledge that makes possible Graves’s sense of entitlement to an 
unquestioning reception from scholars and general readers alike. I then turn to Graves’s 
stance within the Claudius novels as translator, novelist, and historian, attending to the 
shift in focus between I, Claudius and Claudius the God—from the fiction of a 
rediscovered and translated historical text to Graves’s defensive claim that his texts have 
historical as well as novelistic value. When these texts were first published, British 
historical knowledge was in the throes of professionalization, and acute interest in the 
line between fiction and history was shared by groups as otherwise distinct as the 
historical and literary modernists. Given the climate of British historical thought between 
the wars, then, Graves’s desire to span fictional and factual truths, and general and 
specialist audiences, could not help but meet with resistance. 
 
Robert von Ranke Graves and Modernist History 
 Robert Graves’s relationship with modernist history begins, like so many 
accounts of modernist history, with Leopold von Ranke. Ranke not only took a highly 
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visible role in the nineteenth- and twentieth-century professionalization of history but 
also was Graves’s great-uncle and the source of his middle name. In his early 
autobiography Good-bye to All That (1929), Graves tellingly mentions Ranke in the 
process of constructing his own narrative authority, claiming: “To him I owe my 
historical method. It was he who wrote, to the scandal of his contemporaries: ‘I am a 
historian before I am a Christian; my object is simply to find out how the things actually 
occurred’” (5-6). This biographical connection often surfaces in discussions of I, 
Claudius; readers, and Graves himself, have perceived connections between the novel’s 
classical models of historical knowledge and the more recent historiographic concerns 
invoked through the shorthand of Ranke’s name. In one interview, for instance, Graves 
responds to a question about I, Claudius’s representation of the classical historian Livy 
by invoking this modernist inheritance, which he represents as unproblematic: “It’s sort 
of a habit in my family, you know. My granduncle was Leopold von Ranke, the so-called 
‘father of modern history.’ He was always held up to me by my mother as the first 
modern historian who decided to tell the truth in history” (Kersnowski 101). While he 
ties his own historical authority to Ranke’s historical approach, however, Graves remains 
very far from a methodical, scientific Rankean. 
 Peter Green thus notes in Graves’s references to Ranke “a certain sly irony”: 
while Graves suggests that he (like Ranke) uncovers the truth of history, “Ranke (a 
methodical rationalist if ever there was one)” would surely object to what Green calls 
Graves’s “cavalier treatment of evidence” (102). The methodological differences between 
Graves and Ranke are indeed immense. Most colorfully, Graves reports in The White 
Goddess (1948) and elsewhere on his method of the “analeptic trance,” in which he casts 
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his consciousness back in time to overhear (and then record) conversations between 
historical figures. He also acknowledges the central role of intuition in his pursuit of 
historical truth, basing his accounts upon feelings such as a “strange confluence between 
Claudius and myself. I found out that I was able to know a lot of things that happened 
without having any basis except that I knew they were true” (Kersnowski 100). The 
contrast between such an approach and Ranke’s rigorous ideal of archival research need 
hardly be elaborated. Indeed, so far from voicing a genuine methodological or theoretical 
connection, Graves seems to invoke Ranke precisely to divert attention from his 
unconventional practices, focusing readers instead on what he sees as the objective 
historical knowledge they produce. 
 Within I, Claudius, Ranke functions even more problematically. Ranke’s famous 
description of his historical ideal, history “wie es eigentlich gewesen”—usually translated 
as something like ‘history as it really happened’—echoes in novel through the historian 
Pollio’s authoritative voice. In an argument with Livy, Pollio asserts: “History is a true 
record of what happened, how people lived and died, what they did and said; an epic 
theme merely distorts the record” (116). The phrase also resonates in the words of dull 
but eminently accurate Sulpicius when he admires “mere truthtellers [...] people who 
record no more than actually occurred” (123). In the voices of classical historians, the 
values of modernist history are represented anachronistically. At the same time, 
Claudius’s preference of Pollio’s to Livy’s historical approach aligns him, and thus his 
narrative, with a desire to avoid anachronism: in the debate Claudius witnesses between 
these two scholars, Pollio criticizes Livy for “credit[ing] the Romans of several centuries 
ago with impossibly modern motives and habits and speeches. Yes, it’s readable all right, 
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but it’s not history” (115). Paradoxically, this emphasis on anachronism is probably itself 
anachronistic; the idea as we know it derives from a post-Enlightenment reaction against 
history as exemplary and from a nineteenth-century focus on historicity and historical 
change. But in the world of the Claudius novels, while the style of writing has changed, 
classical and modernist historical values remain fundamentally unchanged. 
So, even as Claudius rejects anachronism and I, Claudius presents itself as an 
authentic artifact (or at least as an ‘authentic replica’), it also contains anachronism. It 
typically violates the realism of its historical setting less in historical details than in 
language and interpretation: posed as a translation, the text naturally appears in modern 
English—yet the English of Graves’s Claudius is not simply modern. It is, as J. M. Cohen 
puts it, “modish” (39), the English “of witty, disillusioned, and modern persons” (36). We 
can see this stylistic anachronism in the differences between I, Claudius and Suetonius’s 
The Twelve Caesars, one of the novel’s classical sources. Such a comparison is even 
more fruitful because Graves would, in 1957, provide what has remained a standard 
translation of that text; his departure in I, Claudius from Suetonius is apparent even in his 
own translation, which he renders in modern but decidedly more conventional—less 
dated—language.39 Philip Burton perceives this divergence as yet another distinction 
                                                
39 In 1979, Michael Grant was asked to edit Graves’s translation to “bring his version 
inside the range of what is now generally regarded [...] as a ‘translation’—without, I 
hope, detracting from his excellent and inimitable manner” (11). Grant’s Foreword 
displays that tension between two values, “verbal exactitude” and “vivid and compulsive 
reading” (10), that vexes so many translators. Graves himself appears not to have been 
bothered with it: “Robert Graves (who explicitly refrained from catering to students) did 
not aim at producing a precise translation—introducing, as he himself points out, 
sentences of explanation, omitting passages which do not seem to help the sense, and 
‘turning sentences, and sometimes, even groups of sentences, inside-out’” (10). In other 
words, Graves’s translation of Suetonius plays, though perhaps less vigorously, with the 
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between Graves and Ranke when he notes Pollio’s Rankean lines, claiming that Graves 
“credit[s] his characters with motives and habits and speeches which are aggressively, if 
not impossibly, modern” (209). The novel’s modernizing tendency manifests at an 
interpretive level as well. While Graves’s Suetonius writes of a short-lived rebellion that 
“some divine intervention prevented [the legions] from dressing the Eagles with garlands 
and perfumes” (193), Graves’s Claudius describes the episode in a wryly amused, ironic 
tone. He provides what modern readers will accept as a more rational explanation: the 
officers, not the gods, had stage-managed dark omens for their superstitious soldiers 
(231). Claudius’s classical rhetorical gestures construct his narrative as a true history and 
as a genuine artifact, but Graves’s audience bears twentieth-century assumptions about 
historical truth; I, Claudius picks and chooses, existing between these two sets of 
conventions in its willy-nilly realism. 
 Accordingly, while Claudius constructs his historical authority through all the 
conventions of Imperial Rome, he also provides what modern readers will accept as a 
more stable foundation for his historical authority than his classical appeals. He addresses 
his most explicit claims to such authority to an audience the historical Claudius could not 
have imagined: readers educated in a post-Victorian world. Graves’s Claudius repeatedly 
asserts special capacities for objectivity and interpretation on the basis of his status as “a 
professional historian” (IC 8, 339), but as John Marincola reminds us, “historians were 
never a defined group in antiquity, nor did they have a fixed position: there were no 
professors of history,” such that “the ancient historian was more a man of letters than 
specifically an historian” (19). Yet Claudius views history as his true “profession” (3), 
                                                                                                                                            
same grey area of translation, imitation, and invention as do I, Claudius and Claudius the 
God. 
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which he must strive to protect from his newer position as emperor. In these passages 
Claudius sounds more like a university-trained, conference-attending modern historian 
writing his memoirs than like a classical man of letters setting down his secret 
autobiography. His voice, and its ‘translation’ through Graves’s voice, flatten out 
historical discourse into a transhistorical mode of reconstructing the truth about the 
past—Graves’s oversimplication of Ranke’s history “wie es eigentlich gewesen.” 
 Such a view, by which the knowledge produced by Claudius and other classical 
historians is more or less the same as the knowledge produced by historians 
contemporary to Graves, helps explain why Graves often ignores twentieth-century 
interpretations as unnecessary repetition. When pressed by critics, on the other hand, 
Graves lists in the “Author’s Note” to Claudius the God not only a lengthy list of 
classical sources but also the most up-to-date scholarly work on Claudius, Arnaldo 
Momigliano’s Claudius: The Emperor and his Achievement (1932; English trans. 1934). 
Though Graves was likely unfamiliar with Momigliano’s thought outside this text, his 
mention of this particular historian—a citation which not only gives credit but insists that 
Graves really has performed thorough historical research—inadvertently underscores the 
divergence of Graves’s transhistorical understanding of historical knowledge from the 
work occurring in disciplinary history at the time. Momigliano, an Italian classical 
historian, spent much of his career studying the history of historiography.40 He would 
later write, “The inevitable corollary of historicism is history of historiography as the 
mode of expressing awareness that historical problems have themselves a history” 
                                                
40 Because Momigliano’s work was well-received amongst British historians, he was able 
to move as an academic refugee to England in 1939 and support his family through 
research grants. He spent the rest of his career at Oxford University and the University of 
Chicago. 
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(“Historicism” 70); in lectures, seminars, essays, and books as well as through his 
association with the British historical journal History and Theory, Momigliano promoted 
a historicizing view of historiography. Rejecting wholesale relativism, he instead strove 
to evaluate changing historical methodologies. 
As though in direct opposition to Graves’s fits of intuition, for which he claimed 
the authority of rigorous disciplinary history, Momigliano wrote: “Neither common sense 
nor intuition can replace a critical knowledge of past historians” (Studies vii). Like 
Graves, Momigliano traced intimate connections between classical and twentieth-century 
historical thought; as Karl Christ summarizes: 
contact with the classic masters of historiography should serve not only as 
the backdrop for the development of modern innovations and perspectives, 
but should lead first and foremost to the strengthening of the intellectual 
potential of the discipline, to its vitalization and security in the face of the 
fashionable trends which threaten from all sides. In [Momigliano’s] view, 
only the safeguarding of the historical foundations and precise knowledge 
of the history of historiography solidly based on them would ensure the  
continuation of historical scholarship into the future. (12) 
Whereas Momigliano makes careful and critical connections across historiographic 
periods, though, Graves simply assumes historical truth and its methods to be inherently 
stable. 
 In his historical novels, non-fiction writings, and interviews, Graves expresses 
deep skepticism about conventional historical interpretations such as our received views 
of Claudius and Jesus. Yet in all these forms he also expresses an extraordinarily 
confident attitude toward knowing the historical past. We can see this dynamic quite 
clearly, for instance, in Graves’s assertion that “We know now exactly what disease 
[Claudius] suffered from: Little’s disease” (Kersnowski 100). Arising as it does in 
response to a question about the scarcity of “direct source,” the comment both skirts the 
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fundamental problems of historical knowledge (how and whether we can know about 
events and people no longer present) and the relationship between historical fiction and 
historical fact, and assumes that “we” moderns have access to an objective truth about the 
ancients and their experiences, which they naively misunderstood. Such sentiments help 
illuminate I, Claudius’s use of the historian’s text form, whereby layered and multiple 
claims to historical authority make room for a “professional historian” before 
professional history to speak the truth across the ages, outside his time’s and position’s 
limitations. 
 
Victorian Classicism and Classical Historical Authority in I, Claudius 
 Unlike professional history and unlike Woolf’s literary modernism, I, Claudius 
approaches historical research in an undisciplined and cheerfully haphazard fashion. 
Graves did not, like Woolf, plan to be a historian; he did not struggle with the problems 
of historical knowledge in the way both she and so many historians of the early twentieth 
century did; and though Graves had earned a scholarship to study classics at St. Johns 
College, Oxford, before the Great War and did eventually take a degree at Oxford, it was 
in modern literature rather than any form of history or classical studies. Instead, Graves 
draws upon his classical education from the nineteenth-century holdover that was his 
time at Charterhouse, his public school. Though Graves attended Charterhouse from 1909 
to 1914, the school arguably reached “the height of its reputation” in the 1820s of 
William Makepeace Thackeray’s Charterhouse years (Banerjee), and it continued its 
increasingly anachronistic emphasis on the classics considerably into the twentieth 
century. Thus, although the singular prestige of classical studies at Oxford and 
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Cambridge as well as in the public schools—and in British culture outside the 
educational system—had begun its decline by the end of the nineteenth century, Barry 
Baldwin characterizes the early 1940s as “a time when proficiency in classics was still, 
just, regarded as the pinnacle of sixth-form achievement” at the school. 
 Like history, classical studies changed significantly during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. At the university level, the subject lost its unquestioned place at 
the heart of education as the sciences and other humanities (including modern history and 
literary studies) began asserting their own importance.41 Simultaneously, classical studies 
itself shifted from a long-standing linguistic approach to a more historical and in some 
cases archaeological one, as scholars shifted from an overwhelming emphasis on classical 
rhetoric to greater interest in classical texts’ subject matter and historical embeddedness. 
Furthermore, whereas classics had been studied by a comparatively broad spectrum of 
British boys and young men during the eighteenth century (when the field formed the 
core of education), the nineteenth century saw an increasing split between elite, classics-
centered public schools on one hand, and grammar schools and private schools on the 
other. In response to pressure from the many middle-class families who considered the 
classics impractical, these latter categories of schools decreased attention to or simply cut 
Greek and even Latin from their curricula; classical knowledge thus increasingly acted as 
                                                
41 John Kenyon observes: “As the careers of men like Macaulay, Carlyle and Froude 
show, there was an enormous appetite for history in Victorian England, and a new belief 
in its importance. The movement for university reform in general at last forced modern 
history into the degree syllabus, and as the century progressed it was to make serious 
encroachments on the classics in the field of what we would now call ‘liberal arts’ 
studies, though well on into the twentieth century classics continued to dominate the 
curricula of the independent schools which provided most of the Oxford and Cambridge 
entry” (144). For more on these developments, see M. L. Clarke (113-27) and W. B. 
Stephens (114-32). 
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a class marker (Clarke 85-92). In combination with his years of intense classical training 
at school, Graves’s lack of classical and historical training at the university level impacts 
I, Claudius quite visibly—though this impact is dramatically different from that of 
Woolf’s lack of university training on Orlando. Whereas Woolf’s exclusion from the 
scholarly disciplines forms part of her outsider perspective, Graves’s separation from 
disciplinary ways of studying the past leaves him even more firmly an insider, by 
allowing him permanent residence in a happily elitist state of epistemological confidence 
and simplicity. 
Graves did not embrace this education with open arms. According to Good-bye to 
All That, he was miserable during much of his time at Charterhouse, and earlier in his 
schooling he remembers being taught Latin without “know[ing] what Latin was or 
meant” (Good-bye 25)—in other words, being taught through a firmly linguistic early-
nineteenth-century approach that left out context and substance. Cohen argues that 
“Graves’s approach to the classical past is that of one bored by fourteen years of 
conventional linguistic training who wished to make a fresh approach for himself and 
was not afraid of iconoclasm” (34); this claim usefully draws attention both to Graves’s 
lengthy and highly traditional classical training and to his departure from the traditions in 
which he was raised and educated. This is, after all, the man who said “good-bye to all 
that” in an angry and incendiary farewell to the English culture he found so false and 
restrictive. Yet Graves carried his familiar mode of historical inquiry with him to 
Majorca. 
Despite his discontent with it, Graves’s classical training lies at the base of I, 
Claudius, which revives that most traditional of Latin and Greek assignments: an original 
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composition in the style of a classical authority. Of course, the novel subverts this form in 
‘imitating’ the writing of someone from whom virtually no language has survived, and by 
imitating it in a modern English ‘translation’ rather than in the ‘original’ Greek. But even 
given Graves’s iconoclasm and experimentation, I, Claudius and its sequel work out of a 
Victorian respect for the classics and not in intimate relation to the cutting-edge scholarly 
methods or momentous historiographic debates of the modernist (or even the late 
Victorian) period.42 
For instance, instead of striving for—and/or agonizing over the impossibility of—
modernist objectivity in the style of the natural sciences, I, Claudius substitutes a 
classical value: impartiality. Graves’s references to Ranke outside the text, and the 
classical historians’ Rankean echoes in the novel, imply that modernist objectivity and 
classical impartiality are equivalent. But the concepts diverge quite meaningfully: 
whereas classical historians emphasize fairness of judgment rather than a lack of 
judgment, modernist historiography rejects moral judgment, turning to an ideal of 
knowledge for knowledge’s sake.43 In its treatment of historical values such as these, I, 
                                                
42 Nor do the novels participate in the turn against Victorian historicism that characterizes 
certain strains within literary modernism. Graves shared with the literary modernists an 
interest in the ancient past as it has survived into the twentieth century, which is to say, 
an interest in fragments and myths. Yet, in keeping with his constant railing against 
literary modernism as it has come to be understood, he differs from its practitioners in his 
approach to such remnants. Ian Firla usefully contrasts Eliot and Joyce—“shuffling the 
fragments about and playing with their incompleteness”—with Graves and his desire for 
“wholeness, completeness, and closure,” calling the latter attitude “a product of a late-
nineteenth century historical education that sought a totalizing vision of human history” 
(30). In his Claudius novels, certainly, readers are offered realist historical narrative and 
confident interpretation rather than the unsettling sense that we can never truly know the 
past. 
 
43 For more on this distinction between classical impartiality and modernist objectivity, 
see Bentley 7 and Greenwood 111. 
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Claudius employs classical conventions of historical authority in a way that flattens 
historical distance, rather than illuminating either connections across or differences 
between various moments in historical thought. 
The novel situates itself within classical historical thought from the very 
beginning. Even before its preface with its claims to “Classical correctness” (x), the text 
opens with an epigraph invoking the authority of Tacitus (c. 55 – c. 117 CE), one of 
Graves’s main sources for the material of the Claudius novels. While this passage warns 
readers of the fallibility of the historical record and of the potential for the manipulation 
of historical facts, it also sets the scene for Claudius’s claim to a privileged stance from 
which to detect and pass on the truth: 
… A story that was the subject of every variety of misrepresentation, not 
only by those who lived then but likewise in succeeding times: so true is it 
that all transactions of preeminent importance are wrapt in doubt and 
obscurity; while some hold for certain facts the most precarious hearsays,  
others turn facts into falsehood; and both are exaggerated by posterity. 
If Tacitus is correct, the writer who can shed light on this story will have witnessed those 
“transactions of preeminent importance” and yet have little reason to falsify the facts. 
Enter the Emperor Claudius, who addresses “an extremely remote posterity” hoping “that 
you, my eventual readers of a hundred generations ahead, or more, will feel yourselves 
directly spoken to, as if by a contemporary: as often Herodotus and Thucydides, long 
dead, seem to speak to me” (5). Claudius unites classical and modernist historical 
knowledge through the unmediated communication claimed here for gifted historians; 
historical truth is thus understood not as historically contingent but as universal. 
 The novel’s many references to recognizable classical historians serve to bolster 
the authority both of Claudius and of I, Claudius, and to indicate a classical system of 
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imitation and influence in which the text can then participate. The novel opens with the 
Tacitus epigraph and closes with the newly-minted emperor musing about Pollio’s and 
his own histories’ audiences and merits; in between, Livy and Pollio appear as characters 
and argue about historical methodology, and Claudius refers to the histories of 
Athenodorus, Thucydides, and others—asserting both his own and Graves’s intimate 
familiarity with them. Both Claudius and Graves employ historiographic imitation as a 
mode of constructing historical authority, which thus crosses the levels of the text to 
bolster its various claims as artifact, reconstruction, and impartial interpretation. This 
gesture is a classical rather than a modernist one; as Marincola explains, “conservative 
and [...] consciously classicising” ancient historiography “had as its central technique the 
employment of mimesis, the creative imitation of one’s predecessors” (12). 
While Claudius primarily imitates the style and methodology of various 
historians, however, Graves imitates both form and content in retelling Claudius’s secret 
memoir and its apparent classical sources, Suetonius’s The Twelve Caesars and Tacitus’s 
Annals. Both Claudius novels borrow extensively from Suetonius in content, lifting many 
episodes almost directly and using Suetonius’s interesting asides as prompts for 
fictionalization; they also mimic his style, constantly departing from chronology in an 
effort to represent causality and human character more effectively. Such imitation 
contributes to what Robert Canary calls the novels’ “air of authenticity” (4): as Canary 
argues, “By being true to the tone and facts of his sources, Graves achieves an air of 
realism lost in many a carefully-plotted historical novel” (Canary 7). The novels’ 
mimesis of classical mimesis participates in their careful (re)construction of classical 
historical authority. 
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Claudius’s gestures toward historical authority participate in the conventions of 
his age considerably beyond—though necessarily always within the framework of—his 
(and Graves’s) emphasis on the imitative. Like virtually all historians writing in the 
period, for example, our narrator claims historical authority through the promise that his 
history relies upon his own personal search for the truth. Indeed, his position as emperor 
and his autobiography’s secret status allow Graves’s Claudius to make this claim in its 
ideal form: unlike many authors, he has the opportunity to perform the full range of first-
hand research, from reading—with access not just to publicly available sources but also 
to closed archives—to personally witnessing and even taking part in major political 
events. Especially in I, Claudius, he spends long passages showing readers his hours of 
reading as well as his contact with the world he describes. Indeed, Claudius emphatically 
displays each of the major markers of authority Marincola identifies in the ancient 
historians: experience, social status, effort, danger, and impartiality. 
 Assertions of risk and fairness had become increasingly significant during the 
period of I, Claudius’s supposed composition and are central to the novel. While 
historians enjoyed considerable freedom of information and expression under the 
Republic, the administration of the Roman Empire often involved secret meetings and 
one-sided, official, unverifiable reports; operating under a single authority, officials and 
scholars alike were increasingly pressured to please that individual with their accounts. 
Claudius, of course, claims the status of insider and professes to hand on the privileged 
knowledge that will be missing from other, future histories of his family and reign. He 
then downplays the resulting impression of bias with recourse to other modes of 
constructing authority. In a paragraph treating his historical method, for instance, 
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Claudius displays his effort through language emphasizing labor: he “spent [his] leisure 
time” in “study,” “busy” performing “tasks” of which he would “tire,” and describes 
himself as “too careful a writer”; he also invokes his travels and use of multiple sources, 
implying his impartiality by describing his efforts to read “accounts by writers of rival 
political parties” (264). While Graves’s epigraph alludes to the problems of writing under 
the empire, the following narrative solves that problem, drawing upon Claudius’s 
privileged access to illuminate what for less well-placed historians necessarily remained 
“wrapt in doubt and obscurity.” 
 The novel’s easy solution to its setting’s historical-epistemological challenges 
also draws on Claudius’s distant intended audience, whose situation in the future both 
increases the appearance of his impartiality and allows him to speak historical truth 
outside inconvenient historical limitations. As I have already noted, the Claudius novels 
make much of impartiality, a value that overlaps conveniently with the modernist ideal of 
objectivity. Claudius’s repeated choice of Pollio over Livy as a historical model is itself a 
claim to superior impartiality, at least as an ideal toward which he laboriously and 
conscientiously strives; the novel depicts Pollio as motivated by a desire to tell the truth, 
and Livy as driven by popular success and admiration.44 In proving his impartiality, 
Claudius even refrains from publishing his most deeply-felt works during his lifetime, 
                                                
44 An appearance of impartiality is vital in the autobiography’s ‘original’ rhetorical 
context as well as in its appeal to Graves’s readers, since ancient (especially Roman) 
historians understood bias as strongly obstructive to truth. Yet as the Claudius novels 
imply, the Roman insistence on impartiality has its variations: most notably and 
relevantly in Livy and his unconcealed love of Rome. Even Livy’s explicit national bias 
operates in the context of a larger claim to be, as he was later described, “honest” and 
“fair-minded” (Marincola 170)—he avoided, for instance, the habits of treating 
individuals in a positive or negative light, and of simply vilifying all of Rome’s enemies 
(171). 
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declining to seek with these works the scholarly regard in which he so clearly revels. 45 I, 
Claudius and Claudius the God are thus framed as disinterested through passionately true 
messages-in-a-bottle, which are bound to arrive in the hands of historians safely removed 
from Imperial Rome’s threats to historical truth—the hands of twentieth-century 
historians who naturally share Claudius’s historical values but are now free from the 
extra-disciplinary restrictions imposed upon historiography in his time. 
 
From I, Claudius to Claudius the God: The Demands of Absolute Authority 
 In the opening pages of his secret autobiography, Claudius establishes that he 
writes “directly” to the twentieth century readers prophesied to him by the Sibyl of 
Cumae (5, 7). The Claudius novels’ layering of their original and prophetically projected 
rhetorical situations makes room for two normally contradictory strains to coexist and 
feed off each other. Claudius’s historical message in a bottle, like Pollio’s and Sulpicius’s 
versions of ‘history as it really happened,’ suggest that the values of “a true historian” 
have always been fundamentally what they remain in 1934. Yet at the same time, Graves 
can assume an epistemological position superior to that of Claudius and his 
contemporaries by emphasizing the inhospitality of Imperial Rome to historical truth. 
Claudius claims a special authority in the present work in contrast to the works he could 
safely publish during his lifetime—and in particular contrast to his (now lost) public 
autobiography, in which, he claims, “I told no lies, but neither did I tell the truth in the 
                                                
45 The decision Graves imagines is not unprecedented—Cicero and the elder Pliny both 
delayed publication of works until after their own deaths to avoid any suspicion of 
partiality or the desire for personal gain—but, as Marincola notes, it was an unusual 
historian who was willing to abandon “the chance of fame in his lifetime,” which for 
many was a main point of writing history in the first place (172). 
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sense that I mean to tell it here” (5): the ‘professional historians’ may have been the 
same, but their ability to transmit the truth was compromised. Furthermore, in the 
paratextual elements through which Graves carefully constructs and controls the texts—
his author’s notes and footnotes, I, Claudius’s epigraph, and Claudius the God’s 
appendices, as well as his later statements outside the texts—we encounter a modern 
consciousness that claims access to a greater realism than Claudius could possibly have 
accomplished. 
 Graves’s dehistoricized view of historical truth is thus combined with a 
teleological understanding of historical knowledge. Together, these premises allow 
Graves a stance of absolute historical authority, a claim to tell the unchanging and 
unquestionable truth about the past to nonspecialist and specialist audiences alike. His 
representation of historical discourse as varying in style but easily translatable across 
centuries also facilitates his alignment of his own textual presence with that of 
professional scholars rather than with Woolf’s extra-disciplinary ‘common reader.’ In 
this section, I examine Graves’s demanding stance toward readers through the lens of the 
differences many reviewers and critics note between I, Claudius and its sequel, Claudius 
the God. Especially in the shift between the first and second novels’ author’s notes, we 
can see the fiction of a translated ancient history crack under the pressure of critical 
reactions to the historical value of I, Claudius. Graves’s increasing defensiveness makes 
visible the unavoidable tension between, on one hand, his claims to a universal historical 
truth that is both novelistic and factual, and, on the other, the historical-epistemological 
ideas current amongst his readers. 
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 In Woolf’s Orlando, the implied author and reader are joined by humor directed 
at the narrator and at various historical discourses; we are positioned together as non-
specialists and outsiders. This ironic distance between historian narrator and 
author/reader serves as a useful contrast as we approach the less self-conscious and 
therefore less evident relationships amongst Claudius, the Graves of the paratextual 
elements, and their implied readers. In the Claudius novels, unlike in Orlando, not only 
the historian narrator but also the implied author/translator takes a didactic tone. Within 
and with regard to these texts, Graves presents himself as a scholar, most obviously by 
inserting himself into the text as the editor and translator who signs himself “R. G.”—but 
also in tying himself intimately to the historian Claudius. This connection is apparent in 
the “Author’s Note” to Claudius the God, where claims for the novels’ historical 
accuracy implicitly endorse Claudius’s honesty and competence as a historian; more 
dramatically, it surfaces again in Graves’s later methodological comments about that 
“strange confluence between Claudius and myself” (Kersnowski 100). Graves thus 
positions himself as an epistemological insider, with privileged access to historical truth, 
and as an erudite teacher vis-à-vis his readers and our more limited knowledge. Such a 
stance has proven quite effective toward general audiences; I, Claudius’s popular success 
was immediate and enduring.46 Yet, while Graves habitually described his historical 
                                                
46 I, Claudius was translated into at least seventeen languages and has not yet gone out of 
print (Seymour-Smith 232, Cohen 34). Martin Seymour-Smith outlines its immediate and 
lasting success: “In England the book had reached a third impression before the end of its 
month of publication, and a ninth (large one) by October 1935 [...] and when Penguin 
released their second edition to coincide with the television series in 1976, it was on the 
best-seller lists for over a year” (232). Clearly I, Claudius has resonated with the 
historical assumptions and values of a massive audience, even as it glosses over the 
epistemological crises that so worried Woolf and many others during the period of its 
publication. 
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novels as mere potboilers, his “Author’s Note” to the sequel expresses immense 
annoyance at not being taken quite seriously by specialists as well. 
 In his increasingly defensive posture between the paratexts of I, Claudius and 
Claudius the God, we can see Grave’s frustrated and often frankly surprised difficulty in 
establishing the wide-ranging intellectual authority he wishes to extend toward his 
general and specialist readers. Working out of a belief in a dehistoricized historical truth, 
to which he knows he has unmediated access, Graves sees disciplinary and extra-
disciplinary knowledge as equivalent; he expects the appreciation of classicists and 
historians just as Claudius anticipates the gratitude of “historians of the future” (IC 234). 
Graves complains: “Some reviewers of I, Claudius [...] suggested that in writing it I had 
merely consulted Tacitus’s Annals and Suetonius’s Twelve Caesars, run them together, 
and expanded the result with my own ‘vigorous fancy.’ This was not so; nor is it the case 
here” (CTG vii-viii). After listing twenty-four authors and groups he consulted while 
writing Claudius the God, he continues: ““Few incidents here given are wholly 
unsupported by historical authority of some sort or other and I hope none are historically 
incredible. No character is invented” (viii). Next, in an echo of a scholarly history’s 
methodological preface, he recounts the difficulties he navigated in answering three 
historical questions involving scanty documentation (a battle in the Roman invasion of 
Britain, and British Druidism) or loaded interpretive debates (early Christianity, a topic in 
which Graves would embroil himself less cautiously in his 1946 King Jesus). This shift to 
a defensive posture requires Graves to abandon the fiction of I, Claudius and its 
“Author’s Note,” in which Graves had played translator rather than historian. 
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 Beyond its heading, the preface to I, Claudius might conceivably serve as a 
translator’s rather than an author’s note. Graves’s decisions to modernize dates, place 
names, and the names of historical figures, his search for “suitable renderings for 
military, legal, and other technical terms,” his assertion that the translation’s style is in 
keeping with that of Claudius’s (other) surviving language, and his reminder that its 
original Greek “is a far more conversational language than Latin” might all refer to the 
work of Graves’s many actual translations. The note’s reference to the Twelve Caesars 
abdicates his own responsibility for any aesthetic flaws in what he posits as, if not a 
translation, an impersonation: 
Suetonius in his Twelve Caesars refers to Claudius’s histories as written 
‘ineptly’ rather than ‘inelegantly.’ Yet if certain passages of the present 
work are not only ineptly written but also somewhat inelegantly too—the 
sentences painfully constructed and the digressions awkwardly placed—
this is not out of keeping with Claudius’s literary style as exhibited in his  
Latin speech about the Aeduan franchise, fragments of which survive. (x) 
While much of the material of this preface is repeated in that of the sequel, Claudius the 
God’s “Author’s Note” cannot be read as a “Translator’s Note”: there, Graves-the-
novelist and/or Graves-the-historian rejects critics’ idea that he has merely rehashed a 
classical source or two. Whereas in I, Claudius, Graves seems to discover and translate a 
secret history, in Claudius the God he invokes the different authority of synthesis and 
creation, departing defensively from his fiction to claim the narrative as his own in the 
face of real-world criticism.47 Accordingly, though Graves does not acknowledge this 
                                                
47 The footnotes, signed with Graves’s initials, also shift in purpose between the two 
novels. This version of the historiographic paratext appears only twice in I, Claudius, 
each time clarifying whether Claudius intends the Nero who would later rule Rome or 
Germanicus’s son by the same name (290, 432). Claudius the God, in keeping with its 
presentation as history rather than as translation or artifact, is more widely annotated; its 
six footnotes indicate that a given character will later reign as emperor or otherwise 
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difference, Claudius the God focuses largely on Claudius’s publicly-recorded works as 
emperor rather than on a secret history that supplements and corrects contemporary and 
later historians’ accounts. In its effort to accomplish the authority of fact, it seems to 
overstretch itself and lose its own fictional premise, that of Claudius’s privileged but 
censored access to historical truth. 
Throughout, I, Claudius foregrounds Claudius’s telling of the story, as when he 
comments on his practice of noting dates in the margin of his narrative (9) and repeatedly 
refers to the paper on which he writes (52, 189)—and beyond lending focus to an 
otherwise diffuse narrative, I, Claudius’s related emphases on Claudius’s authorship and 
on imitation bolster Graves’s position of authority. When Claudius is asked to choose 
between Pollio and Livy “as a model” for his own historical work, readers are reminded 
that, if Claudius is writing in the style of Pollio, Graves too is writing in the style of 
Claudius; the novel’s status as imitation is underscored again when Livia writes an 
official document “in Augustus’s own literary style; which was easy to imitate because it 
always sacrificed elegance to clarity” (80). This suggestion echoes and reinforces the 
assurance of the “Author’s Note” that any inelegance or ineptness in I, Claudius, far from 
reflecting poorly on Graves, only proves the accuracy of his translation or imitation. And 
in reminding us of the mimetic nature of this ventriloquizing history, all of these passages 
work to construct the narratives as ‘authentic replicas,’ operating within the classical 
convention of mimesis. 
                                                                                                                                            
identify a historical figure (153, 286, 519), direct readers to the Christian bible as a 
historical authority (491), and comment upon translation (509, 524). At the same time, 
the randomness and scantiness of Claudius the God’s annotation (in comparison to the 
extensive footnotes of contemporary disciplinary histories) reflect Graves’s distance from 
mainstream historical practices. 
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In Claudius the God, however, the “Author’s Note” asserts a historian’s rather 
than a translator’s or ventriloquist’s authority. Its final pages stretch beyond Claudius’s 
life and voice to include multiple accounts of his death: excerpts from Philemon 
Holland’s translation of Suetonius’s Claudius, the Oxford translation of Tacitus’s Annals, 
Cary’s translation of Dio Cassius’s account of Claudius’s death, and Graves’s own 
translation of Lucius Annaeus Seneca’s The Pumpkinification of Claudius, a Satire in 
Prose and Verse. Far from Claudius’s consciousness, the novel ends with a “Sequel” 
offering the finality of a perspective from the far future, and then a genealogical table of 
“The Royal Family of the Herods”; the novel ends, in other words, in the voice of 
Graves-as-historian. The body of the text also departs from a focus on Claudius’s 
authorship; so much so that Graves, without explanation, inserts a proclamation and 
“Surviving fragments of Claudius’s speech to the Senate” (435-9) into the narrative. This 
documentation is included by a twentieth-century historian rather than by Claudius 
himself; even setting aside these passages’ use of the third person in contrast to 
Claudius’s usual first-person pronouns, a future perspective is unavoidable in the phrase 
“Surviving fragments.” After a chapter break, the narrative simply proceeds in Claudius’s 
voice; the disjunctions of this passage, and their unnerving difference from all the 
preceding material, suggest the tensions just under the surface of Claudius the God’s bid 
for both novelistic and historical status. 
Graves often seems conflicted regarding the exact status of the Claudius novels as 
history and/or fiction. On one hand, to invoke Ranke is also to invoke a particular 
understanding of the relationship between historiography and fiction: the modernist 
understanding that absolutely opposes the two, requiring the good historian simply to ‘tell 
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the truth.’ In keeping with this tradition, Graves has Claudius claim proudly, as he closes 
I, Claudius, that he has hardly had to fictionalize even dialogue in his account; he 
chooses Pollio and his unvarnished truth over Livy and his literary effects, after all. On 
the other hand, we are also shown Caligula—as far as possible from a reliable or 
sympathetic figure—taking this preference to its extreme by threatening to kill Livy 
along with all the poets, agreeing with Plato that they are “all liars” (IC 435). And even 
more problematically, a Rankean separation of history and fiction is simply untenable in 
this piece of historical fiction that claims to tell the truth. 
When Buckman and Fifield ask about Graves’s intentions “as a novelist” with 
regard to the ending of Claudius the God, he rejects the label: “I didn’t think I was 
writing a novel. I was trying to find out the truth of Claudius. [...] It’s a question of 
reconstructing a personality” (100). Yet at other moments his description of his research 
and writing process emphasizes the Claudius novels’ status as historical novels rather 
than scholarly histories. When Graves explains that he only needs a small library because 
really “it is simply a matter of throwing myself back into the right period and living very 
much in that period” (52), his example comes from I, Claudius: 
When I was writing Claudius there was an account of a battle [...] and very 
little information could be got from the source books, so I had to invent, and I 
invented. [...] Afterwards I was complimented by, I think, The Times on 
having read a book which I didn’t even know existed. [...] I was very pleased 
when I got a large-scale map to find that the British camp was just where I  
expected it would be. (52) 
In this anecdote, Graves asserts both the novelist’s privilege to invent and the historian’s 
claims of research, effort, and accuracy. He seems to delight in the brazenness of his 
fictionalizing, the seamlessness with which it merges with historical fact, and the late-
coming documentary evidence that supports his version of the story—a version he treats 
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more as historical theory than as fiction. 
Graves’s statements on his historical novels’ relationship to historical fact seem 
blissfully unconcerned about their own contradictions. They are serenely problematic 
and, like his descriptions of his historical methodology and authority, sound remarkably 
overconfident to a reader relying upon the procedures of disciplinary history. In the 
“Historical Commentary” that follows his 1946 novel King Jesus, for instance, Graves 
refers to his efforts in both primary and secondary research but asserts earnestly: 
“refraining even from a bibliography, which would be more impressive than helpful, I 
undertake to my readers that every important element in my story is based on some 
tradition, however tenuous, and that I have taken more than ordinary pains to verify my 
historical background” (420). Such comments underscore Graves’s sense of entitlement 
to readers’ absolute faith, our willingness to suspend scrutiny. 
It is in this attitude that Graves complains in his foreword to a later edition of The 
White Goddess, the 1946 work in which he describes his historical method of the 
“analeptic trance”: 
[N]o expert in ancient Irish or Welsh has offered me the least help in refining 
my argument, or pointed out any of the errors which are bound to have crept 
into the text, or even acknowledged my letters. I am disappointed, though not 
really surprised. The book does read very queerly: but then of course a 
historical grammar of the language of poetic myth has never previously been 
attempted, and to write it conscientiously I have had to face such ‘puzzling 
questions, though not beyond all conjecture,’ as Sir Thomas Browne instances 
in his Hydriotaphia: ‘what song the Sirens sang, or what name Achilles 
assumed when he hid himself among the women.’ I found practical and 
unevasive answers [...]. But it is only fair to warn readers that this remains a 
difficult book, as well as a very queer one, to be avoided by anyone with a 
distracted, tired or rigidly scientific mind. I have not cared to leave out any 
step in the laborious argument, if only because readers of my recent historical 
novels have grown a little suspicious of unorthodox conclusions for which the  
authorities are not always quoted. (9) 
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Graves claims historical authority on the basis of his ‘labor’ in writing the book, and 
dismisses as lazy or ‘rigid’ those scholars who criticize or ignore it. In an escalation that 
echoes the shift in tone from the author’s note of I, Claudius to that of Claudius the God, 
the “Postscript 1960” is even more outrageously defensive: it asserts that the author 
“avoid[s] participation in witchcraft, spiritualism, yoga, fortune-telling, automatic 
writing, and the like” and “belong[s] to no religious cult, no secret society, no 
philosophical sect; nor do I trust my historical intuition any further than it can be 
factually checked” (488). These claims display Graves’s desire to be seen as rational and 
for his historical writings to be seen as ‘factual,’ alongside his injured awareness that he 
and his writings seem rather far-fetched to many readers. 
 They also help us to see the wide chasm between Graves’s procedures of knowing 
the past, on one hand, and those of disciplinary history, on the other. Graves’s refusal to 
accept an extra-disciplinary status or audience, his need for scholars to accept his theories 
and statements as methodologically equivalent or even superior to their own, places him 
in an impossible position in the Claudius novels as in The White Goddess. Like Woolf, 
Graves pursues historical truth through fictional and factual discourses alike, but very 
much unlike Woolf, Graves appears unconcerned about the possibility or effects of 
claiming both “the truth of real life and the truth of fiction” (Woolf 477). Instead, he 
dehistoricizes scholarship and imagination at a historical moment when not only Woolf 
but also historians such as Momigliano were carefully and critically historicizing 
historiography. And while both Graves and Woolf place themselves far outside modernist 
disciplinary history through their faith in a “truth of fiction” and through their fictional 
voicings of historians’ discourses, Graves continues to see himself as an insider to 
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historical knowledge of all forms and is seriously annoyed whenever scholars respond out 
of other assumptions. 
 By treating classical, Victorian, and modernist historical authority and 
conventions as though their differences were purely stylistic rather than methodological 
or ideological, the Claudius novels deemphasize the domination and exclusion that take 
center stage in Woolf’s work on Victorian historical thought. Yet they prove unable 
simultaneously to speak a historian’s voice and avoid the problems of mediation and 
authority in historical discourses—unable to skirt historical and literary modernisms’ 
challenges to a simple assertion of the true narrative of past events. In this sense, though 
published half a century apart, Graves’s Claudius novels and John Fowles’s historical 
novel A Maggot (1985) struggle similarly within the form of fictional historians’ texts. 
Like Graves’s voice in I, Claudius and Claudius the God, the Fowles who writes himself 
into A Maggot desperately wants to envision historical knowledge and its relationship 
with fiction as unproblematic, and to avoid contemporary historical debates and doubt. 
And also like the Claudius novels, A Maggot proves unable to evade these troublesome 
controversies. Yet, as the next chapter shows, the similar-but-different context of 
historical thought in era of A Maggot’s publication allows (and indeed imposes) a 
different sort of exchange between history and fiction from that I have described in either 
Woolf’s or Graves’s writings. Chapter four and the remainder of this dissertation turn to 
fictional historians’ texts that engage—however reluctantly—the historical-
epistemological context of the Thatcherite years. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
“How Little This is a Historical Novel”: 
Barricading History and Fiction in A Maggot 
 
 Even a brief summary of John Fowles’s 1985 A Maggot suggests the degree to 
which this novel enacts a postmodernist approach to history: a shift from Truth to truths, 
a self-consciousness about perspective and methodology, and a weakening of modernist 
confidence in the ultimate accessibility of the truth about the past. In the novel, four men 
and a woman travel through eighteenth-century England. Two of the men split off from 
the group, and the remaining travellers reach a cave in the unpopulated countryside, from 
which one man never emerges; the other runs from the cave and is later found hanged, 
and the woman walks out with a new faith in Christ. A Maggot performs three inquiries 
into this case. Most obviously, the majority of the novel comprises transcribed 
depositions performed by Henry Ayscough, an eighteenth-century lawyer whose noble 
employer wants to find out what happened to his son, the disappeared man known to his 
fellow-travellers as Mr. Bartholomew but never properly named in the text. Another 
inquiry is launched by the novel’s twentieth-century narrative consciousness, which 
compiles a range of archival sources—depositions, letters, newspaper excerpts—and 
comments upon the documents, their composition, and their historical context. A third is 
encouraged in readers ourselves, as we encounter this partial and pointedly constructed 
archive and are encouraged to read it as a historical murder mystery, looking for clues 
and sorting through conflicting accounts in a search for the truth about the (imagined) 
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past. All three inquiries are frustrated—neither character nor narrator nor reader can find 
out ‘what happened’—and in the process, A Maggot’s form and content fundamentally 
question the possibility and purpose of historical knowledge. 
 Yet the novel is framed by its author’s voice in a prologue and epilogue that deny 
any such postmodernist questioning. Before we meet the travellers, readers are instructed 
in our interpretation of both title and text: “A maggot is the larval stage of a winged 
creature; as is the written text, at least in the writer’s hope. But an older though now 
obsolete sense of the word is that of whim or quirk. [...] What follows may seem like a 
historical novel; but it is not. It is maggot.” After the body of the novel, which as I argue 
below launches a thoroughgoing exploration of historical knowledge and doubt, the 
epilogue again and even more anxiously insists that A Maggot has nothing to do with 
history: “It may be that books and documents exist that might have told me more of [the 
historical people on whom certain characters are based] in historical terms than the little I 
know: I have consulted none, nor made any effort to find them. I repeat, this is a maggot, 
not an attempt, either in fact or in language, to reproduce known history” (449). But even 
as the prologue and epilogue form a skin to keep inside in and outside out, to delineate 
whimsical maggot from historical world and mystery from the objectively knowable past, 
the text continually destabilizes and violates such a separation of fiction from history. 
This chapter argues that, trapped in a dichotomy that it knows to be false, A 
Maggot is permeated on every level with the tension between a simple-minded history of 
unproblematic access to facts, and a radical denial of historical knowledge. It sets up an 
either/or choice between a factual and a mystic relationship with historical time, but 
although at various points it attempts to endorse each approach, the text is ultimately 
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unable to accept either one. This compulsive motion toward an untenable dichotomy 
illustrates and—whether Fowles admits it or not—engages in a number of highly divisive 
and related debates about history that raged at the time of A Maggot’s 1985 publication, 
These arguments posed questions about what and how we can and ought to learn from 
history, questions that are raised with timeliness in A Maggot. In the public arena of 
journalism and politics (as well as in many scholarly treatments), these debates often 
operated in the logic of all or nothing. This chapter explores the multiple levels on which 
A Maggot performs and attempts to work within the limiting terms of perfect objectivity 
or unchecked mysticism, historical facts or the human procedures of historical knowing, 
blind acceptance of precedent or equally blind denial of tradition. Ultimately, A Maggot’s 
epistemic dilemma remains as unresolved as its mystery plot; unable to imagine a middle 
ground of questioning but not destroying historical knowledge, the novel cannot settle on 
either pole as viable. 
 In this chapter, I first compare A Maggot and Fowles’s earlier The French 
Lieutenant’s Woman in order to illustrate the shift that occurs between the two texts. 
Because the two novels share formal features—each set in a detailed historical context, 
narrated by a didactic twentieth-century voice, and rich with echoes of its setting’s 
literary conventions—their differences help us trace the conceptual changes surrounding 
historical knowledge that took place between their 1969 and 1985 publications. I then 
examine A Maggot’s prologue and epilogue, so anxious to separate the novel from 
history. The second section establishes connections between A Maggot and three areas of 
impassioned historical debate in the 1980s: the heritage wars, the ‘Great History Debate’ 
over the place of history in the schools, and the rise of postmodernist critiques of 
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modernist or ‘proper’ history. 
Finally, I turn to the novel’s multiple historian figures, including the narrator, the 
reader, Ayscough, his clerk John Tudor, and the sole female traveller, prostitute-turned-
Dissenting-Christian Rebecca Hocknell Lee. I read Ayscough and Rebecca48 as polarized 
figures for two ways of approaching the past: absolute historical knowledge and 
reverence for tradition, as opposed to a mystic and artistic mode of living and thinking 
outside chronological time. The tension between these two characters expresses a tension 
in A Maggot between historical specificity and a mythic or fictional mode of being that 
transcends history, tying the text to a dichotomy between fact and fiction that many of its 
other elements problematize. The novel seems unwilling to discard but simultaneously 
unable to support such simple oppositions between fact and fiction, or between 
straightforward access to historical truth and absolute skepticism. Instead, it engages the 
historical-epistemological conflicts of its era despite itself, reflecting not only the 
concerns of these debates but also their polarizing logics of either/or. 
 
Looking to History: A Maggot and The French Lieutenant’s Woman 
 Though separated by three novels (The Ebony Tower, Daniel Martin, and 
Mantissa) as well as a non-fiction book (The Tree), The French Lieutenant’s Woman and 
A Maggot bear striking similarities and are thus often paired by reviewers and critics. 
Each novel performs Fowles’s continuous juggling act of promoting existential freedom 
while simultaneously claiming immense aesthetic and moral authority. Each engages a 
                                                
48 I follow the text in using Henry Ayscogh’s last name but Rebecca Hocknell Lee’s first 
name, a usage that obviously (though perhaps too complicitly) underscores the 
differences in their gender and class status. These differences are important to the novel’s 
historical-epistemological engagements, as this chapter’s final section asserts. 
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textual past by mimicking genres and styles of the historical period in which it is set: 
where The French Lieutenant’s Woman borrows the intrusive omniscient narrator, 
lengthy and erudite footnotes, and chapter epigraphs of the realist Victorian novel and 
refers extensively to Victorian poets and novelists (above all Thomas Hardy), A Maggot 
ventriloquizes eighteenth-century conventions of epistolary and picaresque novels as well 
as legal and spiritual discourses, explicitly acknowledges a debt to Daniel Defoe, and 
reproduces excerpts of the period’s journalistic discourse in excerpts from The 
Gentleman’s Magazine’s “Historical Chronicle” section. The novels are further similar in 
their narrative stance, by which a conspicuously twentieth-century consciousness narrates 
the eighteenth- or nineteenth-century events. Though it so clearly invites comparison with 
its predecessor, however, A Maggot is far from a repeat performance, and in its 
differences from The French Lieutenant’s Woman we can trace the increased historical 
anxiety of the Britain of its publication. 
 Both The French Lieutenant’s Woman and A Maggot are informed by a tension 
between historical and artistic modes of knowing the past, and in each text Fowles’s 
often-conflicting desires to give freedom (to characters and readers) and to maintain 
authority (if only the authority to grant that freedom) is expressed in part through this 
exploration of how—and indeed whether—we can and should know the past. In A 
Maggot as in The French Lieutenant’s Woman, an enigmatic female character casts off 
past conventions and seems to exist outside historical time; in this sense, the epilogue’s 
admiration of Rebecca’s attempt to break from the past is yet another expression of 
Fowles’s ongoing affirmation of existentialist freedom, much like his earlier valuation of 
Sarah’s uncontrollable, unknowable being. In the earlier novel, however, the conventions 
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at hand are primarily literary: the narrator strives to provide his characters and readers 
some degree of freedom by exorcising Victorian conventions of control. In its much-
discussed thirteenth chapter, which interrupts the engrossing narrative of a nineteenth-
century love triangle to comment on the text, the narrator admits: 
  If I have pretended until now to know my characters’ minds and innermost  
  thoughts, it is because I am writing in (just as I have assumed the vocabulary  
  and some of the “voice” of) a convention universally accepted at the time of  
  my story: that the novelist stands next to God. [...] But I live in the age of  
  Alain Robbe-Grillet and Roland Barthes; if this is a novel, it cannot be a  
  novel in the modern sense of the word. (95) 
Echoing Barthes’s pronouncement of the ‘death of the author,” the narrator further claims 
that though “not even the most aleatory avant-garde modern novel has managed to 
extirpate its author completely [...] we are no longer the gods of the Victorian image, 
omniscient and decreeing; but in the new theological image, with freedom our first 
principle, not authority” (97). Here the narrator attempts to break through his control over 
the fiction and instead orchestrate a fictional world in which characters and readers are 
free to create meaning; he reconfigures traces of a literary past in questioning the 
authority of his own authorship.49 A Maggot, on the other hand, focuses on the casting-off 
of a historical rather than a literary inheritance. 
In A French Lieutenant’s Woman all breaks with the past (Charles’s Darwinism, 
for instance, and Sarah’s transformation from stuffy Mrs. Poulteney’s dark-cloaked 
servant to bohemian Rossetti’s brightly-clad assistant) seem primarily to illustrate the 
desirability of a shift from stable, linear Victorian systems of meaning to a more modern 
                                                
49 As I discuss in the next section with regard to A Maggot, both it and The French 
Lieutenant’s Woman blur any easy line between (without equating) Fowles and his 
narrators. Because the narrators are sometimes associated with Fowles, but more 
decisively because they depict women as absolute enigmas, I use masculine pronouns to 
refer to these narrating consciousnesses. 
 125 
and skeptical aesthetic form. In A Maggot, on the other hand, the literary is more often a 
metaphor for the historical than vice versa: for instance, its many references to theatrical 
conventions do not systematically rethink an artistic form but rather work to comment on 
the agency of historical actors and on human experiences of time. This difference of 
focus is underscored by the difference in the two novels’ paratexts, Gérard Genette’s term 
for all those materials that exist on the edge between being part of the text and being 
outside it: where the epigraphs of The French Lieutenant’s Woman overwhelmingly point 
to Victorian literature, the excerpts interleaved amongst A Maggot’s chapters are clipped 
not just from eighteenth-century journalism but specifically from a newspaper’s 
“Historical Chronicle.” These borrowings take the form of the chronicle—bare 
chronological lists with apparently straightforward reference to past events—in obvious 
contrast with the carefully-wrought bits of poetry, fiction, and prose non-fiction that 
surround Sarah’s and Charles’s stories with literary concerns. These differences 
contribute to the effect that A Maggot is far more explicitly about the historical past and 
ways of knowing it than is The French Lieutenant’s Woman; far from mere context, that 
past asserts itself as the central problem of the novel. 
 
The Skin of the Maggot: Fowles’s Paratexts 
In A Maggot, not only the focus but also the tenor of Fowles’s engagement with 
the past has changed: his career-long struggle with the authority of authorship and his 
equally long-term engagement with modes of understanding the past are rendered pointed 
and defensive by the historical anxiety afoot in 1980s Britain. This shift is especially 
apparent at the level of the paratext. Genette’s term encompasses both the peritext (which 
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accompanies the text in its printed form and includes features such as prefaces, 
introductions, footnotes, indices, the name of the author, and the publication date) and the 
epitext (which exists outside the printed text but influences its meaning and reception: for 
instance, advertisements and interviews with the author). Both A French Lieutenant’s 
Woman and A Maggot open with paratextual elements. But while The French 
Lieutenant’s Woman thus casts itself into a sea of literary and historical allusions, the 
paratext of A Maggot obsessively struggles to control the meaning of the text. 
 According to Genette, paratextual elements bear authorial or editorial 
responsibility and intention, guiding readers to perceive a text in a particular way: to print 
the word “novel” on the cover of a book instead of “history,” for instance, is to ask of 
readers and potential readers, “Please consider this book a novel” (268). While The 
French Lieutenant’s Woman and A Maggot are similar in beginning and then 
interspersing their stretches of narrative with paratextual elements, though, the paratext of 
the former is a far more open-ended and less anxious structure, leaving the text and its 
readers more (though far from entirely) to our own devices. After its cover and 
publishing information, a reader of The French Lieutenant’s Woman is faced with an 
epigraph attributed to Marx, an acknowledgements page referring to four books from 
which the following text borrows, a reiteration of the novel’s title, and then the first 
chapter (which itself begins with an epigraph from a poem by Hardy). Even so 
embedded, the narrative of this novel begins with less hedging than does that of A 
Maggot, in which a reader encounters cover, title, publishing information, and then (in 
the position of the acknowledgements in The French Lieutenant’s Woman), the signed 
and dated prologue. This prologue attempts to control the meaning both of the title that 
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thrice precedes and then immediately follows it, and of the text it introduces: ‘Please 
consider this book a mere whim,’ it says, ‘and do not mistake it for an engagement with 
history or historical narrative, factual or fictional.’ 
Fowles’s use of chapter epigraphs in The French Lieutenant’s Woman is, as 
Deborah Bowen argues, an unstable act of control. The epigraphs open up the text to 
whole other worlds of meaning and interact with each other in unpredictable ways, 
leading Bowen to discuss “the power of the reader in a text where the writer plays with 
plural voices but at the same time desires mastery of them” (67). Though Fowles claims 
immense authority through historically and morally didactic narrative intrusions, Bowen 
sees the epigraphs as more destabilizing than Genette’s sketch of paratextuality might 
lead us to expect. She points out that “this notion of paratext as a free space for authorial 
intentionality must be moderated in the case of the epigraph [...]. Unlike a preface or a 
footnote, an epigraph almost always originates with a different writer from the text, thus 
formalizing the notion of the ‘intertextual event as consciously admitting a polyphony of 
voices” (69). The French Lieutenant’s Woman begins strongly in the spirit of the 
epigraph—with the Marx epigraph, the acknowledgements of permissions for its 
epigraphs, and a chapter epigraph before the body of the text—and does not offer explicit 
or unambiguous directions to its readers. 
Clearly, A Maggot is framed in a far more controlling and cautious way, with 
paratextual elements that operate with greater reference to the author and his plans for the 
text. Its prologue outright directs readers rather than offering evocative snippets of 
powerful and culturally-valued contemporary texts (as The French Lieutenant’s Woman 
does with Marx and Hardy). Also unlike the earlier novel, which ends in the world of its 
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story, A Maggot closes with a seven-page epilogue again directing readers’ reading 
practices and interpretative bearings. Where the 1969 novel offers multiple endings and 
leaves it at that, the 1985 one seems compelled to explain, defend, and warn. This 
framing, this containment of the fictional text through the voice of the author, works to 
fashion a skin to keep Fowles’s maggot inside and the real world of history out—unlike 
the epigraphs of The French Lieutenant’s Woman, which from the very beginning blur 
the edge of the fiction by reaching out into cultural and literary history. Indeed, in A 
Maggot’s prologue and epilogue, Fowles seems to posit fiction and history as so 
absolutely separate that he can simply announce he’s doing one and not the other. Yet his 
insistence itself belies an anxiety that a historically-interested text such as A Maggot is 
unlikely actually to work that way in a historically-uneasy period such as the British 
1980s. 
In the prologue and epilogue that form part of A Maggot’s peritext and in the 
interviews its author later contributed to its epitext, Fowles endorses what is commonly 
labeled ‘proper history,’ an untheorized, common-sense approach to the past closely 
associated with the modernist tradition within academic history. The epilogue speaks the 
language of this approach when it asserts: “I have the greatest respect for exact and 
scrupulously documented history, [...] but this exacting discipline is essentially a science, 
and immensely different in its aims and methods from those of fiction” (449). The 
author’s voice outside the text continues to assume an easy distinction between 
historically-irrelevant fiction and ‘proper history’; citing a 1986 interview, for instance, 
Pamela Cooper notes that “Fowles’s informal approach to the age with which A Maggot 
deals suggests that scholarship has nothing to do with his sense of the artist as historian: 
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‘As an historical period it bores me in many ways: I can’t be bothered to analyse 
Walpole’s régime as a proper historian would’” (215).50 Yet the novel simply does not 
endorse proper or modernist history, characterized in the paratext by an unproblematic 
differentiation of fiction and history and an equally straightforward faith in historians’ 
access to a factual past. Modernist history asserts that, with the proper research skills, we 
can know the truth about history—but A Maggot is focused entirely on the unknowable 
past, the unsolvable mystery. 
Not only does the body of the novel contradict the paratext, refusing to remain a 
harmless maggot unrelated to historical knowledge, but it also continually exceeds and 
inverts its paratextual skin. Through the prologue, the epilogue, and later interviews, 
Fowles strives to control his text and prevent readers from interpreting it as anti- (or even 
as related to) ‘proper history.’ He implies through the text and through his anxiety that 
the alternative to scientifically-certain history is mere fiction, mere mysticism—even as 
he sometimes suggests that fiction and mysticism are superior modes of knowing and 
being. Such a tension problematizes an effort to contain A Maggot’s fiction within the 
truthful communication of the epilogue and prologue, utterances that fit into Genette’s 
definition of factual texts in which author=narrator (whereas, in fictional texts, 
author≠narrator) (“Fictional”). Rather than allowing its fictional body and factual 
paratextual statements—straight from the mouth of the author—to remain separate, A 
Maggot complicates the distinction between fictional and factual discourses. It blurs the 
line between the very forms of knowing and telling, fiction and historical narrative, 
which its paratexts take such pains to separate. 
                                                
50 Here Cooper quotes from Baker 666-7. 
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While the prologue and epilogue (which ask readers to equate “I” and author) are 
physically set apart from the narrative, the distinction is far less absolute than this 
separation initially suggests. Consider, for example, the similarity of these two 
paragraphs, one from the fictional body of A Maggot and the next from its factual 
epigraph: 
Yet surrender to attacks of intense emotion was an essential part of both 
its [the religious movement of Dissent’s] being and its practice, perhaps 
not least because it stood so deeply against the aristocratic, then the aping 
middle class, and now the universal English tradition in such matters; 
which dreads natural feeling (what other language speaks of attacks of 
emotion?) and has made an art of sangfroid, meiosis, cynicism and the 
stiff upper lip to keep it at bay. We may talk coolly now in psychiatric 
terms of the hysterical enthusiasm, the sobbing, the distorted speech in the 
gift of tongues, all the other wild phenomena found in so much early 
Dissenting worship. We should do better to imagine a world where [...] a 
sense of self barely exists; or most often where it does, is repressed; where 
most are still like John Lee, more characters written by someone else than 
free individuals in our comprehension of the adjective and the noun. (388) 
 
I suspect we owe quite as much to all those incoherent sobs and tears and 
ecstasies of the illiterate as to the philosophers of mind and the sensitive 
artists. Unorthodox religion was the only vehicle by which the vast 
majority, who were neither philosophers nor artists, could express this 
painful breaking of the seed of the self from the hard soil of an irrational 
and tradition-bound society—and a society not so irrational that it did not 
very well know how much it depended on not seeing its traditions 
questioned, its foundations disturbed. Can we wonder the new-born ego 
[...] often chose means to survive and to express itself as irrational as those  
that restrained it? (451). 
These two passages are strikingly similar in tone, style, and aim. Each analyses the 
historical setting of the novel from a twentieth-century perspective. Each uses 
psychoanalytic discourse—“repressed,” “ego.” Each attempts to understand the 
fundamental difference of past human experiences, and to historicize a twentieth-century 
sense of self. It seems impossible to distinguish the “we” of one from the “we” of the 
other. In other words, given the similarity of these two passages, and the strong 
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implication that the “I” of the epilogue is the “I” of the author, not just the paratexts but 
parts of the body of A Maggot seem to speak the voice of the author. 
 The extreme proximity of tone, message, and historical knowledge conveyed in 
this pair of passages is only one example of the interpenetration of worlds (fact and 
fiction, author and characters, past and present, paratext and text) both performed and 
forsworn in A Maggot—one way among many in which this maggot turns itself inside-
out. Indeed, Fowles’s assurance that he believes in this totally distinct mode of knowing 
called history but is here merely writing a fiction seems not merely strange given the 
narrator’s historical and moral commentary—seemingly in the voice of the author—but 
also awfully naive for an author as erudite as he (and who implies readers as erudite as 
those he does), and untenable surrounding a text that questions the possibility and 
desirability of total access to explanation of past events or total reliance upon rationality 
for knowledge. His fervent assertion of fiction’s distinction from and his own respect for 
‘proper history’ becomes more legible in context, in the text’s outside world of the 
heritage wars, debates over historical pedagogy, and an increasingly visible (and 
threatening) postmodernist approach to the philosophy of history. 
 
A Maggot Historicized 
 Between the 1969 of The French Lieutenant’s Woman and the 1985 of A Maggot, 
Fowles was far from the only person whose attention turned more seriously and 
anxiously to history. Conflicts over historical knowledge—characterized by a deep sense 
of the meaningfulness and power of the past, and simultaneously a deep doubt regarding 
the accessibility and nature of historical truth—rose in prominence within British politics, 
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popular culture, art, and scholarship during these years. The heritage movement became 
increasingly active, and its opponents increasingly vocal. Simultaneously, and relatedly, 
‘The Great History Debate’ over history in the schools raged. And finally, postmodernist 
thought extended its reach significantly in the years between the two novels, subjecting 
the widely-accepted objectivity of modernist history to thoroughgoing critique. Here, I 
examine A Maggot’s echoes of these three highly polarizing debates, arguing that the 
novel thoughtfully questions the transparency and neutrality of historical authority—
despite its paratextual claim to have nothing to do with history, and despite Fowles’s 
explicit endorsement of ‘proper’ (transparent, common-sense) historical knowledge. 
A Maggot urges readers to look at the national past and its underwriting of British 
institutions with a questioning, critical eye, at a moment when the heritage movement 
urged the British public to value and identify with that past. Culture Minister David 
Lammy claims that though a preservationist movement had been active since the late 
Victorian period, “It was only the sale of Mentmore House and its contents in 1977 
which re-kindled a public outcry and led to the creation of the National Heritage 
Memorial Fund. And with it—for the first time—the concept of ‘national 
heritage.’ Shortly afterward, English Heritage emerged and the heritage world started 
looking much as we know it today.” And very shortly after that, as Lammy regretfully 
concedes: 
in certain circles, heritage began to be a dirty word.  Against the 
backdrop of ITV's Brideshead Revisited [1981], heritage began to have 
inherently conservative, narrow-minded connotations.  The poet Tom 
Paulin voiced it most succinctly, ‘The British heritage industry is a 
loathsome collection of theme parks and dead values.’  A thesis 
expanded upon at great length in Robert Hewison’s The Heritage 
Industry [1987] and Patrick Wright’s On Living in an Old Country  
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[1985]. 
By 1985 there was a very public sense not only of the significance and pleasures of 
national heritage, but also of a critique of heritage as a whitewashing, domesticating 
approach to the past that served the status quo and the political right. 
The novel’s judgment of Ayscough’s interest in precedent and tradition is thus 
implicitly critical of the heritage industry, the more so given the novel’s attacks on the 
related ills of commodification and “media manipulation and cultural hegemony” (453), 
as the epilogue puts it. Lawyer to an unnamed nobleman, Ayscough represents (in both 
the artistic and the legal sense) the ruling classes, and he both offers and demands 
absolute reverence toward tradition and precedent, which he views as transparently 
knowable. In other words, he claims the authority to articulate and uphold the status quo. 
He is also a thoroughly unsympathetic character, arrogant, snobbish, two-faced, and 
brutally single-minded: “I shall have her yet, I shall know,” he tells one witness of 
Rebecca (261). In Ayscough’s frustration with her testimony, the narrator comments, 
“Once or twice his mind slipped back to the days of the real question; interrogation aided 
by rack and thumbscrew” (425). While he stops at torture, he does lie, bully and 
manipulate witnesses, and hold them without allowing communication with family 
members. He revels in threatening people with the gallows without any evidence that 
they may have committed a crime, as when he tricks harmless actor Lacy into his 
chambers and, with “a humourless smile,” informs him: “My client has written a piece 
for you, my friend. It is called The Steps and the String, or Twang-dang-dillo-dee. In 
which you shall jig upon the scaffold, at the end of Jack Ketch’s rope” (109). Ayscough’s 
blood-thirst constantly connects his desire to chart out past events with his power, and 
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with his snivelling deference to his powerful employer. The narrator not only shows us 
these examples of Ayscough’s faults as a moral and epistemic model, but also judges him 
outright: his “crudely chauvinistic contempt for [another] witness is offensive” (227), he 
is “shrewd [...] in [the brutal whoremonger] Claiborne’s terms” (230), he is “imprisoned” 
by “tacit prejudices” (231). Through this figure, the novel connects uncritical celebration 
of traditional hierarchy and knowledge with injustice and narrow-mindedness. 
Further, its choice and treatment of historical setting place the novel at odds with 
a trend to aestheticize and domesticate British history as light entertainment: where The 
French Lieutenant’s Woman takes place in a lovable though flawed Victorian era, A 
Maggot inhabits a fiercely alien eighteenth century. The Edenic countryside of the earlier 
novel—where Sarah can sleep peacefully and where playful lovers find privacy as well as 
a nice bowl of milk at the nearby dairy—is replaced by a threatening wilderness of 
confusing paths and cutthroat highwaymen, “an ugly and all-invasive reminder of the 
Fall” (11). Its plush parlours and spare but clean and comfortable servant’s quarters are 
similarly supplanted by “narrow streets and alleys, [...] Tudor houses and crammed 
cottage closes” that “conveyed nothing but an antediluvian barbarism, such as we can 
experience today only in some primitive foreign land” (11). Modern readers might long 
to inhabit the world of The French Lieutenant’s Woman, but few would choose to make 
their homes in A Maggot’s charmless England. 
Even the sex trade is more approachable in The French Lieutenant’s Woman. 
Here, prostitution appears first as a highly aestheticized tableau, the nude women of a 
high-class club interspersed with eighteenth-century and Classical descriptions of similar 
scenes, and second as a domesticated personal interaction when a drunken and distraught 
 135 
Charles goes to the rooms of a prostitute who turns out to be a kind, honest woman and a 
good mother. Rebecca’s brothel and her experiences as Mr. Bartholomew’s hired woman 
are neither aestheticized nor domesticated, introduced as they are largely through the 
testimony of the brothel’s crude and cruel Mistress Claibourne. Both Sarah (the 
unfortunately-named prostitute Charles hires) and Rebecca are driven to prostitution 
through economic hardship and sexism, and each proves to be “a brave, kind girl” 
(French 321) at heart, but in the meantime we see Rebecca’s life at Claibourne’s house 
and on her journey to the cave in far more disturbing detail. Prostitution is here presented 
more bleakly as sex for money, accompanied by the threat of violent punishment for 
women who would leave; this representation focuses far more on the prostitute as victim 
of historical and cultural circumstances—the religious fanaticism of her community, the 
shortage of economic opportunities for women, the absence of legal protections for 
women and the poor. A Maggot’s less cozy setting presents readers with a past most 
readers would be less than enthusiastic about inheriting; it attacks nostalgia for a pastoral 
British past in terms similar to those with which critics attack the heritage movement and 
industry. 
 During the same period, British politicians, educators, and journalists were much 
occupied with disagreements over the place of history (and particularly the English past) 
as a subject in Britain’s schools. In its manifestations in the 1970s, ’80s, and ’90s, this 
debate organized itself around differences between two approaches (though in reality 
these are the extreme poles of a continuum rather than the two possible pedagogical or 
theoretical approach to history): the ‘great tradition’ of history as a grand national 
narrative, a chronological sequence of great men and events, as opposed to the 
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increasingly influential ‘new history,’ which emphasized skills (especially document 
analysis) and concepts (such as, most notoriously, empathy). Robert Phillips argues that 
by the 1980s, “New Right discourses on history—expressed publicly through the press—
had managed to create an artifical polarization of the ‘skills versus content’ and the 
‘traditional versus new’ debates” (46). Examining the controversy leading up to and 
following the 1990 Final Report of the National Curriculum History Working Group, 
Vivienne Little summarizes the weaknesses of each pole: “While content-led curricula 
were open to various charges of imbalance or distortion, [...] learner-led or ‘new history’ 
ones were accused of undervaluing knowledge in the endeavour to promote conceptual 
development” (323). As in its skeptical implications regarding British cultural heritage, A 
Maggot appears aligned with the more critical and questioning half of this dichotomy. 
Indeed, the formal structure of A Maggot, its scarcity of narration and centrality of 
documents, renders it a performance of the ‘new history.’ 
A Maggot engages historical pedagogy not through commentary so much as 
through enactment: it teaches. Many critics, often in dismay and annoyance, describe the 
narrative voice of The French Lieutenant’s Woman as didactic and pedantic; Susan 
Onega, for instance, argues that the novel’s footnotes paint the narrator as “an 
impartial—if somewhat erudite and pedantic—historian” (72), and Richard Hauer Costa 
calls the novel’s plot “the flimsiest of covers for Fowles’ didacticism” (2). The narrator 
of A Maggot also works to teach us moral and historical lessons; the sense of excessive 
didacticism recurs in reviews of this later novel. Robert Nye, for one, describes it as a 
good start that dissolves into its author’s desire to teach and preach; in contrast to “the 
poet Fowles” responsible for the promising parts of A Maggot, he claims: 
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The other Fowles, alas, is didactic, a preacher/teacher with an incurable 
lust to inflict his views upon us. While he confines his lectures to little 
asides about the importance of sheep and the wool trade in the early 
eighteenth century, this Fowles is just about tolerable; but I have to say 
that I regard the Author's Sermon (called epilogue) with which the book 
concludes as not just rubbish, but a serious failure of artistic nerve and  
responsibility. 
Setting aside the question of artistic merit, I want to highlight these readers’ 
uncomfortable sense that they are being subjected to a lesson, and the question both The 
French Lieutenant’s Woman and A Maggot may raise in an annoyed reader: who does he 
think he is? The novels construct a teacherly voice, positing readers who know less than 
this erudite speaker and who ought to learn from him. 
While the narrator of A Maggot shares the didactic voice of The French 
Lieutenant Woman’s narrator, it teaches its ‘students’ radically differently. Whereas the 
latter is composed almost entirely of narrative and (in chapter thirteen and many shorter 
passages of historical commentary) dissertative exposition, the former includes very little 
of the narrator’s/instructor’s voice. In the teacher-centered mode of the 1969 novel, the 
narrator delivers lengthy lectures on peasant sex, Thomas Hardy, literary theory, and 
countless other topics; here, quotations are rallied as evidence for historical and moral 
claims and to support a sense of realism. In the 1985 novel, instead, readers face a 
collection of documents—transcribed depositions, newspaper clippings, letters—in which 
brief stretches of narration and commentary are peripheral to the archive that awaits our 
analysis. In other words, A Maggot teaches its lessons through a focus on documents and 
inquiry rather than on a narrative; its readers are invited to participate in the process of 
historical knowledge by evaluating competing contemporary accounts of a series of 
events, and navigating the unfamiliar language and form of eighteenth-century 
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journalism. Unlike The French Lieutenant’s Woman, this novel decentralizes the event, 
the fact, and the actor, which all remain evasive. Also in opposition to ‘great tradition’ 
history and pedagogy, A Maggot departs from a Great Men tradition by omitting the 
name of the nobleman and focusing instead on a prostitute; its epilogue directs us to re-
evaluate the “incoherent sobs and tears and ecstasies of the illiterate” as just as 
historically significant as “the philosophers of mind and the sensitive artists” who are 
more central to a traditional account of eighteenth-century England (451). This novel 
urges us to attend to people who did not triumph, attempts that fizzled out in the face of 
powerful establishments. In other words, it launches a critical history more aligned with 
Rebecca’s suspicion of past authority than with Ayscough’s (more successful but less 
admirable) efforts to shore it up—and more aligned with the ‘new history’ than with the 
‘great tradition’ of teaching the British past. 
The novel’s performance of a procedure- rather than fact-focused historical 
pedagogy produces serious doubts regarding historical knowledge, doubts that mirror the 
concerns of recent developments within historical pedagogy and scholarship. The debate 
over school history and shifts within academic history are, naturally, far from unrelated: 
as Little observes, the conflict that produced (and then commented upon) the 1990 Final 
Report took place in three overlapping arenas, the professional, academic, and political: 
“There is a ‘new history’ at the academic level, which, while it shares with its school 
counterpart a concern with method, also raises wider questions about what counts as 
history and the epistemological status of historians’ accounts of the past, which go well 
beyond those at issue in the forms of knowledge debate of the fifties and sixties” (323). 
Little’s description of academic ‘new history’ (an umbrella term that refers to 
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developments such as microhistory and cultural history) might also apply to A Maggot: 
“History used to be about politics and war, now it is also about economics, social 
structure, culture. It used to be about powerful men and heroes and nations, now it is 
about ordinary lives too and about social identities” (323). In the face of such 
multiplicity, “General history and literary narrative, characteristic of the ‘great tradition’ 
of the subject, are much more difficult to sustain” (323). Like the ‘new history,’ A 
Maggot rediscovers “those ‘hidden from history’—the common person, women, blacks,” 
engages “longer-standing perceptions of vested interest alongside epistemological purity 
in the origins of academic disciplines,” and rethinks “history’s characteristic forms of 
expression” (323-4). 
The prologue and epilogue need to endorse a history of simple objectivity and 
claim that the text they bracket has nothing to do with history, because that text so clearly 
critiques a long-established mode of knowing, telling, and teaching the nation’s past. 
Like the ‘Great History Debate’ to which, willingly or unwillingly, the novel contributes, 
A Maggot raises “profound questions about the role of the past and of history in the 
national culture, the nature of the discipline itself [...]—in short, about what history 
should teach” (Little 319). In raising these questions, furthermore, the novel echoes not 
only critics of the heritage movement and proponents of the ‘new history’ in the schools, 
but also the poststructuralist philosophy of history. In the 1970s and ’80s, philosophers 
increasingly turned their attention to historical knowledge and writing—and philosophers 
of history to poststructuralist thought. Though different in many ways, these critics’, 
history teachers’, historians’, and philosophers’ approaches to historical knowledge are 
similar in their willingness to question the possibility, significance, and proper form of 
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historical knowledge. They also share a concern with the role of the historical knower in 
the construction of that knowledge: rather than a historian holding a mirror to the past, 
they envision history as a set of procedures, conventions, and acts of selection. A Maggot 
echoes such questioning stances and participates in the newly-widespread questioning of 
‘factual’ historical discourse. 
The French Lieutenant’s Woman was published at a moment of deconstruction’s 
increasing importance to English-language literature and literary studies—Derrida had 
delivered “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” at Johns 
Hopkins in 1966, and Barthes had published “The Death of the Author” in English (in 
Aspen) in 1967 and in French (in Manteia) in 1968. The novel’s references to Barthes and 
the nouveau roman represent Fowles’s experiments as appealingly novel French 
borrowings. But between the publication of this novel and A Maggot, postmodernism not 
only became more pervasive in literature and literary studies but also extended its 
attention to the conventions and texts of scholarly history. For instance, the years 
between 1969 and 1985 saw the publication or translation into English of Hayden 
White’s Metahistory (1973) and Tropics of Discourse (1978), Barthes’s “The Discourse 
of History” (first published in 1967, but translated into English in 1981), Michel 
Foucault’s “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” (1971, in English 1977) and The Order of 
Things (1966, in English 1970), Michel de Certeau’s The Writing of History (1975, in 
English 1988), and Paul Ricoeur’s three-volume Time and Narrative (1983-5, in English 
1984-8). Like these and other reflections on historiography, A Maggot poses questions 
about the nature and limitations of historical knowledge by focusing its attention on the 
role of the knower in historical knowledge, as well as through its obsession with the 
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absolutely other and unknowable. 
It does so in contradiction with its paratext’s confident endorsement of ‘proper 
history,’ which as Alan Munslow reminds us is still a powerful mode despite what its 
“more militant” practitioners see as the threat of postmodernism: “In the UK and USA 
modernist history remains (for the majority) the means for [...] square dealing with the 
past. Indeed, the argument runs that by relativising history we can no longer grasp the 
significance and meaning of the present” (165). It does not require a great deal of 
imagination to read the concerns and style of poststructuralist theory in this novel, with 
its outright insistence that the self is a cultural construct, its formal de-centering of the 
author and demotion of linear narrative, its performance of the bafflement of Truth in the 
face of multiple truths, its attention to the production of knowledge, and its obsession 
with the difficulties of binary oppositions (the rational and the emotional, the bodily and 
the spiritual, purity and impurity, truth and falsehood, past and present: dramatized for 
instance through the mysteriously twin and co-dependent existence of idiot Dick and 
scholar Mr. Bartholomew). A Maggot undermines the obviousness of the line between 
fact and fiction, between the believable and the unbelievable, in part though its use of an 
archive that is partly discovered but partly fabricated; while the pages of The 
Gentleman’s Magazine are viable historical sources, for instance, Fowles also quotes 
from a 1736 issue of The Western Gazette—a newspaper established in 1737. Like the 
philosophies of history listed above, but through the techniques of fiction, this text 
reflects upon the constructedness and fallibility of historical knowledge based on archival 
research. 
Indeed, as Tony Thwaites observes, the novel begs for a deconstructive reading 
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whether the critic likes it or not: “This cave within the text which calls itself and 
describes itself as A Maggot contains: what? Precisely a maggot, or A Maggot. The 
outside which contains the inside is smaller than and contained within the inside: the 
maggot is, fortuitously but precisely, a figure of Derridean textual ‘double invagination’” 
(62). He declines even to “go into the psychoanalytical richnesses of the primal scene in 
A Maggot, though—given that it involves an enclosed womblike space in the earth, 
which is entered by an impotent (castrated?) man and two companions called Dick and 
Fanny—this clearly begs to be done” (63). In reading A Maggot as a mystery story, 
Thwaites finds he cannot avoid Derrida and Lacan; it is similarly impossible to read the 
novel’s engagement of history without encountering the poststructuralists’ impact on that 
field of knowledge. 
A Maggot works as neatly to illustrate Michel de Certeau’s poststructuralist 
Freudian philosophy of history as its cave does to demonstrate double invagination; it so 
clearly works alongside de Certeau’s text and out of similar concerns that it is difficult to 
view as a mere maggot rather than as a reflection upon historiography. According to de 
Certeau’s The Writing of History, historiography primarily sets up and erodes 
boundaries—between the past and the present, among historical periods, at the limits of 
what we label “events,” and so forth. Writing history is a dual operation of separating the 
past from the present and simultaneously of flattening the past’s alterity through writing 
and understanding it. De Certeau deconstructs this procedure and the oppositions it 
constructs: 
Thus founded on the rupture between a past that is its object, and a present  
that is the place of its practice, history endlessly finds the present in its  
object and the past in its practice. Inhabited by the uncanniness that it  
seeks, history imposes its law upon the faraway places that it conquers  
 143 
when it fosters the illusion that it is bringing them back to life. (36) 
In this theory, historiography works like entombment: the historian both buries the dead, 
containable past away from the living present, and commemorates it through his or her 
present act of writing. History is, after all, “a discipline that deals with death as an object 
of knowledge and, in doing so, causes the production of an exchange among living souls” 
(47). 
At every level, A Maggot too is preoccupied with otherness—and particularly 
with the possibility of an otherness so absolute that it prevents rational understanding, 
emplotment, or (literally, in the cases of the suicide Dick and disappeared Mr. 
Bartholomew) proper burial. It repeatedly uses imagery suggesting different worlds: at 
the level of its story, for instance, Dick seems to Jones “[a]s if he had dropped from the 
moon” (197) and exudes what the narrator calls “an otherness” (28); Rebecca tells her 
interrogator that “Thy world is not my world, nor Jesus Christ’s neither” (423). At the 
level of its telling, too, A Maggot posits multiple and absolutely separate ‘worlds.’ For 
example, the narrator treats the eighteenth century as “a world where [...] a sense of self 
barely exists” (388), emphatically a different reality from that of its author and readers. 
Yet neither Ayscough nor readers are permitted to keep past past and present present, 
outside out and inside in; readers can no more impose our rationality than can Ayscough 
his law on these mysteries. 
Instead, when he and we reach the cave at the center of this epistemologically-
driven novel, part historical inquiry and part “classic locked-room mystery” (Thwaites 
57), we find not clues or rational explanation but a maggot—or, even more frustratingly, 
multiple and contradictory maggots (maggots eating decaying flesh in one telling, a 
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floating maggot-like machine in the other). A Maggot contests “objectivism, 
representation, truth, factualism, reference, realism, the subject-object binary, all of 
which were ideally located in the figure of the disinterested modernist historian” 
(Munslow 25). It also presents readers with an inadequate archive, frustrating a modernist 
confidence in the ultimate accessibility of the truth. So far from including a smoking gun, 
this mystery lacks even the body in question: when Ayscough and the reader have heard 
every available witness’s story (unable to find Mr. Bartholomew, whether dead, in 
hiding, or risen to heaven), read every existing relevant document (unable to access the 
trunk-full of papers Dick and his master burn), and examined the terrain of the tale, we 
are left without a reliable account. 
A Maggot thus performs philosophical doubts and practical limitations by 
prompting its readers to act as historians. It puts us through an experience all too familiar 
to working historians but rarely represented in dissertations, popular or scholarly 
histories, or historical novels: the reader/historian formulates a historical question, 
journeys to the archive, sorts through a collection of sources both relevant and random, 
both fascinating and dull, and reluctantly concludes that the surviving sources simply 
cannot answer the question or provide an account. Where the historian would cut his or 
her losses and formulate a new question, the reader is asked to question popular and easy 
assumptions about historians’ transparent access to past events, an access that now 
appears constructed both by the accidents of documentary survival and by interested 
selection: Ayscough’s motivations in recording particular people’s testimonies, his power 
to require them to speak, and his choice and phrasing of questions. A Maggot is like The 
French Lieutenant’s Woman in frustrating our desire to ‘know what happened,’ but the 
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two novels use significantly different mechanisms of narrative frustration: The French 
Lieutenant’s Woman offers multiple endings direct from the impresario, each in its own 
way a conclusion to the romance plot, but the later novel more radically offers no ending 
in the sense of a conclusion to the mystery plot. Rather, it leaves us in this position of a 
historian faced with an inadequate archive, or a detective without the data to solve a case. 
‘What happened’ is here unknowable not because (as in the earlier novel) it did not really 
happen (because it is fictional rather than historical), but because the past includes 
fundamentally unknowable events and individuals. 
A Maggot emphasizes the unrecorded, the ineffable, and the inexplicable as 
challenges to historiography, reminding readers that in reading textual traces of the past 
we must neglect events and lives that passed without a trace, or that left partial (in both 
senses) traces. It also posits a world in which some events, or at least some accounts, are 
inassimilable into historical logic. The two available accounts of the events in the cave—
the version Rebecca offers Jones immediately after the events but later forswears, and the 
version she offers Ayscough under oath but at a greater distance from the events—fly in 
the face of such logics. In the first, Rebecca is raped by Satan before Mr. B., Dick, three 
witches, and Satan have an orgy; in the second, she is led to a floating “maggot” that 
sounds to a modern reader like a spacecraft or perhaps a time machine, which seems to 
contain a television on which the machine’s pilot screens utopic and dystopic scenes. But 
if these are people from the future operating fanciful but fundamentally mechanical 
objects, how are we to understand the scene in which three women of different ages step 
into each other and join into the wise pilot? When Ayscough tries to reread Rebecca’s 
heavenly “June Eternal” as “Alias, castles in Spain” (369), how does that make it more 
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accountable to his logic—given that she would have to have flown over Spain in a 
buoyant maggot or watched an as-yet-uninvented film by that explanation? If she has 
dreamed it all, as Ayscough suggests (370, 372), how does she come up with all the 
futuristic details that register so strongly with readers? 
Beyond these small frustrations lies the larger one first raised by the Satanic 
narrative: a spiritual account is simply inadmissible to the logic of history or law; it does 
not count. A Maggot thus performs what de Certeau describes as historiography’s 
charting out of the “believable,” the thinkable or unthinkable, and what Hayden White 
discusses in terms of selection and narration. As White argues, every aspect of history-
writing involves interpretation in that we must select which data we accept: for instance, 
even if all available sources agree that a miracle occurred, a modern historian will not 
represent the event as a miracle (59). Like Ayscough in his final letter on the case to his 
employer, we can accept that Rebecca believes her own testimony, but most modern 
readers will remain suspicious of her proto-Shakerism. The novel encourages such 
skepticism by setting up Mr. Bartholomew as a deeply unsympathetic character; it is 
difficult to accept that the erratic man who abuses Rebecca is so holy as to be carried 
directly to Heaven (408). And Rebecca hardly even asks to be trusted, asserting blankly, 
“I care not what other people believed. I know only what I believe” (418), repeatedly 
refusing explanation and telling Ayscough that she does not know how or why what she 
believes is true. 
The active role of the historian in emplotting historical data and in mediating 
between the storytelling and analytical operations of historiography results, according to 
de Certeau, in histories’ need for reliability. Readers of a history must trust the historian, 
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or question his or her trustworthiness, in a manner foreign to the process of reading a 
mathematic proof. The mixed quality of historical discourse—separating and connecting 
as it does past and present, narrative and analysis—also manifests in disciplinary 
histories’ uses of sources, their re-presentation of “chronicle, archive, document”: 
Through ‘quotations,’ references, notes, [...] historiographical discourse is 
constructed as a knowledge of the other. It is constructed according to a 
problematic of procedure and trial, or of citation, that can at the same time 
‘subpoena’ a referential language that acts therein as reality, and judge it 
in the name of knowledge. [...] The role of quoted language is thus one of  
accrediting discourse. (94) 
This function of citation is apparent in A Maggot’s use of chronicles and other 
documents. Yet, as these chronicles also suggest so vividly, and as de Certeau argues, the 
quoted text in its necessary otherness “upholds the danger of an uncanniness which alters 
the translator’s or commentator’s knowledge,” even though “what is cited is fragmented, 
used over again and patched together in a text” (251). The real and false documents of A 
Maggot imply a problematic difference between surviving traces of the past—a body of 
conflicting truths (and falsehoods)—and a selective and conjectural narrative based on 
that archive—Ayscough’s final letter, or the decisive story and ending that our narrator 
pointedly denies us. 
The documents underscore (by requiring of readers) the tricky even if educated 
guess-work of evaluating accounts’ reliability and distinguishing the genuine from the 
forged, falsified, or misrecorded. The text includes both borrowed and fabricated sources, 
challenging readers to speculate as to their authenticity. It also raises these issues on the 
level of the story by questioning the accuracy of John Tudor, the clerk who lurks in the 
novel’s background and records each character’s deposition. Though rendered invisible 
in the transcriptions, this man is not a faithful recording machine but a “sardonic scribe” 
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(388) who jokes rather darkly with Rebecca that “where I cannot read when I copy in the 
long hand, why, I make it up. So I may hang a man, or pardon him, and none the wiser” 
(343). In part though this apparently insignificant historical actor, spending his life in the 
busywork of an informational middle-man, A Maggot places the possibility of historical 
knowledge under question. Readers leave the book “none the wiser” about ‘what 
happened’ not for an accidental, single reason peculiar to this story, but for a collection of 
reasons inherent to much historical research: because scribes can be as careless as John 
Tudor; because contemporary accounts can be written in discourses so different from our 
own as Rebecca’s spiritual and Ayscough’s legal languages; because people with various 
motivations can forge documents just as Fowles does; because witnesses have died; 
because historical voices can be silenced or compromised by disability (like Dick’s), 
illiteracy (like Rebecca’s), or the dynamics of power (like the witnesses Ayscough treats 
so differently according to their station, and often with the threat of death accompanying 
his displeasure with their testimony). 
 
Historians and Mystics: A Maggot in the Excluded Middle 
 John Tudor is only one of A Maggot’s many history-writers. In the multiplicity of 
this text’s representations of historical inquiry, we can see its compulsion toward and 
simultaneous dissatisfaction with an all-or-nothing approach to historical knowledge. 
Together, Ayscough and this scribe perform the work of oral historians, eliciting 
testimony and transforming it into documents to be analysed and cited. In the clerk’s self-
interested fudging and the lawyer’s equally self-interested bullying, they are unethical 
practitioners of this methodology; any potential for impartiality that might reside in legal 
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or historical methods of inquiry proves no match for the characters’ human flaws. Yet in 
the end, these men’s individual failings are not the sole or even the primary impediment 
to total knowledge of past events. Shadowed by his assistant, Ayscough becomes a main 
character in a novel that quickly turns from a single-layer narrative (of travellers on a 
mysterious journey) to focus more on the processes—and inevitable frustrations—of 
knowing than on the events that Ayscough, the narrator, and readers strive to understand. 
Historiography—splitting as it does between past events and present procedures 
of research and writing—shares with mystery fiction, and with this novel, what Thwaites 
calls “a twin narrative, one concerning the events which have taken place and the other 
concerning the reconstruction of those events” (57). Not at all incidentally, this structure 
brings together mystery and history, demonstrating the similarity of these genres’ 
conventions. Thus Thwaite’s description of Ayscough’s task of detection also describes 
the task of the ‘proper historian’: 
Now on the one hand the story derived from the testimonies must have the  
ability to account for all the events narrated in the testimonies. At the same 
time, though, it is accountable to those narratives [...], introducing in its 
turn nothing that cannot be verified from the original testimonies. The 
discourse must allow the construction of a single, necessary and sufficient 
story, one which can be seen in retrospect to link all of the recounted 
events along the linear thread of chronology and causality. Discourse and 
story must in other words be a one-to-one mapping, the pieces from one 
fitting rearranged into the space of the other, with no overlap in either  
case. (57) 
By dramatizing inquiry into the past as a crime investigation in a novel whose setting and 
concerns are so emphatically historical, A Maggot renders Ayscough not only a lawyer 
but also a historian figure in this novel. The obsession with history that permeates the 
levels of the text finds expression in this detective’s flawed and biased attempt to 
reconstruct the past; this alignment of historical knowledge and legal authority 
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emphasizes the workings of power in the creation of knowledge and undermines an easy 
acceptance of a modernist history that works, as Munslow explains, “to demonstrate [the 
historian’s] separation from the present (ideology, society, politics, text)—to make 
him/her ahistorical” and to prompt readers “to consume the truthful narrative as a 
coherent reflection of reality” (27). Yet Ayscough ultimately fails to offer a plausible and 
coherent narrative. 
Furthermore, even as readers are encouraged to identify with the processes of 
historical knowing, it is the mystic—and not the historian-figure seeking answers though 
rational inquiry—who proves sympathetic. The two main characters of A Maggot at least 
in terms of the size of their speaking roles, Rebecca and Ayscough represent directly 
opposed and mutually exclusive stances toward historical time and knowledge: in 
opposition to Ayscough’s reverence for tradition and precedent (and terror of change), 
Rebecca is entirely oriented toward the future, and in opposition to the lawyer’s need for 
evidence, Rebecca seeks inspired faith. She is depicted sympathetically as the ruined 
young woman—“hardly more than a girl” (6)—who empathizes with the deaf-mute 
servant Dick; she emerges from the cave as an appealing proto-feminist and socialist, and 
closes the novel as Madonna with child. As these hints of anachronism and ahistoricality 
suggest, Rebecca is not so much an alternative historian figure as an anti-historian, self-
consciously positing her language and understanding in opposition to Ayscough’s 
rational explanations and need for proof, “thy alphabet” and “mine” (380). So far from a 
writer of history, Rebecca cannot write at all, and while the lawyer uses the written word 
in an attempt to pin down past events into a meaningful narrative fitting his society’s 
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preconceptions, Rebecca hopes to prophesy the explosion of those preconceptions and a 
shift from human history to the heaven she calls June Eternal. 
At the novel’s end, we leave Ayscough offering his employer what is 
transparently an inadequate account of the events in question, suggesting the inadequacy 
of his faith in the solid ground of rational, transparent knowledge of the past—both as a 
sequence of events (what happened in the cave) and as the basis of an unchanging, 
traditional social system. The narrator then turns to Rebecca, who in the final scene sings 
a lullaby while nursing her newborn daughter. While “it is clear they are not rational 
words, and can mean nothing,” the scene affirms Rebecca’s simple, emphatically natural 
mode of being as a serious ethical challenge to the defensive, past-oriented posture of 
Ayscough and the rest of the establishment. 
These two modes of being and thinking in time, the historical and the mystic, are 
embodied in characters who not only engage in direct conflict and prove totally unable to 
communicate or collaborate with each other, but also occupy wildly different positions: 
wealthy and poor, literate and illiterate, Anglican and Dissenting, and most obviously, 
male and female. Fowles’s habit of underscoring and naturalizing gender differences, 
particularly in the figure of the enigmatic woman outside her historical moment, 
manifests here in an emphasis on Rebecca’s femaleness. She is both whore and Madonna, 
and in both positions her reproductive organs take center stage: we hear about Rebecca’s 
lack of venereal disease, her vulva exposed at Stonehenge, her supposed infertility, her 
pregnant belly, and the birth and first breastfeeding of her daughter. The novel also 
represents this mystic, anti-historical mode of existence—the mode by which, as Lacy 
describes it, “all time is as one, eternally now, whereas we must see it as past, present, 
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future, as in a history” (143)—through a female trinity and Mr. Bartholomew, an over-
emotional, impotent man suspected of homosexuality and unable to comply with 
scholarly, rational discipline. In contrast with this feminized alternative to rational 
knowledge of the past, Ayscough stands as a figure for fact- and source-based history. 
This difference and its formulation as a male-female polarization is dramatized 
during Ayscough’s deposition of Rebecca, especially in their exchange regarding the 
place of women in Christian theology. When Rebecca asserts women’s equality with men 
in the eyes of God, Ayscough accuses her of “a new vice” in place of her prostitution: “to 
fly in the face of all our forefathers have in their wisdom told us we must believe; there 
hast thou malignantly found shot to weight a base resentment” (424). He calls her 
“unwomanly” and vengeful, assuming that her actions (like his) stem in a straightforward 
and rational way from her view of the past. Instead, she responds with a utopian view to 
the future: “Most in this world is unjust by act of man, not of Our Lord Jesus Christ. 
Change that is my purpose” (424). The two characters differ so fundamentally at this 
point that Ayscough stares in silence and then simply accuses her of lying; he cannot 
assimilate this perspective or even respond to her reading of the creation stories of 
Genesis, which she has presented as evidence for her argument. Where a lawyer, like a 
historian, must rely upon knowledge of the past, Rebecca rejects that past and looks to a 
radically new future. 
Rebecca embodies two challenges to historical knowledge: that of an anti-
historical mode of knowing and being, but also that of the evasive and mysterious past 
itself. She is the source of all our knowledge about the events in the cave but is also the 
source of all our confusion regarding them. And she is aligned with unaccountable human 
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history rather than with rational historical knowledge through her sex; we meet her, the 
narrator informs us, in “one of those periods when Clio seems to stop and scratch her 
tousled head, and wonder where the devil to go next from here” (11). The past is thus 
imagined as a coy “Clio” who, like Rebecca, is pursued by masculine historical knowers: 
Ayscough and his clerk, of course, but also the narrator and the masculine readers Fowles 
so often seems to assume. The narrator acts as a historian both by executing unspoken 
principles of selection and organization in compiling this archive, and by delivering 
factual information and historical arguments in the novel’s narrative and dissertative 
sections. Readers are furthermore invited to historical reasoning: presented with an 
enticingly unknown event and an archive, we are prompted to sift through accounts and 
perform document analysis in an effort to discover the truth that eludes Ayscough. This 
truth, as the narrator interrupts their argument about women’s place in society to remind 
us, disappears inside Rebecca: “Neither soft nor hard words would break her, reveal the 
enigma she hid: what really happened” (425). All of these positions—lawyer, scribe, 
narrator, reader—are associated with a desire to penetrate the mysteries of womanly 
Rebecca, effeminate Mr. Bartholomew, and the womb-like cave, even if that desire is 
carefully frustrated by the novel. 
Nor does the novel simply set up this desire for a factual past in order to explode 
it. Rebecca is ultimately as flawed as Ayscough as a model for relating to the past; 
adulating the memory of her abuser, she often seems less a genuine, powerful prophet 
than a simple, misguided victim. On one hand, Fowles here and in his other works throws 
his full weight behind an artistic, mystic way of understanding the past and present—the 
ethically and aesthetically superior approach he sees in both Shakerism and the novel—as 
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opposed to the search for literal truth he embodies so distastefully in Ayscough and his 
efforts to serve the status quo at any human cost. On the other hand, though, A Maggot’s 
representation of Rebecca not just as a woman outside historical time (in her faith) but 
also as history’s pointedly feminine victim (properly named from our—and above all 
Fowles’s—position of superior realism), deeply undermines the novel’s support of this 
alternative to historiography. 
The epigraph establishes Fowles’s atheism and distrust of established religion, but 
the novel has already hinted at the delusion under which a passionately Christian Rebecca 
must operate. In her second account of the events in the cave, Rebecca witnesses what 
she cannot identify and bases her theology on misunderstandings. Her glimpse of utopia, 
which prompts the details of her new faith, takes place in the “maggot” at the heart of the 
historical mystery and is a tissue of misidentifications. Like an airplane or spacecraft, the 
hovering maggot extends stairs and rests on thin legs for the characters to board; its pilot 
“touche[s] her finger upon a precious stone beside her” to retract the stairs and close the 
door, and soon a window or screen appears to show a view from the sky. The interior 
space, with “panels upon the ceiling that gave a hidden light,” is covered in glowing 
jewels, many with “signs or marks” or “small clocks or pocket-watches beside them, yet 
the hands moved not” (365). The anachronistic vision of this narrative both validates the 
sincerity of Rebecca’s testimony to readers—how could she make up something so far 
outside her frame of reference?—and renders it absurd to both Ayscough and readers. 
Reluctant to accept this machine’s invasion of the otherwise realistically-rendered 
eighteenth century, and unable to assimilate all the documents’ details into a single 
coherent narrative (Why would kindly female scientists from the future leave Rebecca 
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naked in the cave?), a reader is prompted to see Rebecca’s Christianity as an earnest 
misunderstanding but simultaneously to doubt the narrator’s sincerity. In providing these 
futuristic details, the narrator seems to offer data only the narrator and readers (in our 
shared superior knowledge) can interpret properly, but places them in a context that 
nonetheless remains unreadable to us. Like Ayscough and like White’s and de Certeau’s 
historians, the narrator distinguishes between what Rebecca genuinely believes to be the 
truth and “the substantial truth of what has passed” (435): even as Fowles uses Rebecca’s 
faith as a stand-in for the artist’s ability to think outside the limitations of chronology and 
Enlightenment rationality, he regards her with the same patronizing and superficial gaze 
he earlier directed at Sarah in The French Lieutenant’s Woman. And while Rebecca’s 
approach is far more appealing and ethically productive than Ayscough’s, the narrator 
makes it quite clear that it is not accurate, that its mysticism is based in delusion rather 
than in a genuine contact with God (since Fowles’s is an explicitly godless world) or an 
informed creative leap. 
In de Certeau’s understanding, which seems to mirror that of A Maggot, to write 
history is to claim “the power to keep the past” (215)—a power Fowles seems to desire 
and mistrust very much as he both claims and forswears the authority of literary 
authorship in The French Lieutenant’s Woman. Accordingly, and like Orlando before it, 
A Maggot critiques not just a specific historical tradition but every familiar mode of 
historical existence and knowledge—factual and fictional, historical and mystic, literal 
and figurative—even as it draws upon all of these approaches. In its particular historical 
context, A Maggot’s inability to stake a claim suggests the cultural power of polarizing 
historical debates, according to which we must accept either historians’ absolute, 
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unproblematic access to the past or the loss of all meaningful historical knowledge; it 
also paints the choice itself as bankrupt. Unable to think outside these limiting terms, this 
novel nonetheless critiques them, even against the instructions of its own paratext. 
In this latter sense, A Maggot follows in the path of the Claudius novels and not 
that of Orlando. It engages historical-epistemological debates despite itself, striving 
through its paratext to keep its fiction away from contentious extra-fictional realities. 
Where Orlando works to effect reflection upon and changes in the scholarly discourses 
that exclude actual women, joking but seriously contesting their exclusive “power to keep 
the past,” A Maggot plays more reluctantly with the charged line between fiction and 
history. And, not at all incidentally but in ways that intimately connect its vision of 
gender difference and its historical imagination, the latter leaves quite untouched gender 
stereotypes that imagine women as enigmatic Madonna-and-whore symbols outside 
rational human history. The gendering of historical knowledge and action matters not 
only in Woolf’s and Fowles’s novels but also in the history of disciplinary history, and in 
popular notions of the past and how we know it; the following chapter thus looks more 
closely at this complicated and troubling gendering in two postmodernist fictions. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
History’s Others: 
Femininity and Historiographic Critique in Waterland and The Newton Letter 
 
Until now, a historian has been the embodiment of universal truth, who, 
constructed from bits of psychological detail and out of the purifying trials 
dealt by the contingencies of daily life, human passion, and devouring 
women, emerges as a genderless genius with a name that radiates 
extraordinary power. It is time to begin thinking about the ways in which 
this authorial presence has in fact been gendered as masculine. 
      - Bonnie G. Smith, The Gender of History (101) 
 
 As the preceding chapter suggests, John Fowles’s A Maggot (1985) delineates 
historical logic through multiple historian figures placed in opposition to an anti-historian 
figure, the religious mystic Rebecca. In his final novel as in his earlier work, Fowles 
employs gender difference to express absolute otherness, positing a woman as a 
mysterious enigma to the (presumably masculine) narrator and readers. Yet this trope of 
the woman-outside-history is far from a personal quirk on Fowles’s part: historical 
knowledge has long been imagined in highly gendered terms by not only novelists but 
also professional historians and their disciplinary and extra-disciplinary audiences. And 
since the explosions of women’s history in the 1970s and of gender history in the 1980s, 
historians have become increasingly self-reflective regarding scholars’ as well as 
historical actors’ embeddedness in historically-contingent gender roles. This chapter 
examines relationships amongst constructions of masculinity, femininity, history, and 
fiction through two novels whose male historian narrators, like the historians of A 
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Maggot, define themselves against women who neither practice nor are accommodated 
by historical logic: John Banville’s The Newton Letter (1982) and Graham Swift’s 
Waterland (1983). It follows up on the symbolic weight of Rebecca’s sex, situating 
gestures like Fowles’s within a decade when an influential historiographic movement 
attacked the idea of ahistorical womanhood upon which they rely. 
 By foregrounding a relationship between women and history, The Newton Letter 
and Waterland engage significant changes within the discipline at the time of their 
publication. During the 1980s, historians began to theorize the insights of women’s 
historians such as Joan Kelly and Gerda Lerner, dramatically extending the previous 
decade’s work by employing gender as an analytic tool rather than solely as a topic of 
analysis in historical studies.51 This conceptual expansion took place throughout the 
1980s in publications including Joan Wallach Scott’s Gender and the Politics of History 
(1988, collecting essays originally published 1983-8); Natalie Zemon Davis’s “Gender 
and Genre: Women as Historical Writers, 1400-1820” (1980) and The Return of Martin 
Guerre (1983); and Catherine Hall and Leonore Davidoff’s Family Fortunes (1987).52 
Clearly, Waterland and The Newton Letter were produced during an era of new attention 
to women’s history and especially to the role of gender in historical analysis. Their 
                                                
51 More specifically, according to Joan Wallach Scott, gender history “extends the focus 
of women’s history by attending to male/female relationships and to questions about how 
gender is perceived, what the processes are that establish gendered institutions, and to the 
differences that race, class, and sexuality have made in the historical experiences of 
women” (57). 
 
52 Though this dissertation focuses on interactions between fiction and the history of 
British historiography, the rise of women’s history and then gender history were 
transnational exchanges, drawing upon the insights of American, British, and continental 
historians and theorists. Of the authors invoked here, Scott, Davis, and Bonnie G. Smith 
(discussed later in this section) are American, Hall and Davidoff British. 
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preoccupations resound deeply with these historiographic developments without fitting 
neatly into them. 
Nor do the two novels share a position on the intersection of gender and history, 
though both appear obsessed with it. While the budding field of gender history 
approached gender as historically contingent and variable—as a powerful social 
construct—Waterland projects images of ahistorical womanhood and is thus 
fundamentally at odds with the approach. On the other hand, The Newton Letter is far 
more self-conscious of its own use of gendered imagery, showing up its historian narrator 
for imagining women outside and in opposition to historical thought. Yet The Newton 
Letter is not a work of gender history but rather a fictional historian’s text; it uses its 
narrative stance to reflect upon what it means for a scholar to appropriate femininity as 
his negative image, rather than working to understand the construction of gender at a 
given historical moment. Both novels use gender (and, more specifically, visions of 
female sexuality) in an exploration of historical knowers and their narratives rather than 
as the object of historical inquiry. 
 These novels not only echo the birth of gender history (however obliquely) but 
also foreshadow Bonnie G. Smith’s work on gender’s role in the birth of disciplinary 
history—though Waterland does so far less self-consciously than The Newton Letter. In 
her 1998 The Gender of History: Men, Women, and Historical Practice, Smith contends 
that conventional historical discourse is highly gendered even as it constructs itself as a 
universal and transparent reflection of the past. She identifies ‘the gender of history’ at 
the level of methodology, as historians defined themselves as professionals in opposition 
to “a low, unworthy, and trivial ‘other’” (9): women amateurs, who were excluded from 
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the newly-developing system of university seminars and from access to increasingly-vital 
archival materials. At the level of content, too, historians tended to devalue the female 
and the feminine as “superficial, trivial, and extraneous detail” (150); the domestic, the 
private, the everyday, and the bodily were coded feminine and set aside from history’s 
aspirations to universal truth. Male historians thus defined disciplinary history and its 
procedures largely without the input of, and in negative reference to, women; this 
groundwork would later be challenged by Kelly, Lerner, Scott, Davis, Hall, Davidoff, and 
many other late-twentieth-century scholars working in the new fields of women’s history 
and gender history—as well as, through its critique of its self-centered and sexist 
historian narrator, The Newton Letter. At the same time, these associations of femininity 
with meaningless day-to-day realities and with a situatedness inhospitable to objective 
knowledge retained enormous power within and especially outside the discipline, as 
Waterland shows so clearly. 
In the connections they forge between gender and history, The Newton Letter and 
Waterland perform the difficulty of pinning down a historical mainstream at a time of 
crisis and change, suggesting once again the non-linearity of historical knowledge and its 
history. In this chapter, I trace the continuing impact of the gendered building blocks of 
historical practice in the 1980s as it is evidenced in these two history- and gender-
obsessed fictions. To very different effects, I argue, both novels invite their readers to 
historical-epistemological critique through gendered terms: while Waterland accepts the 
traditional gendering of history but uses it to question the realism of conventional 
historiography, The Newton Letter is prescient in connecting history with critiques of 
scientific objectivity as gendered. 
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This chapter’s first section identifies in Waterland a tension between nostalgia for 
and a postmodernist rejection of past ways of knowing. The novel joins its historian 
narrator in longing for an imagined past from a position of dissatisfied skepticism, 
mournfully discarding the simplicity of universally true historiography in the form of a 
linear progress narrative. This tension plays out along gendered lines: Waterland, I claim, 
achieves its new wisdom with recourse to an essentialized and timeless femininity. 
Neither conventional historical narrative nor extra-disciplinary flight of fancy proves 
adequate to the task of understanding the past, but this idea of womanhood as disciplinary 
history’s other allows the novel to slip back and forth between two opposed possibilities 
instead of finally abandoning the old Grand Narrative historiography for which it is so 
deeply nostalgic. In Waterland, postmodernist doubt and fragmentation thus coexist with 
a vision of past confidence and coherence through the shared ground of women’s 
enigmatic bodies. 
The second section then turns to The Newton Letter and its greater differentiation 
between historian narrator and implied author, arguing that this novel troubles scientific 
and historical objectivity in gendered terms. Both novels’ historian narrators imagine 
their own minds in opposition to and threatened by archetypes of femininity and by the 
messiness of real female bodies, but The Newton Letter suggests that these images are the 
projections of a man blinded by his own self-centeredness. Its postmodernist approach to 
historical thought—its breaking down of those Enlightenment binaries Alan Munslow 
lists as “knower and known, observer and observed, subject and object, form and content, 
and fact [...] and value” (189)—directs itself at gender’s role in the construction of 
historical truth by underscoring gender’s role in a historian’s delusive sense of his own 
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disembodied mind. After tracing this critical distance through The Newton Letter’s 
structure as well as its plot, the chapter considers the implications of these novels’ 
historical-epistemological engagements for my broader understanding of the narrative 
stance of fictional historians’ texts. Despite their considerable differences, both novels 
foreground the role of the historian in historical knowledge by speaking the voices of 
historians. This similarity suggests both the limitations and the potential of such fictional 
engagements with disciplinary history, which dramatize tensions they cannot resolve and 
raise questions they cannot answer. 
 
Rethinking History through Women’s Bodies in Waterland 
Through a historian narrator who has come to doubt the promise he once saw in 
historical explanation, Waterland asks its readers to think critically about familiar notions 
of narrative and objectivity. The novel is composed of history teacher Tom Crick’s 
farewell lectures to his students and, more abstractly, to a confident understanding of the 
past. In its place, this doubting historian models for his students and readers a 
postmodernist realization: that lived reality, which he calls “the Here and Now,” does not 
conform neatly to rationality or teleology. Struggling aloud with his memories, Tom 
perceives the power of storytelling and the impossibility of objectively selecting a 
narrative form in which to emplot a given set of events. Like postmodernist historians 
and philosophers of history, Waterland foregrounds the roles of selection and rhetoric in 
historiography, rejecting a modernist view of writing as transparent reporting. And also 
like postmodernist scholars, Tom becomes intensely self-conscious about his perspective 
and methodology. He loses confidence in the ultimate accessibility of the truth about the 
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past and begins to doubt the stability of his most cherished assumptions. And yet a vision 
of universal, unchanging femininity retains great power within the novel. Essentializing 
images of womanhood and particularly of female sexuality prove strikingly resilient in 
the face of the novel’s postmodernist theoretical gestures and formal characteristics—
because, as I argue in this section, they do the novel’s historical-epistemological work. 
By helping to unsettle categories Waterland privileges over gender, visions of women 
outside history thus become naturalized rather than critiqued in this history-minded text. 
Accordingly, women appear in this novel as evocative symbols rather than as 
complex, thinking characters. The narrator represents his Victorian ancestress Sarah 
Atkinson, for instance, entirely in reference to her reproductive capacity and her 
relationships with men—daughter, wife, mother; a great beauty, idealized and beaten by 
her husband. While she remains an ordinary, living woman, Sarah’s life enters the novel 
as a trivial sketch: she is pretty, she is a devoted wife, she chooses fashionable clothes, 
she pays social calls and goes on walks while her husband makes the more noteworthy 
decisions involved in commerce, politics, and land reclamation. Sarah becomes powerful 
only when she stops being an ordinary woman and becomes a symbol for innocent 
womanhood wronged, frozen in time after her husband knocks her headfirst into a 
writing-table; once her remorseful husband, their sons, and the townspeople are free to 
project myths and fantasies onto this silenced figure, Sarah takes on a great deal more 
significance in the story. In her new capacity of Woman, Sarah serves Tom as a 
springboard for his own obsessions, his rethinking of historical truth. 
As Tom describes reports that Sarah haunted the flood that occurred after her 
1874 funeral, he muses: “Do not ghosts prove—even rumours, whispers, stories of 
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ghosts—that the past clings, that we are always going back …?” (103). Tom appropriates 
Sarah’s story as one more way to ask “What is the point of history? Why history? Why 
the past?” (106). And as this example suggests, Waterland has a habit of using voiceless 
female bodies, images of women trapped in a stable past, as tools for its interrogation of 
historical meaning and methodology. My point is that Tom’s essentializing, binary 
treatment of gender paradoxically contributes to the novel’s destabilizing, critical 
treatment of historical concepts such as objectivity, causality, factuality, and linearity. 
Waterland’s postmodernist epistemological critique is based upon the same essentializing 
notions of ‘the feminine’—the same images of nature, chaos, cyclical reproduction, and 
emptiness waiting to be filled—that also facilitated the formation of the discipline and the 
foundation of its authority, and away from which gender history seeks to move. 
Waterland unsettles absolute statements about the nature of history and enacts 
postmodernist skepticism regarding universal truth, while simultaneously reinforcing a 
system that masculinizes historical knowledge and feminizes its mysterious alternative—
and in which masculinity and femininity work as absolute and universal categories. 
Indeed, it uses its postmodernist instability to reimagine and reevaluate—over and over—
the relationship between, and the relative value of, masculine “History” and the feminine 
“Here and Now.” Readers are prompted to identify with Tom’s navigation of a tricky 
world as we navigate this tricky text, confronted with an unsettled temporality in which 
memory is ever-changing and the past and present both affect each other; alongside Tom, 
we struggle to make sense of the data in front of us, shifting amongst various ways to 
emplot the events as the novel proves generically unstable and plays with forms including 
autobiography, history, realist historical fiction, the Gothic novel, and the bildungsroman. 
 167 
But while Waterland employs the formal techniques of literary postmodernism to 
question the privileging of historical narrative order over messy reality, it does not use 
them to deconstruct those binaries or their gender coding. Instead, gendered dichotomies 
facilitate the novel’s critique of a dry scholarship that flees from both murky day-to-day 
realities and extralogical phenomena—from love and sex, from Sarah’s madness and 
hauntings, from the formless potential Tom imagines in wetlands and wombs. 
Waterland thus leaves intact the assumption that men make history while 
women’s bodies exist outside history in a state of nature and archetype, preserving a 
conceptual framework strikingly like the one Smith identifies in the nineteenth-century 
process of historical disciplinization. As Johann Gustav Droysen worked to develop the 
seminar system, for instance, he identified “the active manliness of the seminar man with 
history/time as a whole and posed it as the opposite of nature/space” (Smith 113); 
Droysen and his contemporaries imagined historical time as “a neutral, mathematical, 
unmarked time matching the transparency of both the citizen and professional historian 
and contrasting with the thick sluggishness of feminine space” (Smith 151). In other 
words, in the stable narrative tradition of historiography Tom so desires as well as in his 
critique of that tradition’s viability, the natural, cyclical, marsh-like female body serves 
as the negative against which men’s minds define and produce ever-progressing history. 
By inverting rather than deconstructing this conventional dichotomy, Waterland allows 
itself to critique confident historical narrative without exploding its foundations. 
This effect becomes especially apparent through Ernst Van Alphen’s sympathetic 
reading of Waterland “as a theory of history,” a reading that oversimplifies Tom’s 
conflicted position into an intellectual progress narrative but nonetheless sheds light on 
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Tom’s construction of his historical-epistemological options. According to Van Alphen, 
Tom distinguishes between traditional histories that “follow the line of linear progression, 
represented in Waterland as male,” and “[h]istories with a cyclical structure, shaped in 
this novel with the help of female sexuality” (209). He argues that Tom ultimately rejects 
a masculine-coded Grand Narrative historical tradition in favor of history writing that 
embraces “the intensity which provokes story telling” (208), an intensity intimately tied 
to female characters’ sexuality and to the feminized, sexualized landscape of the Fens. In 
other words, the novel increasingly values the feminine as Tom learns postmodernist 
skepticism through his personal and professional crises, his contact with “the Here and 
Now.” However, as Van Alphen’s language makes plain, Tom’s understanding of female 
sexuality remains deeply problematic and itself goes unchallenged within Waterland. 
Whether or not Tom finally chooses a feminine alternative to masculine history, the very 
framing of these alternatives protects a conventional gendering of history. 
Furthermore, by placing women in service of this abstract epistemological 
dichotomy, the novel imagines not only Sarah Atkinson but all its female characters as 
archetypes more than as people. Sarah’s story illustrates the symbolic role of femininity 
in Waterland, as her existence outside historical time and logic helps prompt Tom’s 
concern about the limitations of scholarly historical discourse. This ancestress’s image 
facilitates Tom’s pursuit of a history in which “the past clings,” a history that embraces a 
recursive rather than a linear temporality. But Tom does not only appropriate long-dead 
women in formulating his theories of history. To the contrary, his wife Mary provides the 
text’s richest example of a woman understood in opposition to the historian’s masculine 
pursuit of rational knowledge—rather than, of course, as a fully human individual. 
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Many years before, Tom tells us, his girlfriend Mary became pregnant, aborted 
the pregnancy, disappeared into her father’s home for three mysterious years, and then 
married him; Tom portrays these events insofar as they lead ultimately to his dual loss of 
a teaching post and of confidence in historical explanation. Mary’s sexuality and later 
infertility seemed under control to Tom, but he now suspects they have simmered inside 
her all along, posing secret threats to his sense of historical truth. According to his 
interpretation, Mary suddenly regresses into her adolescent Catholicism and into 
womanly instincts she had repressed through her abortion; in his distress over her 
changing behavior, Tom diverges from the curriculum, telling his students stories about 
his traumatic personal past in the Fens rather than recounting the officially-sanctioned 
history of the French Revolution. Mary thus casts the narrator (and his students and 
readers) back into Tom’s adolescence and further, into his genealogy and a history of the 
Fens from the seventeenth century. And when Mary steals a baby from a mother at a 
grocery store because she believes God has promised her a child, the experience throws 
Tom into an epistemological tailspin. Furthermore, the scandal gives Tom’s history-
hating headmaster the excuse he has been seeking to reduce the subject’s role in his 
school. On a practical level, then, Mary’s youthful sexuality (which begat a pregnancy 
which begat an abortion which begat infertility which begat baby-snatching) severs 
Tom’s official control over historical knowledge by getting him sacked. 
 But that same irresistible female sexuality prompted Tom’s need for history in the 
first place. His decision to study, write, and teach history emerged largely from the events 
surrounding Mary’s pregnancy, when: 
a series of encounters with the Here and Now gave a sudden pointedness 
to my studies. […] So I began to demand of history an Explanation. […] 
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And can I deny that what I wanted all along was not some golden nugget 
that history would at last yield up, but History itself: the Grand Narrative,  
the filler of vacuums, the dispeller of fears of the dark? (62) 
Mary’s sexuality and reproductive organs simultaneously function as the mystery to be 
explained by history and as the mystery that threatens to destroy history’s satisfyingly 
linear narratives. This tension surfaces in Tom’s attitudes regarding the quintessentially 
Victorian Grand Narrative tradition: he displays nostalgia for such comforting traditions 
of narrative and historiography, but also knowingly and self-consciously depicts their 
pre-postmodern epistemological confidence as impossible and as impossibly naïve. 
Indeed, Tom both exhibits and reflects skeptically upon a series of nostalgias: for his 
youth; for an ability to idealize that youth; for his once-simple faith in knowledge, 
progress, and rationality. Although Tom begins his narrative by offering his students “the 
complete and final version” (8), he is all too quickly caught in the impossibility of one 
true story, with its just divvying up of responsibility and its clear path of causality. And 
once again we find Mary at the heart of Tom’s historiographic dilemma: whereas Tom 
once saw history as an evidence-based “demand for explanation” and “seeking of 
reasons,” Mary’s actions impress him with the force of the inexplicable and make him 
feel he is “really only telling a –”: cutting himself off, he leaves readers to fill in the 
troubling word ‘story’ (106-9).53 
Despite all this doubt, Tom clings to historical explanation because he believes it 
makes us human by helping us understand and order a chaotic world. Yet despite this 
                                                
53 Tom’s desire for a past epistemological certainty is a perfect example of—and 
illuminated usefully by—Amy J. Elias’s study of post-1960s historical fiction. My 
approach to the novel is in many ways indebted to Elias’s thesis that these fictions regard 
“positivist or stadialist history as the historical sublime, a desired horizon that can never 
be reached but only approached in attempts to understand human origins and the meaning 
of lived existence” (xviii). 
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equation of historical thought with fully realized humanity, Tom imagines women as 
outside history. Indeed, in the novel’s symbolic system, the chaotic world is itself 
associated with female bodies and set in opposition to male minds. Instead of 
representing Mary as a person conducting her own search for explanations, accordingly, 
Tom views her in terms of his own search—as at once responsible for his need for and 
his loss of a career and faith in history. And when he finds his fifty-two year old wife at 
home holding a baby and insisting on a religious narrative outside historical logic, Tom 
insists that she “explain” (268); in the context of Tom’s larger account, this request is not 
only perfectly reasonable (he does finally retrieve enough data to return the child to a 
distraught mother) but also symbolically loaded. After all, Tom informs us, such a desire 
for rational explanation requires that we “carry round with us this cumbersome but 
precious bag of clues called History” (106)—but Tom curiously excludes his wife from 
this pursuit he views as basic to humanity. Mary is historically significant because her 
sexuality prompts a series of events with which the male historian’s rationality must 
cope, and which allow his historical sense to mature; like Sarah, however, Mary herself 
seems not quite human and ultimately loses her mind. 
By habitually associating women with utter irrationality, Waterland gives 
femininity enormous symbolic power but erases women’s ability to launch their own 
intellectual projects or to take an active part in reshaping historiography. Mary is a 
permanently “empty vessel” reverting to what Tom sees as a childish, superstitious 
religious faith, and this interpretation is affirmed by Mary’s obviously objectionable 
behavior in abducting the child. Like Rebecca in A Maggot, Mary creates a narrative 
according to a spiritual rather than a historical logic; like Rebecca, she thus functions as 
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an anti-historian figure, as the other knowledge against which Tom’s forms itself. Yet 
unlike Rebecca, Mary does not voice a genuine alternative to historical conventions and 
their relationship with patriarchal forms of authority; to the contrary, she hardly speaks, 
frightens an innocent young mother, and ends up institutionalized. 
Rather, it is Mary’s body and the symbolic weight he attributes to it—not her 
spirituality—that poses a true threat to Tom’s belief in rational knowledge and progress. 
Tom imagines the female body a figure for the horrifying emptiness of reality, which 
humans attempt to fill by making and telling history. He renders the spiritual physical and 
indeed sexual through his language in describing (what he sees as) Mary’s struggle with 
this reality: he imagines that her unsavory dependence on the idea of God “must have 
been always there […] ripening like some dormant, forgotten seed.” Tom envisions the 
ripening of this seed as an infidelity on Mary’s part and holds it responsible for his 
inability to teach the grand (or at the very least coherent) narratives of proper history, his 
need to tell instead what he calls “these believe-it-or-not-but-it-happened Tales of the 
Fens” (42). Mary is “an empty but fillable vessel” (42) not only physically but also in 
terms of her meaning—or rather, for this historian, her meaning is reduced entirely to the 
physical nature he interprets as the unfulfilled potential of an empty vessel. Like Sarah, 
she exists less as a convincing, three-dimensional individual than as a malleable feminine 
stereotype, a projection of the narrator’s own fears of “vacuums” and “the dark” (62). 
As an evocative site of absences rather than as a particular presence, Mary is also 
joined with a powerful and feminized landscape in service of her husband’s historical-
epistemological growth. Tom’s understanding of reality as flat, random emptiness is 
influenced by his Fenland youth and studies, his familiarity with a landscape that 
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unceasingly returns to marshy uniformity even as men attempt (like the God of Genesis) 
to separate water from land. The novel insistently describes both the Fens and female 
sexuality as extrahistorical phenomena—as forces that, as George P. Landow explains, 
“resist all ideological, narrative control, that refuse to be shaped by stories we tell” (202). 
This relationship between Tom’s visions of a mysteriously fluid and formless landscape, 
on one hand, and of women’s mysteriously damp and hollow sexual organs, on the other, 
helps to explain Tom’s ability to see Mary as simultaneously responsible for virtually 
everything but innocent and unchanging. The novel insistently compares female bodies 
with a landscape it describes in terms of shapeshifting and contradiction (above all, as 
both water and land): as Pamela Cooper explains, “the Fenlands mediate the 
contradictions of history […] with metonymic reference to woman’s body as ambiguous 
terrain” (372). In associating Mary’s body with a landscape so enigmatic and 
extralogical, and in pinning Mary’s entire symbolic and historical significance to her 
body, Waterland positions her as an endlessly flexible tool for Tom’s (and the novel’s, 
and readers’) theoretical speculations. 
In launching its historiographic critique, Waterland depends upon and further 
circulates images of rational, masculine history and natural, female sexuality. While Van 
Alphen seems correct in suggesting that the text often privileges the second rather than 
the first of these terms, this inversion nonetheless leaves the troubling dichotomy intact: 
privileging the womb does not help Mary gain a fair hearing, or grant her visibility as a 
three-dimensional character like Tom himself, or move toward historicizing our 
understanding of gender, or encourage critical thinking about conceptions of women’s 
roles and value. Instead, it helps Tom explore alternative modes of historical 
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understanding, authorship, and existence. Waterland thus questions universalizing 
historical procedures in a way that precludes the questioning of equally embedded and 
universalizing procedures of gendering. It renders its narrator a wiser and more 
epistemologically savvy historian—exploring what he posits as the alternative to 
objective truth, continuity, and progress—and it does that by invoking gender stereotypes 
strikingly similar to those relied upon by nineteenth-century men of history. 
 
The Unsympathetic Historian as Site of Critique in The Newton Letter 
The gendered binaries at the heart of Waterland’s historical-epistemological 
questioning also take center stage in The Newton Letter. Both novels speak the voices of 
historians losing their grasps on historical thought, and both narrators connect this lack of 
officially sanctioned historical discourse with women’s sex organs. This section explores 
the Newton Letter narrator’s imaginative uses of gender difference, which functions here 
as in Waterland to delineate disciplinary history in opposition to a femininity that 
accommodates the irrationality of both the spiritual and the bodily. But The Newton 
Letter does not sanction its narrator’s conceptual schemas; rather, I assert, this novel 
ironizes the historian’s conceptual appropriation of women. Rather than steadily 
supporting the binary that allows Tom to waffle between privileging “History” and “the 
Here and Now” as it does in Waterland, the enduring convention by which scholarly 
reason is masculine—and everything else is feminine—becomes the object of pointed 
questioning in this text. 
The Newton Letter comprises a series of letters from an unnamed historian 
explaining how, though he retreated to a house in the Irish countryside in an attempt to 
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finish his book on Isaac Newton, the details of life keep getting in his way. And here 
again, life takes an emphatically feminine form when it interrupts authoritative historical 
discourse. This narrator’s representations of female characters closely mirror Tom’s, but 
with a vital difference: whereas Tom’s superior (though self-consciously limited) 
rationality is endorsed by Mary’s baby-snatching, the Newton Letter narrator virtually 
never turns out to have been either factually or ethically in the right. Instead of a faithful 
husband to a mentally ill criminal, the Newton Letter narrator is a womanizer. Of the two 
women he meets upon reaching his scholarly retreat, he quickly falls in love with 
unattainable, dark Charlotte and begins a sexual relationship with her blonde niece 
Ottilie, constantly foregrounding a struggle between his abstract intellectual pursuits and 
what he perceives as Ottilie’s intense physicality.54 
He behaves poorly toward each—imagining Charlotte while having sex with 
Ottilie, for instance, and declaring his love for Charlotte immediately after finding her 
husband Edward collapsed on the drawing-room floor. But the more fundamental 
problem is that he cannot see these women or their lives. Time and time again, readers 
watch the narrator’s conceptual frameworks exploded by unavoidable facts—the family 
he has imagined as Protestants go to Mass, and his “entire conception of them had to be 
revised” (54); after arbitrarily deciding that the young boy in the house is the product of 
                                                
54 Ruth Frehner’s reading of the narrator’s representation of Ottilie’s body effectively 
illustrates her intertwined functions as the physical other to his intellect, the object of his 
gaze, and a door to the ordinary. In analyzing her body and imagining not only “breast 
and bum and blonde lap” but internal organs (Banville 26), the narrator’s “gaze is an X-
ray, yet he implicitly accuses her of exposing too much, of leaving his imagination with 
no secrets to feed on” (Frehner 55). His description of their first sexual encounter 
“highlights the narrator’s erudition. Ottilie’s body supplies his imagination with a 
prompt” (55). The narrator, both drawn to the ordinariness represented by this woman’s 
body and repelled by it, represents himself as a mind in contrast to Ottilie’s body and 
heart. 
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an affair between a very young Ottilie and her uncle Edward, he is genuinely surprised to 
learn he is simply Charlotte’s adopted son; he cannot understand that Edward is dying of 
cancer—despite countless hints—until he is told outright at the end of the novel; he 
finally learns that the vague inaccessibility he had so idealized in Charlotte was the result 
of tranquillizers rather than a refined spiritual melancholy. Rather than perceiving Ottilie 
or Charlotte as real people, the narrator projects upon them all the dangers of murky day-
to-day reality (Ottilie) and aesthetic, spiritual experience (Charlotte) to the ideally 
disinterested and disembodied scholarly mind. Like Tom’s representations of Mary and 
Sarah, then, this historian’s representations of Charlotte and Ottilie participate in a larger 
system of gendered knowledge by which objectivity implies masculinity. Yet the novels 
differ significantly in their relationship with that system, because of Waterland’s implicit 
endorsement of Tom as a figure of authority and wisdom in contrast to The Newton 
Letter’s more critical representation of its historian narrator. 
Although both historian narrators sometimes contradict themselves or otherwise 
belie their own intellectual and moral flaws, their unreliability is not equivalent: the well-
meaning but deluded and distraught Tom Crick is different from the willfully ignorant 
voice of The Newton Letter. Even the fact of the former’s name and the latter’s 
namelessness suggests the novels’ distinct presentations of their narrators. Whereas 
Waterland offers a sense of deeply personal contact with Tom through emotional 
accounts of his life from childhood to middle age, The Newton Letter begins and ends 
with a nameless, featureless set of eyes—a self-obsessed narrator who elicits neither 
fondness nor forgiveness. Ottilie, despite the narrator’s tendency to portray her as a 
bumbling innocent, is incredibly insightful in saying that she sometimes imagines he is 
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“just a voice, a name—no, not even that, just the voice, going on” (67):55 furthermore, 
because the narrator hardly exists to readers beyond his obviously-flawed gaze, 
interpretation, and language, this voice is little more than its own unreliability. Rather 
than using gendered images as tools in its historical-epistemological questioning, The 
Newton Letter questions the gendering of history itself by connecting its narrator’s ethical 
and epistemological shortcomings to his perception of female sexuality as everything 
history and rationality are not. 
This difference in gender’s role—as conceptual tool for historical-epistemological 
reflection in Waterland and as a central component of a critiqued historical-
epistemological system in The Newton Letter—emerges partly through the different 
structural positions of women (or, rather, of the narrator’s projections of womanhood) 
within the texts. In Waterland, Tom projects history’s shifting others onto particular 
female characters, most notably Mary and Sarah; the novel also indicates the threat and 
promise of femininity through female sexuality’s actions upon the plot. But in The 
Newton Letter, such otherness is projected not only onto parts of the novel (Charlotte, 
Ottilie, and the narrator’s inability to finish his historical biography) but also through the 
entire novel in its rhetorical stance. Whereas Tom speaks to both male and female 
students but clearly has the resistant young man Price in mind, the Newton Letter narrator 
                                                
55 The narrator is resistant to the idea of Ottilie as possibly a source of insight or as 
contradictory to his preconceptions about himself and his relationship with the world. 
Derek Hand notes an especially dramatic example of this resistance when he argues that 
“It is only when Ottilie directly confronts the historian’s version of events, telling him 
that, ‘You don’t know anything. You think you are so clever, but you don’t know a 
thing,’ that he begins to question his own assumptions” (55). But the narrator does not 
welcome such questioning, and Ottilie’s “affront to the historian’s author(ity) produces 
an unexpected and violent outburst in the historian: he slaps her hard across the face” 
(55). 
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pens his letters to an emphatically female figure whose ambiguity of symbolic and literal 
reference places gender front and center. Not an incidental though powerful tool in some 
larger project, this projected femininity thus frames the whole account and its 
unreliability. 
 The narrator’s letters address a shadowy Clio whose identity or nature is never 
revealed: is she history personified, a muse, a lover, a friend, a colleague?56 Certainly the 
novella’s opening, and the choice of the name Clio in a novel narrated by a historian, call 
to mind an invocation of the muse as well as a farewell to a feminized History: “Words 
fail me, Clio. How did you track me down, did I leave bloodstains in the snow? I won’t 
try to apologise. Instead, I want simply to explain, so that we both might understand. […] 
I have abandoned my book” (1). However, as the text progresses the addressee becomes 
not only Clio but also “dear Cliona” (2), a particular woman rather than a mythical figure. 
The narrator sometimes addresses her quite personally in reference to his scholarly work 
or lack of it: “Remember that mad letter Newton wrote to John Locke in September of 
1693, accusing the philosopher out of the blue of being immoral, and a Hobbist, and of 
having tried to embroil him with women?” (5), he asks in one letter, and in another he 
thanks her for a book. Nor does this duality encompass the addressee’s multiplicity. As 
Ruth Frehner points out, while her nickname Clio invokes Greek mythology, the 
addressee’s full name—Cliona—points to an Irish figure of love and seduction. The 
                                                
56 While several critics have referred in passing to the novella’s addressee, none has yet 
explored the implications of this conflation of history and woman. Indeed, the majority of 
critics, including Brian McIlroy (123), Joseph McMinn (89), Geert Lernout (75), and 
Derek Hand (58), take for granted that the addressee is the muse of history. Although 
some critics, including Rüdiger Imhof, do acknowledge that “Clio” seems to refer both to 
history and to an actual, contemporary woman (150-1), this multiplicity of reference 
duality has so far remained parenthetical in criticism of the text. 
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name is an Anglicization of Clíodhna, who according to some versions is a goddess who 
seduces men and transports them to the otherworld at the risk of their lives. Thus, no 
fewer than three female referents—the Greek muse personifying history, an ordinary 
woman with an interest in the narrator’s scholarly success, and this Celtic violator of 
boundaries—operate simultaneously as the addressee of the narrator’s letters. 
By implicating a vaguely-imagined woman in the very production and reception 
of its narrative, The Newton Letter depicts its narrator’s discourse as inextricably 
embedded in conventional yet contradictory ideals of femininity as they interact with 
historical knowledge. This composite figure is obviously unlike Ottilie and Charlotte in 
their total and straightforward otherness to history, since she incorporates a conventional 
symbol for historical knowledge and a real-life woman scholar as well as a threateningly 
otherworldly seductress. Yet the narrator seems unable to make such distinctions, 
slipping amongst female figures in a way that calls attention to the slippage within each 
of these figures: between Clio-as-goddess and Clio-as-symbol in standing for history, 
between professional and personal when the narrator offers intimate details about his 
sexual experiences and fantasies to a woman who apparently has discussed only 
academic questions with him and sent him a scholarly book, and between the otherworld 
and this world in legends surrounding Cliona. This messiness participates in the 
narrator’s larger tendency to conflate women, most dramatically exposed when he begins 
to conceptualize Ottilie during sex as “neither herself nor the other, but a third—
Charlottilie!” (48). The narrator is chronically unable or unwilling to distinguish amongst 
individual women, or between real women and imaginary ones—whether between 
colleagues and goddesses or between the actual Charlotte and Ottilie and his flights of 
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fancy about them. 
Instead, he shifts amongst women as it suits his own ever-changing intellectual 
and emotional needs. Like Tom Crick, this narrator accomplishes such epistemological 
flexibility by defining femininity negatively and abstractly: he tends to imagine women 
as not-rationality, not-intellectualism, rather than as anyone in particular. This approach 
allows womanhood to encompass a wide range of threats to masculine reason; in The 
Newton Letter, it accommodates both the excessively physical (ungainly, sexually 
available Ottilie) and the insufficiently worldly (wispy, unattainable Charlotte). As 
Frehner argues compellingly, Ottilie thus functions as a metonymy for “ordinariness” in 
opposition both to the scholar adrift from the details of everyday life and to the woman 
this scholar imagines as a tragic heroine (54). Yet these differences prove far less 
significant to the narrator than do the various female archetypes’ shared threat to 
scholarship and reason—and so he remains perfectly and perversely able to imagine that 
seamless combination of Charlotte and Ottilie as Charlottilie, and to attribute his 
unfinished book to her. Obviously problematically, it is neither Charlotte nor Ottilie but 
imaginary Charlottilie who stands in the narrator’s mind for feminine reality’s challenge 
to historiography. 
 Despite repeatedly and grandly rejecting history as a mode of knowing inadequate 
to the reality embodied in these women, however, the narrator does return to an academic 
post and is far from committed to the abandonment of his Newton biography by the end 
of his account. Throughout the novel, he repeatedly catches himself at his old ways, 
slipping into historical rather than autobiographical narrative conventions: “Look at me, 
writing history,” he notes wryly; “old habits die hard” (6). Perhaps most tellingly, when 
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faced with the task of recounting the traumatic night during which he finally realizes that 
Edward is dying and Charlotte drugged, he reverts to his historian-voice for two 
substantial paragraphs of “evidence” and a footnote before claiming, “I can’t go on. I’m 
not an historian anymore” (69-70). But far more striking than his gestures of 
epistemological maturation is the fact that he does go on, narrating and speculating. 
Alongside his tentative withdrawal from history and his flirtation with the intensities of 
life outside scholarship, this intellectual continues to bring to bear powers of disciplinary 
history—analysis and distance—against the irrational world of details he posits as 
feminine. 
By the chronological end of the novella (introduced near the text’s opening), the 
narrator has fled from this threatening figure of his imagination, but he does so 
geographically rather than through genuine intellectual growth. The Newton Letter 
distances itself from its narrator’s conceptual framework partly through a structure that 
underscores his unsatisfactory stasis. Although the narrator repeatedly finds his theories 
incorrect and adjusts the individual conjectures according to new evidence, he never 
rethinks his fundamental habit of viewing the world through predetermined theories in 
the first place. By weaving the story’s end throughout the text, the novel highlights its 
narrator’s continuing moral and intellectual failures and their relationship to his way of 
seeing women. We leave him waffling about whether he will return to his Newton 
biography, struggling to imagine his future because he remains overconfident and 
irrationally specific about it (certain, for instance, that his and Ottilie’s child “will be a 
boy, it must be” [81]); because he is unwilling to commit to either scholarship or world, 
in the false and still-rigidly-gendered dichotomy on which he insists; and because, 
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although at the text’s end he acknowledges his “willful blindness” toward Edward (80), 
he is just as willfully blind at the end of story and text as at the beginning.57 The end of 
the story, the narrator’s life in the present tense as he receives Ottilie’s letters and writes 
his own to Clio, surfaces to be compared with the shameful past from the novella’s 
beginning to its last page, the end of these letters—and although the letter-writer 
perceives himself as deeply changed, this structure actually underscores his continuing 
delusion and self-importance. 
 
Fictional Historians’ Texts and the Role of the Knower in Knowledge 
 Through its nonlinear epistolary structure, then, The Newton Letter critiques 
gendered fantasies and echoes the gender history that was gaining force at the time. Both 
Waterland and The Newton Letter use their rhetorical stance as fictional historians’ texts 
to invite extra-disciplinary readers into questions about how historians do and ought to 
                                                
57 Critics disagree on this point. McMinn and McIlroy, for instance, believe that the 
narrator changes substantially and for the better: “Wiser now,” McMinn maintains, “the 
narrator realises that the original separation of thought and experience that led to 
Newton’s breakdown is precisely his own problem” (91). By this reading, the narrator 
employs this realization in producing the text we read in place of a traditional historical 
biography; an innovator in his discipline, he has learned the lessons of his experiences 
during the story. On the other hand, Imhof insists that this historian remains “a victim of 
willful blindness. He has not learned anything […]” (151). It seems to me that the 
narrator’s representation of Ottilie makes this point quite clearly: by the time he writes 
the letters that make up this novel, Ottilie is writing him her own letters, but he neither 
reproduces her words for us as he does Newton’s and his own, nor seems to pay much 
attention to them. Instead, he claims, “Less in what she says than in the Lilliputian scrawl 
itself, aslant from corner to corner of the flimsy blue sheets, do I glimpse something of 
the real she, her unhandiness and impetuosity, her inviolable innocence” (8). His brief 
reference to the letter’s content is an amused, patronizing one; now pregnant with the 
narrator’s child, “She wants me to lend her the fare to come and visit me!” (8). If the 
narrator’s aim in writing outside disciplinary history is to overcome that “willful 
blindness” toward the ordinary world around him, as he suspects Newton did in 
abandoning his scholarship, he fails utterly. 
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know the past. In the terms of this questioning, they reflect the period of their publication, 
when modernist historians found their work under attack on multiple and often 
contradictory grounds—as dependent upon philosophically problematic notions of the 
subject/object divide, factuality, and realist narrative (on the part of the postmodernist 
philosophers of history); as too far from Victorian narrative histories with their reassuring 
progress narratives and accessible style (on the part of conservative critics and 
proponents of English heritage); and as ignoring women and reinforcing unexamined 
assumptions regarding gender identity (on the part of the gender historians). Both novels 
participate in a postmodernist epistemological critique by deconstructing faith in the 
disembodied mind, the intellectual above the fray of ordinary life, as the basis of 
historical knowledge and production. Yet, as my readings have suggested, the novels 
exert distinct degrees of force in unsettling the foundations of mainstream historical 
knowledge, in part because of their different understandings of gender and their different 
emotional connections to the past. This chapter concludes with attention to the 
implications of Waterland’s nostalgic critique and especially The Newton Letter’s more 
radical stance toward received forms of knowledge by considering their connections to 
and differences from historians’ scholarly work. 
Although this chapter has foregrounded the differences between Waterland and 
The Newton Letter, their similarities are also relevant to the concerns of this section, 
which begins to ask the larger question at the center of the next and final chapter: how are 
fictional historians’ texts’ historical-epistemological functions related to those of 
disciplinary histories? In outlining the diversity of fictional historians’ texts while tracing 
their common ground of unavoidable embeddedness within contemporary anxieties about 
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historical knowledge and authority, the preceding chapters describe a narrative stance that 
operates in ways distinct from, but potentially complementary to, factual historical 
discourse. And indeed, both The Newton Letter and Waterland use their connection to 
and distance from disciplinary history to position their readers as historians’ readers and 
guide them through historiographic issues, but from a stance that invokes disciplinary 
history as a practice without tying itself to disciplinary procedures. The result is that both 
texts comment upon the production of historical knowledge without the requirement for 
systematic critique. The freedom this narrative stance creates—to speak as though from a 
position both within and outside this authoritative discipline—allows the novels to pick 
up strands of current historiographic work and debates without accepting or rejecting 
them wholesale, and without sorting them into tidy categories. More specifically, these 
two novels use storytelling to dramatize the limitations of a mind or a discourse 
convinced of its own universality and transparency; both thereby imply a reality in which 
all knowledge is situated, and viable knowledges integrate their own embeddedness into 
their accounts. 
But although neither historian can achieve his initial goal of narrating reality more 
clearly by avoiding the reality for which women become metonymies, these failures take 
on fundamentally contradictory meanings in the two novels—contradictory meanings that 
implicate them differently in a rethinking of gender as a force within historical 
knowledge. As I have argued here, Waterland wavers between longing for and inverting 
familiar historiographic values, leaving their essentializing visions of femininity in place; 
The Newton Letter, on the other hand, undermines the conceptual system that links 
women to nature-outside-history, and men to historical reason, in the first place. Far from 
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performing the work of gender history in historicizing gender roles, Waterland serves all 
too well as an illustration of the reification of women and the removal of women from 
history that necessitate this project in the first place. The Newton Letter illustrates the 
conditions against which gender history reacts with greater self-consciousness, itself 
indicating the need for rethinking through its ironic representation of its historian 
narrator. Despite these differences, however, in both cases—and indeed in all the 
fictional historians’ texts treated in this study—because the novels connect to disciplinary 
history primarily through ventriloquizing a practitioner of history, their commentary on 
historical knowledge places the role of the historical knower front and center. 
 In The Newton Letter, this metahistorical emphasis on the producer and 
production of historical discourse (rather than on the discourse itself) is further 
underscored through the figure of Newton. While the proper historical text—the scholarly 
biography of Newton so nearly completed by the narrator—would presumably offer an 
account of Newton’s life and work based upon archival research and situated within 
specialized scholarly debates, the extra-disciplinary form of this novel allows it to 
employ Newton more evocatively. Here, he appears simultaneously as a historical actor, 
as a familiar symbol in the popular historical imagination, and as a projection of the 
narrator’s mind. Through a fictional letter from Newton as well as a historical one, The 
Newton Letter depicts this human symbol of scientific rationality as himself already 
unable to reconcile such rationality with the reality surrounding him: unlike Waterland, it 
avoids an implication that some lost form of knowledge once offered representational 
adequacy, instead connecting the narrator’s late-twentieth-century historical assumptions 
with a masculinist arrogance in Enlightenment science. The novel’s use of Newton 
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facilitates its critique of historical-epistemological confidence by making visible 
Enlightenment science’s influence on modernist historical thought, and by setting not 
only the historian narrator but his scientist subject against a frightening, essentialized 
(and totally imaginary) female sexuality. 
Despite his abandonment of the Newton biography, the Newton Letter narrator 
continues to obsess about this figure of scientific rationality at its birth in the 
Enlightenment. As he distinguishes himself and especially his scholarship from the 
physical and the feminine, the narrator ties himself intimately to the subject of his 
historical work-in-progress; in an increasingly emphatic parallel to “that mad letter 
Newton wrote […] accusing the philosopher out of the blue of […] having tried to 
embroil him with women” (5), The Newton Letter positions itself as a mad letter accusing 
humdrum reality of trying to embroil the narrator with women. This mocked opposition 
between serious scholarship and a femininized world clearly resonates with Smith’s 
history of disciplinary history, according to which an “antimony of body (concerning 
women and everyday life) to spirit (indicating politics) generally resonated through the 
language of professionalization” (138). But, as Smith also notes and as The Newton 
Letter dramatizes with such clarity, a gendered construction of objectivity was not an 
invention of late-nineteenth-century history but rather a borrowing from Enlightenment 
science. Unlike Waterland, where the historical-epistemological difficulties of a violent 
and disordered twentieth century are opposed to the narrative security of an idealized 
past, The Newton Letter thus works to deconstruct the Enlightenment roots of both 
Victorian and modernist historiography. 
 Both The Newton Letter’s use of Newton and its attention to the gendering of 
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knowledge tie it to projects within disciplinary history in the 1980s and later. In 1991, 
when Scott looked back upon recent decades’ developments within the overlapping fields 
of women’s history, feminist history, and gender history she urged historians to consider 
the implications of these approaches upon disciplinary history as a way of knowing: 
The radical threat posed by women’s history lies exactly in [its] challenge 
to established history; women can’t just be added on without a 
fundamental recasting of the terms, standards and assumptions of what has 
passed for objective, neutral and universal history in the past because that 
view of history included in its very definition of itself the exclusion of  
women. (58) 
Feminist historians of science had already launched such a project in the 1980s, with 
publications including Evelyn Fox Keller’s Reflections on Gender and Science (1985) 
and Londa Schiebinger’s The Mind Has No Sex?: Women in the Origins of Modern 
Science (1989); these works analyze the gendered construction of scientific authority 
during science’s period of disciplinization and professionalization and beyond. But 
historical scholarship’s own foundations remained largely unquestioned by historians 
who, as Scott reminds us, were largely preoccupied with making room for women within 
historical narratives and the discipline’s institutions (rather than with attacking history’s 
core values).58 From outside the discipline, however, The Newton Letter foreshadows 
Scott’s “radical threat” by tying its historian narrator’s knowledge to the anxiously 
                                                
58 The history of science, a subfield firmly established within disciplinary history by the 
early twentieth century, set to questioning progress narratives and internalist intellectual 
history much earlier than has the history of historiography; Thomas Kuhn’s influential 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, for instance, appeared in 1962. It is significant 
that, while the history of science has long enjoyed an institutional presence and 
recognition as a subfield within the discipline, the history of historiography has yet to 
develop a comparable legitimacy. Despite a long tradition of historical biographies of 
individual historians, and increasing production of more broadly researched and theorized 
monographs on the discipline’s own past, the absence of such a field of knowledge and 
debate continues to restrict our understanding of this epistemologically—and often 
politically—authoritative way of knowing. 
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masculine knowledge of Isaac Newton. 
Indeed, both Waterland and The Newton Letter join their feminist contemporaries 
in the history of science in suggesting that Enlightenment-born ideals of universality, 
rationality, and objectivity are not at all universal but markedly masculinist. As Keller 
would argue in 1985: 
In sympathy with, and even in response to, the growing division between male 
and female, public and private, work and home, modern science opted for an 
ever greater polarization of mind and nature, reason and feeling, objective and 
subjective; in parallel with the gradual desexualization of women, it offered a 
deanimated, desanctified, and increasingly mechanized conception of nature. 
[…] With [Nature] reduced to its mechanical substrate, and [Woman] to her 
asexual virtue, the essence of Mater could be both tamed and conquered; male  
potency was confirmed. (63-4) 
Such polarization is of course evident in both novels, whose narrators assume the 
conceptual clumps of mind-reason-objectivity-men and nature-feeling-subjectivity-
women. Furthermore, both texts undermine the implied universality of these associations 
by suggesting that this tamed version of Woman/Nature is no longer feasible in their 
postmodern world. Much as both men long for the certainty of male potency as it might 
be affirmed by women whose bodies, actions, and symbolic resonance are easily 
controlled, femininity proves insistently troubling. Tom can never understand, let alone 
control, Mary; the Newton Letter narrator subjects Ottilie to his analytic gaze but, as 
readers perceive all too clearly, has enormous trouble seeing clearly. 
Both novels thus use a gendered dichotomy to present the inadequacy of inherited 
form of historical knowledge to a postmodern perspective—to enact what Brian McIlroy 
describes in The Newton Letter as “the humbling of an intellectual in the face of the 
natural, arbitrary, tragic, disorganized world” (128). But unlike Waterland, The Newton 
Letter suggests not only that reality sometimes takes precedence over historical discourse, 
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but also that women are probably not actually enigmatic anti-historian figures. It hints 
insistently that Ottilie and Charlotte contain more than the narrator’s projections of 
murky particulars and pristine feeling, even if it cannot convey the details of that reality. 
Readers know perfectly well that the narrator is wrong: far from the aristocratic, calm, 
dignified spirit-lady he imagines, for instance, Charlotte is a depressed, medically sedated 
woman struggling with financial problems and Edward’s terminal illness. Because the 
narrator is so clearly unreliable, readers are able to glimpse this ‘real’ Charlotte behind 
his illusions—yet she cannot appear as a full character or become fully available to us 
through his consciousness. Similarly, while we are shown that Ottilie is probably not the 
“semi-animate doll with childlike ways and no name” the narrator first perceives (43), we 
can only see alternative, equally stereotyped, Ottilies as the narrator shifts in his 
perception or creation of this woman. 
What we do see increasingly clearly is the narrator: in his self-absorption, lack of 
feeling or empathy, and anonymity, he is himself closer to that “semi-animate doll with 
childlike ways and no name” than Ottilie. Women in the novel, not allowed to exist 
beyond the narrator’s intellectual and aesthetic projects, function as modes of his own 
self-reflection and self-expression. And while this limitation of perspective prevents the 
text from doing much of the work of women’s and gender history—from telling women’s 
stories and from reconceptualizing gendered relationships and roles as historically 
contingent—it also not only allows but dramatizes a critique of this precise limitation and 
its implications for historical (mis)understanding. Like all fictional historians’ texts, The 
Newton Letter is intensely and inherently metahistorical, focusing on the role of the 
historian rather than on the knowledge produced (and rather than producing historical 
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knowledge). While this novel does not actually historicize gender, it does suggest the 
need for such work. And it suggests it to an extra-disciplinary audience in a performative 
mode that does not require in-depth historical or historiographic knowledge. 
These capacities offer a preliminary answer to the question I raised near the 
beginning of this section: how are fictional historians’ texts’ historical-epistemological 
functions related to those of disciplinary histories? These historically-engaged fictions are 
not just undisciplined, sloppy, or ill-informed histories or philosophies of history. Rather, 
through imaginative performances of historical discourse and of individual historians’ 
voices, they prompt readers to pay attention to the role of the knower in historical 
knowledge. As we can see in the marked contrast between Waterland and The Newton 
Letter, the narrative stance they share can accommodate a wide range of engagements 
with the production of historical knowledge; whereas The Newton Letter cultivates 
skeptical readers, Waterland actually reinforces unexamined assumptions that, from a 
feminist perspective, seriously need deconstructing. Not itself a historiographic-
epistemological position, then, the fictional historian’s text form is a tool that can do the 
work of a number of positions. 
Because their imagined rhetorical situation causes them to foreground and 
historicize historiographic processes, these texts have the potential to translate scholarly 
changes and debates about historical knowledge in ways that can mold and persuade non-
specialist receivers of history. And although some reviewers and scholars reacted with 
horror when historian Simon Schama mingled fiction and history (defined by those 
anxious reviewers as simple opposites) in his 1991 Dead Certainties, the next chapter 
analyzes his interdiscursive employment of fiction in this more specific context of the 
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fictional historian’s text as a technique for shaping and instructing historians’ readers. By 
operating partly in a fictional mode, Dead Certainties does limit itself in its ability to 
construct historical narratives and tell historical truths. But it also thus avails upon the 
fictional historian’s text’s potential to engage extra-disciplinary readers in historiographic 
questions by dramatizing the changing processes of historical knowing. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Narrowing the Modernist Divide: 
Professional Historians, Extra-Disciplinary Readers, and Dead Certainties 
 
 At the 1893 Special Meeting of the Massachusetts Historical Society held in 
memory of Francis Parkman, the Society’s president unveiled a memoir the historian had 
given him in 1868 to be read after his death. In Simon Schama’s 1991 Dead Certainties 
(Unwarranted Speculations), Parkman’s colleagues listen as the president reads out the 
document, which quickly transforms their eager curiosity into distress by turning their 
cherished image of Parkman on its head: 
it became suddenly, dismayingly apparent that the document was indeed 
saturated, even supersaturated, with egotism, not in the least diminished 
(in fact reinforced) by Parkman’s manner of referring to himself in the 
third person. Moreover, what they were listening to, with rapidly 
mounting discomfort, was not history at all but case history. It spoke to 
them of sickness, torments mental and physical, an unceasing, unsparing 
war between body and mind […]. Was this poor tragic figure, crumpled in 
pain and hysteria, the same man whose prose had encompassed the 
American landscape and had made the death of Wolfe a great 
transfiguration? Was this truly Parkman, the historian-as-hero? (44- 
5) 
This memoir is tangential in its relationships to the two historical events that serve as 
focal points for the two parts of Dead Certainties, the 1759 death of General James 
Wolfe and the 1849 murder of George Parkman—Francis Parkman, who wrote the long-
influential account Montcalm and Wolfe, happens also to have been George’s nephew. 
Yet however peripheral in terms of the plots, this connection renders Francis Parkman 
 195 
uniquely central to the text, as the only concrete connection between its two sets of 
narratives. Furthermore, the historian’s memoir not only introduces him as a conflicted 
but brilliant figure, but also raises the most fundamental issues at stake in Dead 
Certainties: the proper stance of the historian, the possible roles of historians’ readers, 
and the ways in which discursive conventions (and violations of them) tend to hide (and 
expose) these historically- and personally-situated factors under the guise of universal 
historical knowledge. 
 This chapter argues that Dead Certainties works to produce more active receivers 
of history—readers who approach historical discourse as historically embedded—by 
systematically drawing attention to the role of the historian in historical knowledge. It 
foregrounds this role on multiple textual levels: though its treatment of Parkman, through 
the narratives’ mixing of historical and fictional discourses, and through Schama’s 
historical and theoretical gestures in the many paratextual elements that accompany these 
narratives. Dead Certainties thus works to cultivate extra-disciplinary readers who 
understand objectivity as an ideal rather than as an unproblematic reality and see 
historical knowledge as bound by individual scholars’ decisions as well as by the inherent 
incompleteness of archival records. In this sense, Dead Certainties fosters an engaged 
rather than a passive audience, not only for itself but for the huge number of popular 
histories, history magazines, historical documentaries, and historical films and fictions so 
voraciously consumed at the time of its publication.59 
                                                
59 This eager consumption of popular historical narratives was shared by Schama’s native 
England and his adopted United States, though it operated with reference to the 
culturally-specific context of English Heritage in the former; the debates over 
postmodernism’s impact on disciplinary history (important to a later section of this 
chapter) were even more transnational. Born and educated in England, Schama moved to 
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 This text and its most negative reviewers share a rhetorical strategy that has taken 
on great significance in the context of this dissertation: they emphasize the position of 
Dead Certainties’s author as a historian. For the text’s critics, its diversions from the 
historical record are particularly disturbing and harmful to historical knowledge because 
of Schama’s status as historian.60 Yet, whereas some historians publish fiction under 
pseudonyms,61 Schama not only publishes under his own name but constantly reminds 
                                                                                                                                            
the United States in 1980 and wrote Dead Certainties in Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
rather than the Cambridge of his university years. Yet Schama has continued contributing 
to the British popular history boom through his work with the BBC, and publishes in the 
popular presses of both countries. This chapter continues the dissertation’s exploration of 
a British historiographic context without treating it in isolation, as Schama constantly 
crosses such national lines—both of scholarly community and of historical subject—in 
his scholarly and his popular work. 
 
60 Diana Solano, for instance, describes Schama as “a professional historian lured by the 
prestige of contemporary literary theory” (233). When Gordon Wood writes that Dead 
Certainties “is an extraordinary book, with important implications for the discipline of 
history, especially because of who Schama is […] a prominent practicing historian” 
(rather than a literary scholar, philosopher of history, or novelist) (12), and when A. J. 
Sherman refers pointedly to Schama as “a well-known historian with a substantial body 
of historical publication to his credit” before describing the text’s inclusion of imagined 
scenes and voices (90), each draws attention to the responsibilities and expectations 
associated with Schama’s status outside the text. Sherman critiques Dead Certainties for 
a “blithe approach to historical writing, which teeters on the brink of infotainment, lies in 
that border area perhaps more appropriate to Norman Mailer or Truman Capote, and 
seems fraught with problems for serious historians”—implying that the same book would 
be far less problematic it if were written by someone outside the discipline (90). In his 
review, Wood is able to refer to “the historian’s responsibility” (16) as though we all 
know and agree about what that is—an assumption considerably less likely to be made 
about a concept such as “the novelist’s responsibility.” 
 
61 Paul Doherty, for instance, long published historical murder mysteries as Vanessa 
Alexander, Anna Apostolou, Michael Clynes, Ann Dukthas, C. L. Grace, and Paul 
Harding, though he now uses only his own name. This option probably gained force 
during nineteenth-century professionalization as historians defined themselves 
increasingly against fiction-writers, even as many of them continued to enjoy and even 
produce novels: for example, Henry Adams published Democracy (1880) anonymously 
and Esther (1884) as Frances Snow Compton. On the other hand, Schama is far from the 
only historian who has chosen to publish fiction under his professional name; nor is he at 
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readers to imagine him as a professional scholar of the past. Like John Fowles’s A 
Maggot, Dead Certainties constructs a historian consciousness through both its peritext 
(the paratexual elements printed alongside the main text) and the body of the text—and 
like A Maggot, this text and its paratext ask readers to take an active part in historical 
interpretation rather than relying solely upon a reliable historian narrator. The implied 
author of Dead Certainties does historians’ work, writing footnotes, narrative, analysis, 
and a bibliographic note, and inserting and captioning images: all of these marginal 
features remind readers to imagine the text’s maker as a historian, keeping visible the 
text’s constructions of authority and authorship. In this case, however, the narrator’s 
status as historian extends outside the printed work into Schama’s biographical existence 
and the epitext that informs the text’s reception.62 Through interviews and reviews as 
well as through the text’s narratives and the paratext’s acknowledgments, footnotes, 
afterword, and other components, the author reminds readers that we are reading a 
historian’s text even as their oddities make it quite clear that Dead Certainties is not a 
proper history. 
 This chapter begins by exploring the text’s use of its two main historian figures, 
Simon Schama and Francis Parkman. Parkman’s simultaneously tangential and central 
position in the text mirrors Schama’s own role, as he speaks an anonymous voice in the 
main narratives but draws attention to his acts of selection, arrangement, interpretation, 
and imagination through paratextual elements. Through a self-consciously 
                                                                                                                                            
all innovative in turning to fiction in an effort to reach a wider audience. It seems that it is 
the conjunction of Schama’s historian status and his performative assault on modernist 
conventions, not his idea that truths about history might be expressed through fiction, that 
strikes some of his colleagues as particularly offensive. 
 
62 As in chapter four, I borrow this terminology from Gérard Genette. 
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unconventional structure, Dead Certainties foregrounds these historians’ roles in 
historical knowledge—in direct contrast with modernist scholarly history’s self-
construction as a transparent way to represent the past. By emphasizing the role of a 
historian’s choices—shaped by their training, values, interests, experiences, and 
personalities—in the construction of a historical account, Dead Certainties asks its non-
specialist audience to become critical receivers of all historical narrative. And as the 
following section asserts, the text simultaneously emphasizes the value and possible role 
of this extra-disciplinary audience in a way that makes a point regarding historians’ 
practices: that modernist historiography has moved too far from a narrative tradition and 
has become too insular in its discursive conventions, neglecting both the literary style and 
the large, public audiences Schama nostalgically remembers in the nineteenth-century 
historians. 
This second section moves outside the text into its epitext, the critical debate that 
retrospectively affects the text’s significance. In the context of modernist historians’ 
anxiety regarding what they perceive as a postmodernist threat to their discipline 
emerging from literary studies and philosophy, Dead Certainties has often been 
appropriated as a symbol for a larger menace breaking into the profession itself rather 
than on its own terms. Even in the popular press, the text’s most virulent critics treat 
Dead Certainties as a manifesto on historical practice—as proposing that scholarly 
historians ought to eschew the line between fiction and factual history. But as my 
readings of Parkman’s and Schama’s roles suggest, the text speaks fundamentally to and 
about extra-disciplinary readers’ interpretive practices. Rather than modeling the crossing 
of the fact/fiction divide as the best or only possible approach to history, it uses that 
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charged divide in a performance that works to bring extra-disciplinary readers closer to 
professional historians (by learning more sophisticated interpretive strategies) and to 
bring professional historians closer to extra-disciplinary readers (by blending modernist 
and pre-modernist historiographic values). 
Although Schama’s and my own projects differ in their approach to literary style, 
this dissertation joins Dead Certainties in envisioning a nonstadial and nonteleological 
history of historical knowledge in which literary texts and techniques can meaningfully 
intervene. The chapter’s—and the dissertation’s—final section reflects upon the marginal 
status of Dead Certainties to this study’s category fictional historians’ texts. I conclude 
by asking what this text can clarify about this label, about the texts analyzed in the 
preceding chapters, and about the possible relationships between historical and literary 
authority, between history’s and fiction’s discourses and truths. Indeed, Dead Certainties 
seems unavoidably to echo the threads of my dissertation as a whole. This common scope 
relies upon the fundamental shared ground of both projects: their interest in the impact of 
disciplinary historical discourse upon extra-disciplinary audiences. 
 
Dramatizing Mediation: The Roles of Parkman and Schama 
 Dead Certainties addresses extra-disciplinary readers largely by performing the 
production of history in a way that constantly foregrounds the historians’ role in the 
construction of a written history. The text frames its historical narratives so deeply within 
a self-conscious historiographic peritext that their telling becomes more central than the 
tales themselves. This section asserts that at a structural level—in its peritext as well as in 
its architectural use of the Parkman figure—Dead Certainties insistently makes historians 
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and their discursive decisions visible, in contrast to the modernist ideal of historical 
discourse as mere/clear mirror held to the past. Schama’s control over the accounts is 
partly established through the emphatic and extensive peritext, whose elements in the 
1992 paperback edition include: the author’s name (accompanied, on the front cover, 
with a reference to his 1989 popular history Citizens), praiseful excerpts from reviews, a 
list of Schama’s other books, a biographical note outlining his credentials, a dedication 
and epigraph, a table of contents, an acknowledgements page—all before the text begins. 
After the narratives of shifting representations of Wolfe’s death and of John Webster’s 
trial for George Parkman’s murder, readers also receive retrospective interpretive 
instructions and modified historiographic conventions in further peritextual elements, 
including the much-cited afterword and a bibliographic essay. The conventionally 
peripheral peritext thus soon takes over as central to the text’s meaning, just as that 
apparently incidental figure Francis Parkman proves the vital connective tissue between 
the two parts of the text. 
The peritext of Dead Certainties is noteworthy both in its echoes of conventional 
historiography and in its manipulation of those echoes; its elements suggest the powerful 
position of the historian by being obviously constructed and thus defamiliarizing. The 
conventions of scholarly historiography tend to marginalize the historian with regard to 
his or her own discourse—for instance, by minimizing first-person pronouns and by 
separating historical procedures and the historian’s perspective into a methodological 
preface and footnotes distinct from the main text. In contrast with this drive to 
transparency, Dead Certainties draws attention to disciplinary conventions and values by 
almost but not quite framing itself like a product of those conventions and values. By 
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denaturalizing such conventions as textual performances, these formal near-misses draw 
attention to the role of the historian who performs them. And in emphasizing the choices 
of the potentially unreliable individual historian, Dead Certainties reminds readers of our 
own responsibility for deciding what to believe. Thus, as Louis P. Masur observes, 
“Schama has shifted the burden from himself to his reader. He has demanded an 
interactive, not a passive reader” (124). The text’s rejection of a familiar conception of 
historians—as objective recorders of the ultimately accessible historical truth—implies a 
shift away from an equally familiar conception of non-historians as passive receivers of 
this unproblematic data. 
Dead Certainties also performs this shift through the order of its textual and 
peritextual components, which violate the traditional order of the parts of a historical text. 
While commentators including Keith Windschuttle and Gertrude Himmelfarb criticize 
the text for mixing fictional and historical modes, it is Schama’s manipulation of 
scholarly historians’ structural expectations that turns this error of fictionalization into a 
full-fledged sin: a methodological preface ought to warn readers of any fictionalization or 
unusual uses of sources before readers encounter them.63 But only after the main 
narratives does Schama address his peculiar methodology and mixture of fiction and fact, 
acknowledging his use of fiction and instructing us as to its meaning:  
  Though these stories may at times appear to observe the discursive  
  conventions of history, they are in fact historical novellas, since some  
                                                
63 Himmelfarb criticizes Schama for “introduc[ing] entirely fictional characters and 
scenes into what might appear to be a conventional work of history […], identifying them 
as ‘pure inventions’ only in an ‘Afterword’” (14); Windschuttle not only complains that 
readers belatedly learn that text includes “what Schama admits are composite assemblies 
from several different documents” but also asserts that “once some of a book of history is 
discovered to be fabricated, the reader can never be sure that it is not all made up” (229-
30). 
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  passages […] are pure inventions, based, however, on what documents  
  suggest. This is not to say, I should emphasise, that I scorn the boundary  
  between fact and fiction. It is merely to imply that even in the most austere  
  scholarly report from the archives, the inventive faculty—selecting,  
  pruning, editing, commenting, interpreting, delivering judgments—is in  
  full play. This is not a naïvely relativist position that insists that the lived  
  past is nothing more than an artificially designed text. (Despite the  
  criticism of dug-in positivists, I know of no thoughtful commentator on  
  historical narrative who seriously advances this view.) But it does accept  
  the rather banal axiom that claims for historical knowledge must always  
  be fatally circumscribed by the character and prejudices of its narrator.  
  (322) 
Angry critics tend to point to the first sentence of this passage, demonstrating in a 
shocked tone that fiction and imagination take a part in the preceding historical accounts. 
But surely any historian reading the text would already have noticed the many passages 
that call attention to themselves as possibly inaccurate in being probably unknowable—
for instance, the detailed description of Governor George Briggs’s sighs, glances, 
emotions, and thoughts as he muses alone in his office (73-88). Rather, the less-often-
quoted sentences after the admission of fictionalization seem considerably more 
important in staking two claims. They explicitly reject ‘naïve relativism’ as a mere straw 
man rather than an actual historical-epistemological position amongst professional 
historians. And they make a large assertion about historical work: “that even […] the 
most austere scholarly report from the archives” involves “selecting, pruning, editing, 
commenting, interpreting, delivering judgments.” By referring to the historian as a 
history’s “narrator,” Schama does not treat histories as fictions; rather, he asks histories’ 
readers to approach their claims as narrated claims rather than as transcribed truths—to 
pay attention to the “discursive conventions of history” which are, as he shows through 
the examples of the preceding narratives, quite manipulable. 
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 Through this skeptical afterword’s retrospective impact on the meaning of the 
narratives, Dead Certainties asks its primarily extra-disciplinary audience to reconsider 
our own reading behavior. The bibliographic essay also contributes to this dynamic; by 
further delineating the narratives’ documentary and imaginative impulses, it too prompts 
us to rethink the interpretive work we performed as we navigated the preceding 
narratives’ blend of factual-seeming accounts, interpretive claims, and passages begging 
the question ‘How does he know that?’ Following these historical accounts, the afterword 
and bibliographic essay prompt readers to feel not only newly conscious of disciplinary 
conventions but also self-conscious of the ways in which we may simply have trusted the 
historian of the narratives to tell us the truth. Situated as they are within an assertively 
unconventional peritext, these narratives are not left to tell stories (whether factual or 
fictional) about the historical past. Instead, the peritext reframes them as performative 
examples through which we might become more active and responsible receivers of 
historical knowledge. 
 This reframing and refocusing—on the production and reception of history rather 
than on historical narratives themselves—also help to clarify the strangely central role of 
Francis Parkman, who holds the text’s two parts together in a way one critic dismisses as 
“only accidental” (Strout 157) and most others overlook entirely. Parkman’s appearance 
dramatizes the role of the historian on another textual level, working with the peritext to 
render this role visible to extra-disciplinary readers. This historian figure also helps to 
historicize Schama and his present-day readers through an implied comparison with this 
earlier historian and his audiences. If Parkman’s histories are significantly the products of 
a nineteenth-century Boston cultural elite and of a man who struggled with physical and 
 204 
emotional challenges, must not Schama’s be similarly tied to a particular perspective? 
And if the gentlemen so distressed by Parkman’s memoir hold a historically-contingent 
understanding of the historian’s proper role and appearance, must not all readers of 
histories? Parkman’s role as the text’s connective tissue again indicates the book’s focus 
on the narrativization and analysis of the past, and especially on the possible roles of the 
historian in those processes, rather than on ‘the past itself.’ 
 The text’s treatment of Parkman dramatizes the point made outright in the 
afterword: an astute reader will remember that historians’ characters, experiences, and 
decisions are always present in historical texts, even when historians work to make 
themselves transparent. It seems to Parkman’s shocked colleagues that he has removed 
all traces of his private self—“this poor tragic figure, crumpled in pain and hysteria” 
(45)—from his histories. But Schama has these gentlemen recognize the potential 
falseness of rhetorical gestures of objectivity, bemoaning the memoir’s “egotism, not in 
the least diminished (in fact reinforced) by Parkman’s manner of referring to himself in 
the third person” (44). Dead Certainties represents Parkman’s suffering as entirely 
relevant to his historical methodology and style; although “there was little on Francis 
Parkman’s written pages to suggest a man stranded at the border of his sanity,” the steps 
he took to continue writing after losing his vision and ability to use a pencil necessarily 
affected his approaches to both research and composition. Schama further suggests that 
Parkman’s sufferings allowed him better to understand Wolfe’s “perseverance and 
fortitude; the punishments of his body; the irritability of his mind; the crazy, agitated 
propulsion of his energies” (64-5). Schama’s Parkman is miserable, unstable, and wildly
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different in public and private, yet these flaws contribute to the writing others find so 
brilliant. 
Both the biographical Schama and the historian implied author of Dead 
Certainties clearly admire Parkman’s historical writings, his “thrilling, beautiful prose” 
(Schama, “Clio” 33). And yet, Schama takes pains to point out what he sees as the 
“compulsions and obsessions that run through the entire tragic [Parkman] dynasty,” 
including both Francis and George (Schama, Dead 323). Not simply a brilliant historian, 
Parkman the person is depicted as struggling to maintain a construct, the figure of 
“Parkman the Historian” (61). This extensive attention to the great historian as a troubled 
human being, combined with admiration for his work and indeed for the remarkable 
physical and mental discipline it took for this broken man to produce quantities of 
beautiful prose, illuminate with greater nuance Schama’s “rather banal axiom that claims 
for historical knowledge must always be fatally circumscribed by the character and 
prejudices of its narrator” (322)—whether of this nineteenth-century “gentleman scholar, 
rose grower and anti-feminist” (41) or of Schama himself. 
 Indeed, not only the figure of Parkman but also this historicization of Parkman’s 
historical work ties together multiple parts of this otherwise diffuse book. In both sets of 
narratives and in the afterword, Dead Certainties situates Parkman and his writings 
firmly in the context of late-nineteenth-century Boston’s intellectual and economic elite. 
It suggests that his colleagues were in need of the epistemological shake-up posed by his 
distasteful memoir, pointing to their naïve faith in “the historian-as-hero” and their 
related confidence that “history if not wholly on their side was at least firmly in their 
custody” (41). Schama represents this sense of superiority as dangerous: “With the 
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Brahmin […] sheltered from the incivilities of modern life, the barbarian hordes—
plutocrats, democrats, Jews in West Roxbury, Irish in South Boston, and especially 
women, loquacious, determined, vexing women—might all be safely relegated to the 
remote horizons of the next century” (40-1). And despite his posthumous boat-rocking, 
Francis Parkman and his depression are depicted as part of the fall of this elite. When 
Schama claims that “The Parkman inheritance—lying at the core of Boston’s own 
ambiguous historical relationship with old England and New England—deeply colours 
both [the Wolfe and Webster] stories” (323), his emphasis on the word historical is 
appropriate to the text’s entire treatment of the Boston (and especially Cambridge) elite 
and of the Parkmans as representatives both of that group and of its decline. 
 In other words, Dead Certainties uses the figure of Parkman to historicize 
scholarly (and specifically historical) authority. In this sense, the larger second part of the 
book is not tangentially but directly related to the first; the point is not merely Francis 
Parkman’s relationship with the murder victim but rather the larger historical-
epistemological context implied by the Webster trial. In considering his own role in the 
trial and ensuing death sentence, Schama’s Governor Briggs feels betrayed by a Harvard 
elite he had admired and trusted. These “Brahmin” are distressingly tied up in a sordid 
crime, in the persons of the accused murderer and Harvard professor Webster and the 
murdered and wealthy George Parkman; they then react to the crime in a way Briggs 
finds distasteful, causing him to wonder, “Had they fallen, the Elect?” (83). In the trial 
itself, part of the defense relies on “that institution whose honour and virtue were really 
on trial […] Mother Harvard” (234-5)—but the defense proves unsuccessful. Schama’s 
analysis of nineteenth-century Boston suggests that the trial occurred at the time of, and 
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was impacted by, a shift in the status of a cultural, economic, and scholarly elite, whose 
authority was quickly becoming questionable and questioned. This historical view of 
cultural and scholarly authority works in a two-way relationship with Schama’s own 
presence in the text as a cultural and scholarly authority; each makes the other more 
visible and more significant. 
 
Dead Certainties and Modernist History 
 Dead Certainties habitually renders the peripheral central by focusing on the role 
of the historian in historical knowledge, reminding readers that historical discourse arises 
out of historically contingent disciplinary and cultural values as well as personal quirks. 
The text thus acts out historical discourse as embedded in an imperfect world and poses a 
challenge to a modernist ideal of absolutely distinct “knower and known, observer and 
observed, subject and object, form and content, and fact [...] and value” (Munslow 
189)—for the benefit of its readers as readers of history. Yet at the same time, Dead 
Certainties also resonates with a critique Schama voices more explicitly in many of his 
other writings: a critique of mainstream disciplinary history in the form of a highly 
professionalized, empiricist, footnote-obsessed, and insular modernism. Critics attack the 
text for threatening disciplinary history as a whole by abandoning the distinction between 
fact and fiction and thus joining with an anarchic postmodernism. But this section claims 
that its real threat lies in Schama’s desire to return to aspects of pre-modernist 
historiography. More specifically, just as Dead Certainties cultivates questioning lay 
readers by foregrounding the position of the historian, it also critiques the practices of 
many professional historians by foregrounding the (potential) role of a popular audience. 
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 More than the other texts discussed in this dissertation, Dead Certainties 
intervenes clearly and explicitly in the historiographic debates of its time: Schama not 
only performs a particular historiographic position through the narratives but also directly 
analyzes it in the following peritextual elements. Furthermore, by virtue of his dual 
position as a university historian and popular television presenter, as well as his ongoing 
contributions to arguments about historical knowledge in the popular press, anything 
Schama writes is necessarily thrown into a context of historiographic debates—about the 
public role of the historian, about the commodification of scholarship, and about the 
relationship between television-worthy narratives and archival evidence. Though Dead 
Certainties avoids the contentious (and often vaguely-employed) term “postmodernism,” 
its claims position the text with reference to modernist historians’ anxieties regarding just 
this perceived threat to their discipline. When the afterword distinguishes amongst its 
own stance, “a naïvely relativist position,” and “dug-in positivis[m]” (322), it clearly 
engages the debate raging over postmodernism and its possible effects on disciplinary 
history. 
 Historians including Himmelfarb, Windschuttle, Linda Colley, A. J. Sherman, 
Lawrence Stone, and Gordon Wood have associated Dead Certainties with literary and/or 
historical postmodernism, often as an example of a troublesome postmodernist blurring 
of the line between fact and fiction. For Himmelfarb, postmodernism in literature 
involves “a denial of the fixity of any ‘text,’ of the authority of the author over the 
interpreter, of any ‘canon’ that ‘privileges’ great books over comic books,” while in 
history it involves “a denial of the fixity of the past, of the reality of the past apart from 
what the historian chooses to make of it, and thus of any objective truth about the past” 
 209 
(14). In chapters one and four, I outline a significantly different understanding of 
postmodernism within historical studies,  but the most vigorous critics of Dead 
Certainties characterize it as postmodernist in terms more resonant with Himmelfarb’s 
than with my own definition.64 It is from this perspective that the fictionalized passages of 
Dead Certainties, often read as just such a rejection “of the reality of the past apart from 
what the historian chooses to make of it,” have incensed commentators. 
 These responses tend to posit Dead Certainties as variously a symptom, portent, 
or symbol of a postmodernism that threatens to destroy the moral and scholarly discipline 
of historians. Wood sees the text as a harbinger of disciplinary disaster, turning a wary 
eye toward my own discipline: “Although historians have scarcely begun to experience 
the kinds of epistemological quarrels that have torn apart the literary disciplines over the 
past decade or so, the signs of change are ominous. And Simon Schama’s new book […] 
is the most portentous of them” (12).65 Sherman extends even further this tendency to 
view Dead Certainties as representative of a larger problem, by positing it as a model for 
future scholarship: 
  Schama’s blending of fact and fiction, his toying with real events to  
  produce what is in his view a more readable, dare one say marketable,  
  product, paves the way for others to play at the same speculative game.  
                                                
64 Yet as the previous section suggests, if Dead Certainties is a postmodernist text as 
Windschuttle, Himmelfarb, and its other most vehement critics assume, it stands as a 
challenge to those modernist historians’ view of postmodernism as dehistoricizing. 
Instead, its drive to historicize historical knowledge supports Linda Hutcheon’s assertion 
that postmodernism “asks us to recall that history and fiction are themselves historical 
terms and that their definitions and interrelations are historically determined and vary 
with time” (105). 
 
65 Wood further suggests that Schama has been led down this dangerous past in part by 
his admitted reading of novels, including an admiration of Jeanette Winterson, Julian 
Barnes, and Penelope Lively; both literary criticism and literature itself threaten proper 
history in their postmodernist manifestations. 
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  But in the hands of those not willing to do the hard archival slog, those  
  incapable of reading and interpreting, say, eighteenth- and nineteenth- 
  century letters and journals, what is to prevent the substantial  
  manipulation of evidence, its refashioning to fit some preexisting thesis, or  
  perhaps its mere exaggeration for the sake of drama? (90) 
Yet, setting aside the issue of whether any methodology could promise useful results in 
lazy and incompetent hands, the previous section suggests that Dead Certainties acts as 
warning to readers more than as model for historians. This distinction also problematizes 
Stone’s already-conflicted assertion that “Schama’s book reveals the perilous chasm 
looming directly ahead of us” (192) and that postmodernism is quite ineffectual in its 
attack, “since nearly everyone, except perhaps Schama, seems to be retreating from this 
position” (193). Moves such as Sherman’s and Stone’s suggest that Dead Certainties—
and even postmodernism in general—function more as straw men than as genuine threats 
in their arguments. 
 As Himmelfarb points out, much postmodernist insight with regard to historical 
knowledge is far from news to historians. She claims: 
  Historians, ancient and modern, have always known what postmodernism  
  professes to have just discovered—that any work of history is vulnerable  
  on three counts: the fallibility and deficiency of the historical record on  
  which it is based; the fallibility and selectivity inherent in the writing of  
  history; and the fallibility and subjectivity of the historian. As long as  
  historians have reflected upon their craft, they have known that the past  
  cannot be recuperated in its totality, if only because the remains of the past  
  are incomplete and are themselves part of the present, so that the past itself  
  is, in this sense, irredeemably present. 
Historians including Himmelfarb herself characterize Dead Certainties as an attack upon 
the heart of disciplinary history in insisting that historical knowledge is situated and 
partial even when the historian strives conscientiously for objectivity and truth. But for 
most historians (again, including Himmelfarb herself), these insights are so obvious as to 
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be trite. Disciplinary history has long operated in terms of scholarly disagreement, 
competing theories, careful awareness of historians’ own preoccupations, and the simple 
but significant limitations imposed through the availability of archival materials, financial 
limits on travel, time constraints on research and writing, and publication opportunities 
influenced by market forces and institutional priorities. This strange double motion—
postmodernism as new menace, postmodernism as old news—suggests that perhaps 
extra-disciplinary audiences are more to the point than are disciplinary procedures, in the 
most negative criticisms of the text as in Dead Certainties itself. After all, familiar 
traditions of school history and popular history do present historical knowledge as 
unquestionable, factual truth and historians’ authority on the past as absolute: as Amy J. 
Elias reminds us, although a linear, one-event-after-another timeline “enormously 
oversimplifies what historians do, […] it does not oversimplify how history is taught. 
Ordinary people in the West tend to learn history this way: as a series of interlocking, 
singular events along a time line that form a pattern and meaningful past” (137-8). Even 
the vast majority of the college-educated minority never experiences history as it is 
taught in graduate seminars and practiced by professional historians, learning it instead as 
transparent content and narrative. Yet the selection of a research topic and questions, the 
very forces that bring scholars to a particular text, interviewee, or archive (not to mention 
research method) in the first place, are based on both personal and disciplinary values. 
Admitting that, as most mainstream historians do, allows conscientious attention to the 
role of the historian’s and the discipline’s historically-situated values in determining what 
counts as legitimate history. But it also undermines an unquestioning belief in the 
authority of the historian as the objective, wise holder of a mirror to the past. 
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 Thus, Dead Certainties does suggest a critique of modernist historical values and 
practices, though not the critique these modernists decry—a critique that would tear 
down any distinction between fact and fiction and discard all historical procedures willy-
nilly. Instead, this text suggests a challenge both less radical and more threatening than 
such an imagined postmodernist upheaval: a critique of the absolute separation between 
professional historians as masters of knowledge, on one hand, and extra-disciplinary 
consumers of that historical knowledge, on the other. Far from a wholesale dismissal of 
historical knowledge, Dead Certainties more modestly encourages readers to entertain 
the idea that a given history may not be as transparent, authoritative, and unmotivated as 
we had always assumed. By breaking the promises of historical discourse, it foregrounds 
the troublesome assumptions we may be tempted to make—that history and fiction are 
easy to tell apart; that history (singular) is the truth (also singular); that historians are 
objective heroes of knowledge rather than individuals with character flaws and hardships, 
as well as self-interested members of a certain class in a certain time and place; that the 
written works of historians are transparent representations of historical truth rather than 
followers of a set of historically-determined conventions. The historians who say ‘we 
don’t need this warning’ may simply be misunderstanding the non-specialist audience of 
Schama’s text, thinking too much through their own particular positions. The historians 
(sometimes the same ones) who say that such texts undermine the authority of historical 
discipline may simply prefer their readers to believe in their ability to provide objective 
and universal historical knowledge, even if the historians themselves know that such faith 
is misguided. 
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 In opposition to such an epistemological divide between authoritative historian 
and passive audience, Schama pushes professional historians and general audiences 
closer together in two ways: by prompting general audiences to perform as more 
sophisticated receivers, and by proposing a shift back to an earlier form of historical 
narrative. In Dead Certainties and elsewhere, Schama refers to history’s past in ways that 
historicize and critique the discipline’s current mainstream practices. Indeed, in many 
passages an epistemologically nostalgic Schama sounds strikingly like his conservative 
critic Windschuttle—except that the latter cites earlier historians to bolster rather than to 
destabilize late-twentieth-century modernism. For Windschuttle: 
  The best reasons for studying the works of the historical canon are those  
  given by John Clive: the great writers show us how history can be a  
  literature that attains the highest form of art. Reading their works provides  
  not only lessons in the form and structure of writing and research but  
  inspiration to ignite the ardour of both readers and writers. Moreover, in  
  showing us what we stand to lose if this endangered discipline is hunted to  
  extinction, the great works [canonical histories] give us not only the  
  grounds to truly value history but the determination needed to hold off all  
  the theoretical and literary interlopers who are now so hungrily stalking in  
  the corridors. (249) 
As examples of “great writers,” Windschuttle cites Edward Gibbon, Thomas Babington 
Macaulay, Thomas Carlyle, Frederic William Maitland, and Alexis de Tocqueville—a 
list not unlike Schama’s in an article published the same year as and highly consonant 
with the values of Dead Certainties. In this article, Schama endorses an essentially late-
Victorian historical approach through a brief history of history’s disciplinization, in 
which he distinguishes between the “storytellers” and the “scientists”; on the side of the 
“storytellers,” Schama cites Jules Michelet, Thomas Carlyle, Thomas Babington 
Macaulay, George Bancroft, William Hickling Prescott, and Francis Parkman himself; as 
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“scientists,” Karl Marx, John Seeley, and William Stubbs (“Clio” 22).66 Like 
Windschuttle, Schama strikes an elegiac note in describing the canonical narrative 
historians: “The thrilling, beautiful prose of the Bostonians—Bancroft, Prescott and 
Parkman—began to gather dust and line the shelves of antiquarian bookstores, where 
they may still be dependably found, neglected giants slumbering within their dark green 
casings of cloth and morocco.” Schama and Windschuttle even share an admiration of 
John Clive, to whose memory Dead Certainties is dedicated. But if both these historians 
aim to redirect their colleagues’ attention to classic models of narrative historiography, 
why does Windschuttle not only slam Schama as the mortal enemy of historical 
discipline but also completely ignore this overlap of interest? 
 Beyond the obvious rhetorical convenience of portraying Schama and Dead 
Certainties as the unambiguous representatives of those postmodernist “theoretical and 
literary interlopers,” another cause of this total differentiation lies in the very different 
schemas through which Windschuttle and Schama seem to imagine the history of 
disciplinary history. Dead Certainties supports Schama’s more straightforward (analytic 
rather than performative) accounts by enacting a layered and nonlinear understanding of 
historical knowledge; it thus promotes a historicized vision of the profession by which he 
                                                
66 Schama recounts history’s professionalization thus: 
 in the third quarter of the [nineteenth] century, as history became an academic  
 discipline, the free companionship between literature and history was deemed by  
 newly founded university departments to be fundamentally unserious. The  
 storytellers were shoved aside by scientists intent on reconstructing from  
 fragments and clues what they insisted would be an empirically verifiable,  
 objectively grounded version of an event, its causes and consequences precisely  
 delineated. […] The power to make a reader live within such vanished moments,  
 to feel for a while the past to be more real, more urgent than the present, was  
 henceforth left to the historical novelists, while the “professionals” got on with  
 “serious work,” the production of a Definitive Explanation for Important Events.  
 (“Clio” 32-3) 
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himself—like Parkman—is necessarily situated within a particularly disciplinary and 
cultural context. To this account, Windschuttle implicitly opposes a teleological 
understanding by which historical discipline has reached a pinnacle of scientific 
objectivity and must not be abandoned or trifled with. Schama’s effort to extend 
historians’ voices outside the discipline and to dramatize historiographic debates for an 
extra-disciplinary audience—his effort to overcome what he sees as modernist history’s 
distance from extradisciplinary audiences—takes place through a combination of 
postmodernist formal innovation and deep formal nostalgia. And this combination simply 
does not make sense in terms of a modernist account of historical knowledge and its 
history. 
 Schama hopes to harness the late-twentieth-century expansion of popular 
history’s audience by returning, however self-consciously and partially, to the Victorian 
narrative tradition in which historians like Macaulay reached incredibly large 
audiences—but instead of launching an argument against such inviting narrative history 
in the popular press at the risk of appearing elitist, many of the text’s critics attack Dead 
Certainties by lumping it together with highly-theorized postmodernist philosophies of 
history and postmodernist fictions so often dismissed as inaccessible. Yet Schama also 
does not simply support a return to a pre-modernist historical approach, let alone affirm 
the status quo by which extra-disciplinary audiences are offered essentially Victorian 
histories (usually by extra-disciplinary writers) while disciplinary historians publish 
modernist histories for each other. Instead, Dead Certainties includes not only admiration 
for and emulation of nineteenth-century historical style but also typically postmodernist 
techniques of formal defamiliarization, rupture in place of continuity, and the questioning 
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of universal rather than situated truths—all of which ask readers to enjoy but actively 
question the book’s engaging narratives. 
 Both explicitly and implicitly, Schama reaches back toward an expansive and 
elegant style while disapproving of the elitism, racism, and sexism of its masters. Even as 
Dead Certainties critiques nineteenth-century historical culture as snobbish and 
restrictive, it also participates in Schama’s project of returning to particular aspects of 
nineteenth-century British and American historical discourse. It also illustrates a larger 
trend within late-twentieth-century British historiography to reach back to a Victorian 
narrative tradition that valued and attracted audiences far beyond professionals in the 
discipline. While Dead Certainties views Francis Parkman critically, for instance, its 
description of his historical writing—his “prodigious craft; his gift of painting in 
paragraphs, of recreating the identities of La Salle and Champlain, Montcalm and Wolfe, 
of tracking their destinies through the forests and river valleys of pristine North America, 
of giving meaning to their lives and deaths” (43)—is lushly admiring. 
 Yet despite this evident appreciation and nostalgia, Schama is careful not to 
recommend a naïve return to the powerful historical approach against which modernism 
established itself during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—just as he is 
careful not to recommend “a naïvely relativist position” in Dead Certainties’ afterword 
(322). He proposes instead a composite form: 
  To emulate, of course, is not to imitate. We shall never write again in their  
  manner and with their rhetorical confidence, nor should we try. The  
  present generation of historians must find its own voice, just as every  
  generation has before it. The narrative tradition is by no means extinct. In  
  work of unimpeachably “professional” historians and scholars—Bernard  
  Bailyn, Jonathan Spence, Eric Foner, James McPherson, William Cronon,  
  Peter Gay—it remains brilliantly vivid. (“Clio” 33) 
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Schama not only proposes a happy combination of “professional” (modernist) standards 
and procedures with a nineteenth-century “narrative tradition” as a theoretical possibility, 
but also describes that combination as an already-lived reality. He thus suggests a 
nonlinear and layered history of historical knowledge. Through its use of the nineteenth-
century “gentleman scholar” Parkman alongside the twentieth-century university 
historian and teledon Schama, Dead Certainties hints at a similar vision of modernist 
historical thought coexisting with historical narrative on a grander scale, and at a similar 
hope that the nineteenth-century tradition may come into its own again even within 
professional historiography. Here, too, Schama’s endorsement is limited. For instance, in 
a passage that clearly invites readers to compare the operations of Dead Certainties and 
of Montcalm and Wolfe, our narrator both admires and bemoans Parkman’s blurring of 
the line between factual history and historical fiction. In Parkman’s work, Schama writes, 
“there were brilliantly fabricated moments, flights of pure fanciful embroidery, stitched 
into the epic. But when he and others could stand back and look at the thing, unfolding 
before them, the marvel of it all was unmistakable” (63). This moment of tension not 
only depicts total return to this earlier tradition as undesirable but also further undermines 
critics’ assumption that Dead Certainties posits its own fictionalizing as a model for 
future histories. 
 When Schama lists the contemporary scholars he does consider sound models for 
historical writing—Bailyn, Spence, Foner, McPherson, Cronon, Gay—the result does 
suggest relativism regarding the distinction between fact and fiction. Rather, by focusing 
on historians who write for both popular and scholarly audiences, Schama implies that 
the storytellers’ narrative tradition stands not only for a prose style that has since gone 
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underground, but also for a lost closeness between historians’ discourse and a broad 
popular audience. Schama’s critics tend to substitute a specific form of historical 
authority and discourse (scientific, modernist, proper history) for all the traditions and 
possibilities of scholarly historical knowledge, assuming rather than arguing that any 
departure from modernist history’s characteristic discursive conventions, its emphasis on 
specialization, and its valuation of a professional rather than non-specialist audience must 
represent a departure from meaningful, non-fictional historical knowledge in toto. But for 
Schama, a viable alternative already exists in the works of the fully-credentialed late-
twentieth-century scholars he lists so approvingly. 
 Schama, in and outside of Dead Certainties, presents these issues of style (“the 
storytellers” vs. “the scientists”) and of audience as directly related—a connection he 
often indicates through a tidy peritextual shorthand, in commentary on and (mis)uses of 
the footnote. This typically modernist peritextual convention was the topic of a lively 
exchange which, though it considerably postdates Dead Certainties, serves efficiently to 
clarify and contextualize the earlier text’s unconventional treatment of the footnote as a 
symbolically-loaded form.67 To Jonathan Thompson’s colorfully-titled article “History 
Just Isn’t What It Used to Be: Schama Slams Academic Historians,” Schama responds: 
I most certainly did not “slam” academic historians in the interview I gave  
                                                
67 Historians footnoted long before nineteenth- and twentieth-century professionalization; 
Gibbon used the form with particular zest. But footnotes as mainstream scholarly 
historians use them today did emerge along with seminars and professional institutions. 
In his history of the footnote, Anthony Grafton describes such a note’s functions thus: “It 
identifies both the primary evidence that guarantees the story’s novelty in substance and 
the secondary works that do not undermine its novelty in form and thesis. By doing so, 
[…] it identifies the work of history in question as the creation of a professional” (5). In 
other words, while eighteenth-century footnotes could pursue literary and stylistic flights 
alongside the main narrative, by Schama’s time they had become marks of scholarly 
procedures and requirements for professional advancement. 
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[…]. In fact, when egged on to say something of this sort, I was at pains to 
say what I believe, namely that we are now in something of a golden age 
of narrative writing and that more history which combines scholarship of 
the highest level with narrative craft is being written than ever before. […] 
Nor (since a leader in your paper took me to task on this) did I say 
anything, or indeed have anything, against footnotes; and in the same 
interview I went out of my way to sing the praises of Gibbon's footnotes, 
which are things of stunning erudition, elegance and mischievous wit.  
(“History” 27) 
Rather than critiquing footnoting across the board, Schama makes fun of the modernist 
spirit of footnote-obsession.68 The two footnotes of Dead Certainties are absurdly, 
assertively random: one offers biographic information regarding the Boston mayor who 
provided for a “Smokers Circle” mentioned completely in passing in the text (79), while 
the other discusses the grandson of Parkman’s brother-in-law, who is himself an 
incidental figure in the narrative (110). Both are so oddly placed and irrelevant to the 
historical accounts that they overtly mock the form. In their small way, these sparse and 
ironic footnotes partake of Schama’s distaste for his discipline’s increasing specialization 
and isolation, in which climate, he quips, “More and more is known about less and less. 
Articles like ‘Labor Relations in the Dutch Margarine Industry 1870-1934’ (History 
Workshop Journal, 1990) have no difficulty in finding a publisher” (“Clio” 30). They 
join in his call for an alternative mode of scholarly writing that would extend historians’ 
knowledge and attention to an audience beyond their discipline, in opposition to the 
                                                
68 Derek S. Linton is certainly correct in writing that not all worthwhile historical research 
lends itself to narrative, that footnotes are not “simply hollow rituals calculated to 
constrain Schama's fertile imagination” but rather “enable the reader to judge the fairness, 
accuracy and reliability of the author,” and that “Without lots of minute research, the 
grand syntheses that Schama cherishes would be impossible” (14). While Schama does 
often dispense with footnotes in writing for a popular audience and tends to mock just 
such important archival groundwork, though, he does not actually represent footnotes as 
so universally offensive as Linton suggests in his response to Schama’s New York Times 
Magazine piece “Clio Has a Problem.” 
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insular conversations that occur in scholarly footnotes desperately attempting to 
differentiate their author’s account from those of previous specialists. 
 Dead Certainties performs self-consciously at the edge of disciplinary 
conventions in order to question the wide gap between mainstream scholarly historians 
and extra-disciplinary receivers of historical narrative. It functions as a historian’s text 
rather than as a proper history, not because Schama cannot distinguish between 
researched historical account and imaginative story but because he objects to the 
contemporary assumption that “proper history” can only include a very specific mode of 
empiricist, scientific, modernist history. And in yet another echo between textual levels, 
we find a historian’s text inside this historian’s text: just as Parkman’s position in the text 
serves to foreground and denaturalize Schama’s, his memoir mirrors the text as a whole. 
Both Parkman and Schama produce alternative accounts that do not fit into the 
expectations of historian readers, and (as Schama surely anticipated even in writing the 
text) both appall those colleagues with their deviations. This comparison suggests yet 
again that Dead Certainties positions itself far more as a warning to naïve readers than as 
a model for historical writing: it is Parkman’s history Montcalm and Wolfe, not this 
painfully personal and self-indulgent historian’s text, that Schama praises here and 
elsewhere. But, like Dead Certainties, the memoir remains important in another way. The 
very existence of this other discourse—and the inability of Parkman’s historian 
colleagues to accept it—perform for readers the necessary interactions between a human 
historian and a historical text, no matter how glossy and self-contained the latter may 
appear in print. 
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Concluding Remarks on (Fictional) Historians’ Texts 
In the preceding chapters, I employ the term fictional historian’s text without 
addressing a point of ambiguity which Dead Certainties helps to make visible: in short, 
does fictional modify historian or text? Each of the novels I have discussed so far—
Orlando, I, Claudius, Claudius the God, A Maggot, The Newton Letter, and Waterland—
is narrated by a fictional or clearly fictionalized historian and operates (at least primarily) 
in a fictional mode. But this chapter focuses on a text that complicates matters on both 
scores: the author of Dead Certainties is in fact a historian and does not distance himself 
from the text’s discourse through a fictional narrator, and the degree to which the text 
operates in a fictional as opposed to a factual mode is a point of critical contention.69 
Although it clearly contains fictional scenes, Dead Certainties is no more a proper novel 
than it is a proper history. Judging from both the body of the text and the peri- and 
epitextual elements that guide our reading of it, the interpretations and arguments put 
forth in this book are to be taken as Schama’s—such that, by Genette’s distinction 
between factual and fictional discourse, the book takes a largely factual stance. In other 
words, readers are given no signals to imagine that this historian narrator is anyone other 
than a textualized version of the historian author himself.70 Unlike the novels explored in 
                                                
69 Martha Tuck Rozett asks, “who decides where the dividing line lies between history 
and fiction? […] Consider […] the case of Dead Certainties (Unwarranted Speculations), 
a fascinating pair of linked historical novellas by the well-known cultural historian Simon 
Schama, whose scholarship has hitherto fallen squarely in the category of non-fiction. 
Dead Certainties was given a Library of Congress "F" classification for history rather 
than a "PS" for American fiction, despite the fact that Schama calls his text ‘a work of 
imagination, not scholarship’” (25). See also Cushing Strout and Diana Solano. 
 
70 I obviously exclude those first-person accounts that are clearly distinct from the rest of 
the narration and whose narrator is a fictional witness—a soldier serving under Wolfe—
rather than a fictional historian. 
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the previous four chapters, Dead Certainties is always-already embedded in a 
historiographic context, by virtue of this historian author—a figure and function 
emphasized, as we have seen, by being mirrored on various levels of the text. 
 Yet even if—or rather because—neither historian nor text proves fictional in any 
straightforward way, Dead Certainties illuminates another feature of fictional historians’ 
texts: that they pose as historians’ texts rather than as proper histories. In each of the 
novels I have so far discussed, a historian consciousness speaks through an unorthodox 
discursive form. It is by speaking historians’ voices but at various angles to their 
discipline—by operating as alternative texts that take the place of or supplement 
disciplinary histories—that all of these texts create spaces in which creative 
historiographic engagements can cross the powerful lines dividing disciplinary and extra-
disciplinary speakers, audiences, and concerns. Dead Certainties occupies a position 
between the discourses of fiction and of professional history, placing itself in a liminal 
space whose very existence poses questions for fiction, history, and the line between 
them. At the same time as it undertakes this project, the text operates under the shadow of 
its historian author; as we have seen, many reviewers are appalled at its diversions from 
the historical record explicitly because of Schama’s status as historian. As such, this 
historian’s text is peculiarly well-placed as a window through which we can revisit 
fictional historians’ texts’ technique of asking historiographic questions through a 
historian narrator. Schama’s use of a (possibly fictional, possibly factual, certainly 
unconventional) historian’s text to question the distance between historians and readers 
underscores the form’s implications in terms of how historical authority does, can, and 
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should operate in extra-disciplinary arenas, and in terms of the actual and possible 
relationships between literary fictions and historical-epistemological critique. 
Like Dead Certainties, this dissertation has explored an intersection of fictional 
and historical ways of knowing and has found those ways of knowing to be both situated 
within and limited by discursive conventions—a condition rendered more visible during 
but by no means limited to the particularly contentious periods I have addressed. But in 
both Dead Certainties and this study, it turns out that such conventions also enable 
productive self-reflection within and dynamic connections between established ways of 
knowing. Schama—and, for that matter, Woolf, Graves, Fowles, Banville, and Swift—
critique particular ways of knowing and telling history through textual performances 
whose mixing of discourses denaturalizes but does not disregard the scholarly and 
aesthetic value of their conventions. By foregrounding the dual function of scholarly 
discourses as they simultaneously convey knowledge and construct their own authority, 
these historians’ texts engage debates within and about disciplinary history in challenging 
but never dismissive ways. 
In other words, despite concerns such as Himmelfarb’s that fictions presuming to 
comment upon history are bound to posit history as simply a form of fiction, fictional 
historians’ texts more often underscore and historicize the precise discursive differences 
between history and fiction. These texts do often criticize the conventions and values of 
particular traditions within disciplinary history—The Newton Letter’s performance of 
modernist objectivity as tied to a limiting and distorting sexism, for instance—and prove 
perfectly capable of misrepresenting those traditions to a popular audience—most notably 
in Graves’s strange appropriation of Rankean modernism. Yet they are not characterized 
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by a wholesale dismissal of disciplinary history’s procedures and authority, let alone of 
historical knowledge as a whole. Instead, in their different ways, each prompts extra-
disciplinary audiences to engage history as a particular, powerful, and meaningful way of 
knowing both the past and ourselves. 
On the other hand, my dissertation is not merely an elaboration of the theoretical 
and practical stance of Dead Certainties. Instead, the preceding chapters chart a 
relationship between fiction and history in which not only history but also fiction 
operates as a legitimate and historically-situated way of knowing, which like history is 
both bound and freed by its own elaborate and variable discursive conventions. Whereas 
the anxious critics discussed in this chapter tend reproachfully to group Dead Certainties 
with postmodernist forms such as historiographic metafiction, Schama’s references to 
literary merit actually support Hayden White’s 1966 complaint: “when many 
contemporary historians speak of the ‘art’ of history, they seem to have in mind a 
conception of art that would admit little more than the nineteenth-century novel as a 
paradigm” (42). In other words, it seems to me that Schama imagines a return not just to 
literary value but to a particular kind of literary value that he fails to historicize—even as 
he prompts readers to view historiographic values as variable and situated. 
This reluctance or inability to historicize not only historical but also literary 
discourse facilitates Schama’s epistemological-aesthetic nostalgia. Beyond preventing a 
nuanced understanding of the relationship between literary and historical values, this one-
sided use of discourse mixing also distinguishes Schama’s historiographic-
epistemological critique from the far more politically- and ethically-engaged one I traced 
through Woolf’s works. It allows Schama to regret in passing the great nineteenth-
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century narrative historians’ distaste for and blindness to “plutocrats, democrats, Jews in 
West Roxbury, Irish in South Boston, and especially women, loquacious, determined, 
vexing women” (41). In this sense, his historians’ text separates literary style and 
authority from inconvenient historical contingencies such as elitism, racism, and 
sexism.71 Here we see a marked contrast with the exchange between history and fiction as 
Woolf presents it. Perhaps because of the intimate proximity of late-Victorian 
historiography to her life and work, and perhaps because of her position as a woman 
concretely affected by that approach’s continuing authority, but also certainly because of 
her lifelong engagement with problems of literary style as well as those of historical 
discourse, Woolf is far more concerned with Victorian narrative traditions’ habits of 
exclusion. What Schama presents as unfortunate but avoidable byproducts of the 
interaction between flawed men and a fundamentally sound set of literary and historical 
conventions, Woolf views as central products of the realist novel and of Victorian 
historiography and biography. In carefully situating literary conventions, historiographic 
conventions, and their interactions, I have attempted to follow Woolf rather than 
Schama—despite what might reasonably be read as a cautionary tale, the fact that 
Woolf’s care left her permanently unable to settle on a satisfactory way to approach or 
abandon the historical past. 
All of these texts narrate historians’ voices beyond the boundaries of their 
discipline. As we have seen, this shared narrative stance prompts each—carefully or 
carelessly, deliberately or reluctantly—to engage its period’s divisive debates over the 
                                                
71 Similarly, Schama sometimes urges a return to the style of the Victorian historians with 
the minor adjustment of setting aside their view of English history as victor’s Grand 
Narrative. See for instance the preface to the first volume of Schama’s History of Britain 
(especially 14-17) and his “Clio Has a Problem.” 
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proper audience of disciplinary history, and over the proper relationship between 
historical discourse and storytelling. But by using the liberties of fiction and by speaking 
at an angle to disciplinary history, fictional historians’ texts need not launch coherent 
arguments or answer all the questions they raise. Rather, like Woolf across her career, 
each of these texts is able to think seriously about history and ask its readers to do the 
same, even if it remains self-consciously unable to resolve the daunting historical-
epistemological problems of its time. By dramatizing these debates for an extra-
disciplinary audience, historians’ texts propose an enticing ideal. In their different ways, 
they strive to fulfill the most compelling promise of Dead Certainties—the cultivation of 
sophisticated and responsible receivers to process the historical narratives flying at us out 
of books, magazines, radios, and now televisions and movie screens as well as from 
behind professors’ desks—while critically engaging the nuances and embeddedness of all 
the discourses that allow them to perform their worlds. 
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